

Proceedings of the
SEVENTH
INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS
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Editor :
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FOREWORD

I hope that this Volume of the Proceedings of the Seventh Session of the Indian philosophical Congress will also be received with favour by the Students and Associations of Philosophy.

It has not been possible for us to print *in extenso* for financial and other reasons all the papers read at the different meetings of the Philosophical Congress. Some of them exceed the limits of the size prescribed and some others were published in other Journals.

I am taking this opportunity of expressing our thanks to professor N. N. Sen Gupta, M. A., Ph. D. (Harvard), who was the Secretary of the Indian Philosophical Congress from its inception till this year. Members of the philosophical Congress know how much this Association owes to his energy and enthusiasm for philosophical studies.

S RADHAKRISHNAN

17th November, 1932.

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SPEECH OF

Mr. Justice T. S. Macpherson,*Chairman of the Reception Committee.*

Ladies and Gentlemen,—I deem it a special privilege that as Chairman of the Reception Committee, it falls to me to welcome to Patna the Indian Philosophical Congress for this, its 7th session.

Patna University congratulates itself that the invitation to meet at Patna which it cordially extended to the Congress a year ago, has been accepted, and trusts that the arrangements made for the reception of the honoured guest will prove satisfactory and that the forthcoming session will be pleasant to the delegates and members and of high advantage alike to them and to all others interested in philosophy both within and beyond India.

The advent of the Congress and its discussions should do much to advance the influence and standing of the philosopher in our midst. Teachers in the University cannot fail to derive profit and encouragement from contact with the leading minds of other Universities. The young and vigorous Patna Philosophical Society whose meetings under enthusiastic leadership have already attracted large audiences, will reap no less benefit. The Congress takes much interest in Indian philosophy which is one of the subjects of study in Arts for the Master's degree in the Patna University and is an alternative course to modern philosophy for the Bachelor's degree.

My own connection with philosophy has, especially in recent years, been rather on the fringe of the subject. After the elementary steps came, as usual, Green, Mill, Berkeley, Spencer, James, Kant but chiefly Ancient Philosophy, and in particular the Republic of Plato and the Psychology, Politics and Ethics

of Aristotle in the original Greek. The next stage was to espouse the daughter of one who is now the oldest Ferguson Scholar in Philosophy. She also being no mean philosopher. Then the busy official's desultory dips into Oriental philosophy. And lastly during the past decade I have watched with special interest the opening out of the minds of my sons through the medium of Creats at Oxford.

Perhaps my views are coloured by the fact that with the younger generation, the study of philosophy was a training for practical affairs. I see no reason to doubt that it is as fine a preparation as any other course of non-professional instruction for the problems with which serious-minded men have to deal. Till times comparatively recent, the popular view seems to have been that "the native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." One recalls Chaucer's charming word-picture of the clerk of Oxenford "that unto logik hadde long i-go" which concludes with a line constituting the finest tribute I know to a teacher; "And gladly wolde he lerne and gladly teche." Chaucer's clerk loved his books:

"For him was lever have at his beddes heed

Twenty bokes clad in black or reed

of Aristotil and his philosophie

of studie took he most care

and most heed

Then robes riche or fithel or gay sawtrie."

Modern Philosophers

Our modern philosophers are not less devoted to books and study and they yield not a whit to their predecessors in grasp or in depth. But so far from being remote from practical concerns, they are among the soundest men of affairs. Here in India, the executive headship of Universities, of other great

educational institutions and of leading businesses is held with conspicuous success by " votaries of the divinity in the innermost shrine " of the temple of Science. Incidentally, it is a special pleasure to welcome so many Vice-Chancellors including the President of the Congress and the General President of the session to Patna on this occasion.

It is hard to see how any apology could be required at any time for a Congress whose aim is the promotion of systematic thought and which embraces both the oriental and the western methods. As to our own perplexing times, the position has recently been thus expressed by 11 distinguished British philosophers: " It is not difficult in the present disorganisation of beliefs in fundamental principles that is manifest in every department of life, to see the need of a cultivation of systematic thought that has the most intimate bearing upon practice."

Local Arrangements

The local arrangements have been in the hands of a large and influential Reception Committee, with a most energetic Working Committee under the convenorship of Mr. D. N. Sen whose tireless labour merits a special meed of appreciation.

Every endeavour has been made to secure the personal comfort of the members of the Congress and any point that may have been inadvertently omitted has only to be brought to the notice of a member of the working Committee to receive immediate attention. As to the intellectual edification of the members and delegates, no apprehension is entertained.

It is remarkable that so frequently in the history of the Indian Philosophical Congress, it has fallen to the Minister for Education to declare open the session of the Congress. On the present occasion, the Committee have been fortunate in securing the Hon'ble Sir Fakhruddin who has presided over

the destinies of education in Bihar and Orissa throughout the entire period of ministerial government, and, if I may be permitted to say so, to the very great advantage of education in all its branches and with universal acceptance. Nothing now remains for me but to request him to declare the Congress open.

OPENING ADDRESS

Sir S. Fakhruddin*Minister of Education, Bihar and Orissa.*

Ladies and Gentlemon,—It gives me great pleasure to meet you on this occasion at the invitation of the Vice-Chancellor. I thank you not only for the honour you have done me by asking me to open the present session of the Congress, but also for the unique opportunity of meeting in this ancient city and within the precincts of this University, representatives of the thought of the West and of the East who have come from long distances at great sacrifice and personal discomfort with the object of offering the results of your investigations into some of the deepest mysteries of life and existence.

Vedantic Ideal

It was said by a provincial Governor on a similar occasion that philosophy was an object of study in the West, but with Indians it is of great political importance. In the East thought passes into action with a startling rapidity and action is sublimated into thought with no less promptitude. It is a wonder how the Vedantic ideal has filtered down into the lowest strata of this country and shaped the lives of the people during long centuries and is still tenaciously holding their imagination and dominating their temperament. It was one great thought, namely, that of moral purification, which supplied the tremendous motive force of the Buddhistic movement under whose spell millions of people still lie charmed and fascinated. That thought is even now making new conquests among the highly civilized nations of the world. In Tibet, China, Corea, Japan, in Ceylon, Burma and Siam it is still a living force in individual lives, communities and nationalities.

Driving Force of Islam

The driving force of Islam was one great all-compelling idea which gave the world a new culture and has been the binding force in many vast organisations. Islam is still alive and flourishing, animated by one powerful ideal which has succeeded in producing a unique brotherhood and is waiting for still further achievements in the future. It is at the same time equally true that the dreamy East has often converted reality into idea and lost all balance of mind in the exuberance of thought and sentiment and moved far away from the wholesome control of experience into dreams and delusions. It has often made us incapable of attaining that balance which comes out of the adjusting of thought to action. When the ordinary facts and pursuits of life become a dream and the world a delusion, the tragic result is the loss of moral and intellectual equilibrium. In the West life has never been thrown out of gear by the exuberance of thought and the result has been a very serious pursuit of trade and commerce and of the deeper scientific investigation of the immediate realities of existence. The Indian Philosophical Congress in which the Eastern and the Western currents meet, will be fruitful in balancing the East and the West and working out a system of thought which will correct their characteristic defects and make them more perfect.

Thought Currents

It is remarkable that European Philosophy rose not in Europe but in Asia in the flourishing maritime colonies of Greece and was subsequently transplanted to Greece itself where it grew luxuriantly and for many centuries inspired European thought and culture. It is also remarkable that problems of philosophy came to be keenly discussed both in India and the Ionic groups near about the seventh century

before Christ, though Indian philosophical movements can be traced to a period one or two centuries earlier. The dominant note of Indian Philosophy was the solution of the problem of reality as embodied in mind; the early beginnings of Greek thought were busy with the search for the primeval and fundamental element in nature. These are still the most distinguishing characteristics of Eastern and Western thought.

The earliest forms of Indian as well as Greek thought both recognise four elements instead of five. All these prove that interchange of ideas between Asia and Europe was possible even in those early days through trade, commerce, travel and diplomatic relations between distant principalities. East and West have from remote antiquity always met and profited not only by mutual exchange of commodities, but also of ideas. Indian thought ultimately penetrated the entire Asiatic continent and Greek philosophy found a new soil to grow in Muslim countries when Greece lost her political existence.

A Welcome Asylum

Greek philosophers found a welcome asylum in Syria and Persia in the early years of the 6th Century A. D. and powerfully stimulated Muslim culture which received a great impetus when Alexandria was taken. As the Mahomedan armies swept over the Mediterranean coast and the standard of Islam was carried to Gibraltar and Spain the philosophical movement grew and spread over the conquered countries. Muslim history records many great names of which two are prominent, viz., Ibn Sina (980-1037 A.D.) and Averroes. The most interesting feature of Ibn Sina's philosophy was the treatment of the problem of the relation between the universal and the particulars, a question which was hotly debated in the scholastic schools. Ibn Sina's conclusion was that the universal existed in the mind of God before the particulars

came into existence and embodied the universal. We still remember with pride the great philosopher Averroes who taught that matter is eternal and evolves from the potential forms inherent in it and is ultimately dependent upon God. The human reason is also immortal and by cultivating it man may enter into union with the Universal Reason.

Cultural Influence

The cultural influence of Greece spread also to the West, to Rome and Syracuse and through Rome to the modern races of Europe. Plato and Aristotle ruled long over the Western mind and are even now potent factors in shaping the thoughts of the people in the far West. It is not for me to trace Greek thought through its many meanderings until the rise of modern European philosophy. I will leave that to you. There are many points of resemblance between Indian and Greek philosophy. Both agree in declaring that thought is the ultimate fact.

European Philosophy

The distinctive characteristic in Modern European philosophy is the stress it lays upon the value of experience as a criterion of reality and the method of the study of experience. It has cleared the weeds in which later European thought became hopelessly entangled and led the way to scientific investigations which have revolutionised our ideas. The West stands face to face with the East the one with the results of the investigations of immediate reality and the other with its intrepid onslaughts upon the profound mystery of life and existence, one with the revelations of scientific analysis and generalisation and the other with the synthetic vision of the reality which lies hidden in its depths.

At the outset there was a violent clash between science and philosophy when modern thought broke away from a sterile

scholasticism. Under the old system thought had become stationary and emulated the gyrations of a whirlpool. But modern science has opened up vistas of reality and greatly enriched thought by its bold generalisations which have revolutionised our ideas about the universe we live in. Western philosophy has been profoundly influenced by the doctrine of evolution and by the more recent theory of relativity. From a static we have passed into a dynamic conception of things. From the idea of finality we have come to a recognition of infinite progress and a growing purpose. From a conception of the absolute separation of body and mind we have come to recognise their close and intimate relationship. From an idea of the ineffaceable distinction of living and dead matter we have come to realise that matter is instinct with movement and thoroughly organised of which life is only a higher and later evolved stage. From the idea of an insuperable barrier between matter and energy, science has led us to a knowledge where the difference ultimately vanishes and everything can be expressed in terms of Energy. Philosophy and Science, each following separately its own methods, have agreed that energy in its widest generalisation embraces everything that moves, feels or thinks. An earlier philosophy had separated mind and matter and placed them in absolute isolation. Now the gap has been bridged and that bridge is Energy.

Philosophy and Life.

Philosophy has a profound significance for life. Men try to understand life in order that they may live better. The system of Indian and Islamic thought are thoroughly pragmatic and arose out of practical needs and if we seek a new light now it is in search of, a formula which will interpret life better and enable us to live better and adjust ourselves more perfectly to our environment. Our political and social ideas

which are rivetting our attention are but fragmentary and give only side views of what the soul of the race really wants. We strive and wait for an illumination which will show us the right way and solve all our problems satisfactorily, which will be the organising principle of our life as a whole.

We are the inheritors of great ideals but these have to be harmonised and welded together into one comprehensive message for the race. Broken lights have done their work in the past, but India now demands an illumination which will bring together the split up colours into one synthetic whole. It is for you to formulate such a message and earn our gratitude.

A Special Significance.

This learned congregation irresistibly sends our minds back to the remote times when Janak, the King of Ancient Mithila used to hold such assemblies and of the discussions which used to take place in his court on the deepest problems of the soul and its relation with the Oversoul. Such reports of these discussions as are still preserved in Indian sacred literature are among the richest treasures of this land. They have not tarnished with the lapse of time but still burn with a bright glow. We still draw from those valuable records thoughts that enrich life and illumine the mysteries of existence. In the sixth century before the birth of Christ, Prince Sidhartha travelled all the way to Rajgriha, which is about 60 miles from this town, in search of teachers who could lead him to the knowledge of the truth which emancipates man from the bonds of the flesh. And not far from the spot where he spent 6 years in austerity and meditation is the famous Bodh Gaya where he received the illumination he sought. Three great assemblies of Buddhist divines took place in this province ; the first at Rajgriha immediately after

Buddha's passing away which collected his sayings and rules of discipline ; the second at Besar, ancient Vaisali, a hundred years after the first meeting, to consider some heresies which had sprung up ; and the third in this city under the auspices of the great Asoka which resulted in an unprecedented revival of the the old faith which was promulgated to distant corners of Asia under royal patronage. We still read the history of those times in stone-cut records of Asoka's proclamations.

Glorious Traditions.

We have laid here in Patna the foundation of a university which when fully developed will be reminiscent of the traditions of Nalanda and Vikramsila both of which flourished in this province and drew students from China and other parts of Asia. A little imagination will carry us back to the glorious traditions under the glamour of which we are meeting and let me hope that this session of the Philosophical Congress will be worthy of the great past which broods over us and that the discussions which will take place in the various sections will be inspired by the spiritual heritage which has been handed down to us. I feel confident that your deliberations will bring a new illumination which will be of great benefit in solving for us the problems of life. I declare the Congress open and wish you every success.

Proceedings of the Seventh Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress

held at Patna, (December, 1931)

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

OF

Professor G. H. LANGLEY

*Vice-Chancellor of Dacca University and President of the
Seventh Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress
held at Patna (1931).*

Before proceeding to the subject of this address I would like to express my deep appreciation of the great honour which the Committee and members of the Indian Philosophical Congress have conferred upon me by inviting me to preside over this annual meeting. I well remember the first annual meeting of this Congress in Calcutta which was presided over by Dr. Rabindranath Tagore and I can assure you that I am very proud and gratified to follow in the line of our great Indian poet and of those distinguished thinkers who have since occupied this important position.

When thinking of a subject for this discourse I admit that I fell into some perplexity. I felt that it is the business of the President to state his views on some fundamental problem of interest to speculative thinkers and at the same time I was aware that we should be inviting, and gladly inviting, to this inaugural meeting many who are not philosophers in the very narrow meaning of that term. I therefore crave your indulgence while I present my views on a subject which appears to me to be of considerable importance at the present time and which I shall endeavour to make of as much general interest as possible.

Many of the leading thinkers and schools of thinkers who have contributed most to the formation of men's views of the universe in modern times have emphasised the reality of "becoming". In describing the fundamental and ultimate character of the Universe they have found such concepts as "evolution" and "duration" most applicable. The tendency is intelligible for it appears to be the result of the advance of science and the growth of democracy, both of which increase man's interest in the actual world and in human experience. On the other hand, many of the greatest thinkers both in the East and in the West, and especially deeply religious minds, have been led to the conclusion that what is ultimately Real is eternal. Many of them hold that progress in the apprehension of Reality is largely a process of lifting the mind from the experience and contemplation of the "temporal" to the "eternal". It may therefore be helpful if I attempt to explain what appears to me to be the relation between the "temporal", or the "spatio-temporal" as I would prefer to call it, and the "eternal" as this is revealed in experience. The method of my inquiry will be empirical and I shall endeavour to indicate the relation as it is present in each grade of existing entities and organisms, beginning with the most simple constituents of the physical world yet known to men of science.

First, then, let us ask what the elementary constituents of matter signify in regard to the relation of the "spatio-temporal" and the "eternal". I do not intend to speculate upon the precise nature of these entities, nor am I competent to do so; but it will suffice if I draw your attention to certain features of their characters and mutual influences. Only a short time ago the ultimate constituents of matter were regarded as hard, impenetrable, unchanging particles, called atoms; but in recent years such conceptions have been entirely abandoned by physicists who now tell us that there is nothing whatever fixed and

unchanging in the ultimate entities that constitute the physical world. Atoms, which for centuries were regarded as simple, have been broken up and they are now known to be systems of positive and negative electric forces which retain their relations because of their mutual influences. Under certain conditions, individual atoms are affected by external forces in such a way as to make them release some of their stored-up energy and they send it forth in radiation, such as the radiation of light which comes to us from the sun. Radiation travels at enormous speeds so that here also there appears to be an absence of all fixity. The electric charges that constitute atoms are called protons and electrons, the former being the name given to the positive and the latter that given to the negative charges. As far as I can gather, the most ultimate constituents of the physical world yet known are the protons and electrons of the atoms and the radiations which in certain circumstances they emit. What then does present knowledge of these constituents signify as to the relation in which we are interested? Both types of constituent at first sight appear to teach that the fundamental fact of the physical world is change, and that it is much more adequately described by concepts such as force and energy than by the concept of matter. But reflection shows that permanence which was formerly associated with the atoms still persists in the laws which govern the changes and that such laws are connected with the forms that characterise the changes of the constituents. I will emphasise the importance of what I have described as 'forms that characterise the changes' by reference to the atom of hydrogen, which is the simplest known, and to radiation. An atom of hydrogen consists of a single proton with its positive charge of electricity, known as the nucleus, and a single electron negatively charged revolving round it in a manner similar to that in which the earth revolves round the sun. Now scientists tell us that the electron of any hydrogen

atom can revolve in one of many orbits which may be at varying although determinate distances from its nucleus. Further they say that the atom is a reservoir of stored-up energy and that the amount of energy it contains depends upon the dimensions of the orbit of its electron. A similar fact is true concerning radiation. Here the amount, or more accurately the 'quantum,' of energy possessed by any form of radiation is dependent upon the frequency of the radiation, that is, the number of vibrations per second, and the number of vibrations is dependent upon the length of the waves. The greater the wave length of any radiation the less the frequency, and therefore the less the energy which it transmits; whereas the smaller the wave length the greater the frequency, and therefore the greater the energy transmitted. This is the importance of the forms which persist through the changes of the simplest constituents of the physical world. They govern the behaviour of these constituents and determine the kind of influence they are able to impart.

I wish to insist upon a further point. It is that the "forms" and the "laws" for the transmission of force or energy with which they are related are pervasive of the physical universe as a whole. The changes of the physical entities in which the laws are manifest belong obviously to particular spaces and particular times, but the laws themselves and the forms with which they are associated cannot be said to belong to any space or to any time. The laws are as it were ready to operate wherever and whenever the necessary conditions exist. This truth is impressed upon us very forcibly by the inquiries of modern astro-physicists. The science of astro-physicists is built on the assumption that the atoms and molecules in the most remote of the heavenly bodies behave in a manner which is analogous to that in which the atoms and molecules behave when observed by a physicist in his laboratory. (Sir Arthur Eddington tells us there is an exact analogy between the wave

equation of an electron and the equitations which explain the action of the remote spiral nebulae). If this were not the case it would not be possible for him to interpret the lines on his spectroscope made by the light of distant stars. But what does this mean? The most distant of the heavenly bodies are hundreds of thousands of light years from the earth, and light travels at the rate of 186,000 miles a second. Now the forms and laws to which we have been referring belong to constituents of the universe so minute that, even if they were hundreds of times bigger than they are, they would still remain invisible with the aid of the most powerful microscope yet made. They belong to a kind of material underworld within the world of sense perception. At the same time they are so universal that they are assumed to have operated in universes incredible distances from our earth and incredible ages before the birth of man.

Let us then try to picture the essential features of the physical world. It is a world in which there are no unchanging entities. Its constituents are centres or transmitters of energy and are all forms of motion. Every constituent is spatially and temporally determined and all its changes belong to particular space-times. It is surrounded by innumerable other constituents that are similar to it in regard to these essential features, and it may be regarded as the direct recipient of influences from the many other constituents in its neighbourhood, and as indirectly affected by other influences from more distant constituents. Under such influences any constituent may change into a different kind of constituent, or it may conserve its form despite movement, or it may even fail in self-conservation and be destroyed. In any case whatever changes take place will be according to law, and the law operating will be related to the form of the constituent in question and will manifest a pervasive power of the universe as a whole. If we wish to find something in the visible world

to represent the minute invisible constituents to which we have been referring, I can think of nothing better than the great systems of heavenly bodies. Let the earth with the moon revolving about it represent an atom of hydrogen, the electron being held in position by the proton somewhat in the same manner as the earth keeps the moon in its orbit by the force of gravitation. Now the earth is related to the sun and the other bodies of the solar system. They are separated by great distances in space, but they are kept in their various positions by the forces which they mutually exert. Beyond the solar system are the stars, many of them possibly being solar systems like our own. They are at incredible distances from us and are themselves separated by immense distances. Yet they radiate influences to our sun and earth to which changes here are due. The sun and the bodies of its system may be taken to represent the neighbouring constituents to our atom, and the stars others that are more distant. The bits of apparently solid matter that we see dissolve before scientific investigation into systems of moving entities separated from each other by intervening spaces but exercising mutual influences. All is change, but the laws of movement and change, for the invisible constituents as for the vast bodies in the heavens, belong to all time and to all space expressing pervasive powers of the universe as a whole.

To sum up, it seems to me to be clear that the constituents of the physical world are forces or movements, or systems of forces or movements, that are uniquely determined by space-time, and which by their mutual influences are ever effecting changes that are so determined. I use the term space-time rather than the separate terms space and time since the spatial and temporal determinations of any moving object are interdependent, just as the space of an express train that leaves Patna for Calcutta, say at 10 p.m., will depend upon the time, 11 p.m. or 11-30 as the case may be, at which a parti-

cular space will be occupied. Despite this, however, all these uniquely determined spatio temporal processes are manifestations of powers that in their operations are pervasive of the immensity of space and of time, and which for this reason belong to no particular space and to no particular time. So far I have not used the term *eternal* in respect to these pervasive powers and forms ; but it seems to me that they are of the kind to which we usually attribute this term, and that when we inquire into the ultimate structure of the physical world we have a vision of the *eternal* carrying on its characteristic function of creating, conserving and changing the beings of time.

II

But to attain a somewhat less inadequate understanding of the relation between the Eternal and the Temporal let us examine this relation as it is manifest in the more complex and higher forms of being, and we will first consider the problem as it concerns organisms. An organism differs from the entities we have been contemplating in that, first, its *form* is a pattern of a much more complex whole which, despite its complexity, functions as a whole and secondly the *form* embodies a principle of development. As regards the organism's complexity it is clear that its form is a complex pattern that includes many subordinate forms and groups of forms. All its members have definite forms ; and, within the members, there are other groups or societies of forms such as the living cells. Then below the living cells are the chemical and physical constituents with their characteristic forms ; and within these constituents are the innumerable invisible molecules and atoms such as we have been attempting to describe. Thus an organism is a very complex form including a whole hierarchy of subordinate forms. Nevertheless, despite its well-nigh inexhaustible complexity, the organism functions as a whole and the activities of its innumerable parts are entirely sub-

ordinated in the unity of its functioning. Further, the form of an organism develops. We identify the embryo, the infant, and the man. And it is clear that the form of the rudimentary organism contains within itself an internal principle of development whereby it is able to utilize influences which it receives for the evolving of its characteristic form, which can be regarded as potential in the embryo.

Now what are we able to learn from living organisms concerning the relation between the Temporal and the Eternal ? There may be those who would tell us that we should not expect to learn from life anything new concerning the powers that pervade the universe as a whole, since life has appeared—comparatively speaking—only recently, and then only in a tiny part of the universe, so tiny indeed that it may be regarded as a speck of dust in regions that extend for hundreds of miles. It may be that scientists are right when they tell us that life first appeared on the earth a few million years ago, and that a few million years is a very brief period of the great history of the physical universe. But be this as it may, hold that the nature of life is such that it is very significant of the character of the fundamental powers of the universe ; and that, despite the limitations of its distribution in space and existence in time, it does connect with the forces operating throughout the entire universe. It is obvious that we must think of living organisms as related to their environments in a manner similar to that in which we thought of the ultimate physical entities as belonging to theirs. Living organisms, like these entities, are constantly receiving influences from their environments ; such influences coming from physical entities like the sun, the air, the earth and the innumerable minute entities they contain, as well as from other organisms in the neighbourhood. These influences are used by the organisms for the maintenance and development of their forms. The changes of living organisms, like the

changes in physical entities, are determinate spatio-temporal processes, but, again like physical entities, they embody principles that are not limited by any space or by any time. In so far as these principles are peculiar to living organisms there is a sense in which they operate only where such organisms exist, but they are truly universal since they always operate wherever and whenever the conditions for their operation are present. Further they connect with the powers pervasive of the entire physical universe: for as we have already indicated they are able to utilize the operations of purely physical entities for the conservation and development of their own forms. Thus living organisms present us with instances of unities or wholes that are, as it were, able to take the universal powers pervasive of the physical universe and to use them for the attainment of ends that are immanent in their own forms.

III

In what has preceded I have attempted to show that our knowledge of various types of being reveals a relation between pervasive powers that must be regarded as eternal and changing entities and organisms that are determined by particular space times. I now wish to draw attention to a fact which to me appears to be most significant. When the higher forms of being emerge and such beings become aware of the entities and organisms from which they receive influences, not only do the powers pervasive of nature operate in them but they are able to co-operate with the eternal powers by directing the modes of their operations and using them for ends which they themselves seek. In illustrating my meaning I will again follow the method of explaining by means of the simplest kind of instance, and I will make use of certain observations in regard to the behaviour of young animals to which Mr. Lloyd Morgan refers.

Suppose a number of chicks immediately after they have emerged from their shells placed in an enclosure covered with tiny objects—some of which are edible and some not edible. Among such objects may be included soft grains of rice, tiny pieces of stone, and small but distasteful insects. At first the chicks peck indiscriminately at all the small objects, but their reaction to the various kinds of objects will be very diverse. Grains of rice will be consumed with apparent zest, but tiny stones will be rejected after they have been taken into the mouth, and small insects will be rejected with obvious disgust. If, however, the chicks are repeatedly placed in similar circumstances it will not be long before decided changes take place in their characteristic behaviour. They will begin to discriminate at sight between the various types of small objects presented. Grains of rice will still be pecked at with apparent zest, but small stones will be rejected at sight unless they are very like grains of rice, and there will be obvious revulsion at sight from the small insects. Now what is the nature of the change that has taken place? For it is obvious that the repetition of the circumstances has resulted in a marked change of characteristic behaviour. It seems that before repetition certain visual sensations were followed by instinctive and natural responses, such as the pecking at the small objects taken into the mouth; and that the bodily and tactile sensations consequent upon this procedure were also followed by instinctive and natural responses, such as the consumption or the rejection of the small objects so taken. But after repetition (and it is important to note that the change only becomes possible in virtue of such repetition) it is clear that similar visual stimuli lead to responses of a different type. The responses to visual stimuli after repetition are such as are appropriate to the tactile and bodily sensations but they occur without the intervention of such sensations. It follows then that the repetition of the stimuli and their appropriate

responses effect important changes, and these changes appear to be due to the fact that the visual stimuli, after "repetition", begin to originate what might be described as "foretastes" of the bodily sensations which would result from the appropriate instinctive responses to visual stimuli before these instinctive responses have time to take place. This being the case, the "foretastes" of the bodily sensations apparently perform similar functions to those which would be performed by the actual sensations, and thus the appropriate responses take place despite the absence of the actual sensations. Further it is evident that these fundamental changes in characteristic behaviour are controlled throughout by the forms of the recipient organisms. The tendency is to repeat responses which are of such a kind that they satisfy some need of the organism, and to eliminate responses that frustrate the satisfaction of such needs.

Let me emphasize the significant feature of this phenomenon. In it we find living organisms beginning, instinctively and unconsciously, to direct the operations of the pervasive powers of Nature and to use them for satisfying ends which they seek. The "foretaste" of bodily effects is the foretaste of a universal. Obviously it is a crude feeling of universal significance and does not include any discriminating analysis of content; nevertheless it refers to that which is universal and not to what is particular. Foretaste is only possible after repetition, and it instinctively presupposes that similar responses to similar stimuli will lead to similar bodily effects. Hence the characteristic behaviour which follows from this assumption. Further it is apparent that by this behaviour the living organism prevents changes within itself resulting from the operation of universal powers that would lead to its dissatisfaction and fosters the operation within itself of other universal powers which lead to its satisfaction, and possibly also to its development. Thus in small measure, and restric-

ted by the operation of innumerable universal powers present in the environment and entirely beyond its control, the little chick, by determining its reactions to certain temporal entities, decides whether certain non-temporal forces are to operate within itself. Later it may be seen that the value of a living being is dependent on the measure in which it is able to co-operate with the Eternal and to participate in the direction of its operations in creating new temporal experience.

IV

We have seen that the behaviour of various types of determinate and particular spatio-temporal processes manifests the operations of forces that are not limited by any space-time but are pervasive of the whole universe. Further we have seen the emergence in living organisms of an awareness of the nature of objects in the environment, which enables such beings to co-operate as it were with the pervasive forces of the Universe and to use these for the attainment of ends which they seek.

I now wish to maintain that the appearance and perfecting of such powers in living beings marks the entrance into the Universe of an order of beings that are not merely sub-ordinated to the processes pervasive of the Universe as a whole but are raised to the great position of being permitted to co-operate with these processes in their work of creating temporal advance in the Universe. By their co-operation such beings are able continually, again under limitations and it may be in small measure, to increase the richness of their own experience and of the experiences of other conscious beings by determining the matter of the ingression (to use a term of Mr. Whitehead) of universal forces into situations with which they are confronted in time. The extent and significance of this new power are seen clearly only in rational beings endowed with the power of appreciating values and we are therefore led to the consideration of the functions of reason and appreciation in this respect.

What then is reason? It seems to me that reason can be described as the power of apprehending those forces to which we have been referring which are operating throughout the space and time of the Universe and of establishing such relations with them that their efficacy can be used for the attainment of ends apprehended by the rational beings themselves. It is important to note that the interest of rational beings is not merely in the pervasive forces of Nature as abstract laws but is also in the modes of their functioning. There is in fact no sense in which the laws can be said to exist apart from their operations in changing temporal events, any more than there is a sense in which a person can be said to exist apart from his characteristic behaviour. It may be that to many it appears that when I talk of rational beings apprehending the forces of the Universe and establishing such relations that these forces operate for the attainment of ends that are apprehended by the rational beings themselves, I am stating a merely speculative principle which has little relation to experience. But this is not the case. I am indeed endeavouring to state a fact of ordinary experience. Take a concrete example. Suppose a village is in danger of being wiped out by some virulent epidemic and those responsible for its administration are desirous of the health of its inhabitants. They call to their aid those who have studied the disease and who are expert in methods of sanitation. These persons presumably have some insight into the laws of Nature that are operating to cause the disastrous conditions and, because of their knowledge, are able to suggest changes that will result in mitigating the effects of the epidemic, if not in eradicating it altogether. Now how are we to explain this change? The experts suggest and the administrators make certain changes in the conditions of the village, that is, in the entities in the space-time environment which they are able to control; and in suggesting and making these changes they are guided by a

knowledge of the relevant universal laws. They do this in order to effect certain ends which they have made their own and which are for the well being of the villagers. This is the limit of their power. If they succeed, and there is no reason why they should not, it will be because certain universal forces over which they have no control begin to operate through the new conditions they have made, and carry out their work of transforming and recreating the conditions of the village and so of effecting the health of the villagers. I could have chosen an illustration from any of the spheres of our activity. The same principles apply when man tackles the problems of industry and agriculture, as well as those of his social, moral and spiritual well-being.

It is for this reason that I have used the term "reason" to describe man's power of apprehending universal principles rather than the term "intelligence." The latter term is commonly applied to the power of analysing precisely observed changes and of making exact statement of principles found to operate. Such analysis and precision of statement are in a measure possible in regard to the more ultimate constituents of inanimate nature, but they are not always possible in dealing with the behaviour and relations of the higher forms of being. We have seen how a young animal may be guided in its reactions to its environment by crude unanalysed "foretastes" of the operations of principles that are universal. In like manner man is often guided by what are commonly described as common-sense principles, which are crude and unanalysed "fore-experiences". But he may also be guided by insight into the nature of things that comes from a finely tuned moral and spiritual nature. Such insight is apprehension of the universally pervasive powers of the universe ; and it may be not only unanalysed but unanalysable, since the relations with which it is concerned are more complex than can be described by the human mind.

This leads to another point of importance. I have attempted to show that the facts with which we are dealing are facts of ordinary experience. While this is true I would like to add that they are also deeply significant facts. From their very nature they compel men, at any rate such as are sensitive, to feel their mystic union with powers that belong to all space and to all time. Despite the fact that man's activities are limited to their minute spheres in space-time, that they are as it were points upon a speck of dust in a universe, extending for thousands of miles, they are humbly conscious of their relation with the eternal forces that create spation-temporal changes and of the high power that has been entrusted to men of co-operating in their beneficent operations.

Before closing this section I would like to add a word in regard to the appreciation of values. I think it will be evident from what has been said that the way in which any human being will fulfil his function of co operating with the operations of universal powers will depend upon the value which he places upon them. Obviously he will not seek to make that possible which he does not think worth while. It is therefore important not only that man has learned to apprehend but that, with the power of apprehension, there has also arisen his power of appreciation. Now there is one feature of appreciation upon which it is necessary to lay some stress. It is that appreciation leads to ideals and that ideals are the directing forces of a man's life. But what are ideals? They are conceptions of ways in which universal forces might operate to create better human experience and a better human environment, but in which such forces are not operating at the present time. In appreciating values man again is interested in concreted values and not in values as mere abstract principles. The objects of his appreciation are not justice and kindness in the abstract but just and kind

men and women. So his ideals have regard not to the forces that pervade the universe merely as universal but to these forces as functioning in creating richer and more satisfying forms of experience. Now as ideals represent forms of experience and conditions that are necessarily not actual, the question may arise as to whether a man is wise in permitting them to regulate his striving. In doing so is he not striving after something that is vain and illusory? I think not, and the question has not so much meaning as appears. For every man who possesses an ideal is drawn by it. He must follow although other motives often interfere with his pursuit. But I hold that the ideals which men conceive and which they must take as guides to action are not illusory. It is true that they do not at present exist. It is true also that they may never be found to exist in the form in which they are conceived. For, after all, we conceive our ideals very dimly and they are being continually transformed as we seek to attain them. But they are founded in the appreciation of experience and they make demands as to what experience should be. I know that it is not possible to prove that what should be, exists; but this can be accepted as an article of faith; and I for one accept it. After all, as philosophers, we know that our belief in the uniformity of nature is a venture of faith. We have never discovered that nature is entirely uniform and it cannot be proved, but the belief regulates our thinking and we accept it. In like manner I am convinced in the reality of the ideal. I believe that the ideal springs from the universe and that the resources of the universe can support it in the sense that they can bring it to pass. This I take it is the demand made by religion as spiritual experience. For the spiritually-minded the ideal exists in God, and he has faith in the possibility of its ultimate attainment since he conceives the process of attainment not as the fruit of his own effort but as a movement in which God is working through him.

V

In conclusion I will endeavour to state briefly the results of this argument and to indicate its significance. I am conscious that it is most hazardous to suggest applications of an argument so general to other problems but I will make the venture.

In the first place it is clear that all knowledge of the eternal or pervasive powers of the universe as a whole is derived from acquaintance with temporal (or rather spatio-temporal) experience and entities. All space-time experience, rightly understood, is a drama revealing the functioning of the Eternal. The changes of the most simple known physical entities manifest the operations of natural laws, living organisms utilize these operations for the development of their characteristic forms, and conscious beings begin to co-operate with the operations of eternal powers and to direct them towards the attainment of ends which they seek. This capacity for directing increases with the development of reason and the power of appreciation, and persons possessing such powers strive to use the pervasive forces of the universe for the attainment of ideals. I hold then that the universal forces and the ideals reside in the Supreme Reality, and that the high calling of man is that he is permitted to co-operate with this Reality in its function of creating richer and more satisfying space-time experience. If you inquire why the Supreme Reality does not carry on its great work of evolving space-time apart from the co-operation of human beings, I am unable to give any reply ; save that this order of the universe does commend itself as being the only order which would evolve the most perfect type of finite spiritual beings.

Secondly, I think it will appear that our way of viewing the relation between the Eternal and the Temporal is contrary to all those modes of thinking that fail to recognize what might be described as the status of the temporal. Many great

thinkers, both in the East and in the West, have held that the Eternal and spiritual transcends the temporal in such manner that the only path to attaining the spiritual is that which leads to retirement from the temporal. But if, as I have maintained, the function of the Eternal is to create, conserve and enrich the temporal, human beings are likely to attain it by entering upon their high calling of co-operating in this great work of regeneration.

Thirdly, the view put forward abolishes every kind of absolute distinction between the "material" and the "spiritual." We have seen that the changes and influences of the simplest known material entities reveal the operations of powers pervasive of the whole universe. We may describe these changes as material if we like, but when the whole universe takes part in creating a change in space-time, it appears to me that the act is very akin to what is spiritual. And certainly when human beings, by their apprehension and appreciation of the laws of the universe, direct the operations of such laws to the attaining of ends they conceive as of value, their acts are spiritual. When, for instance, a physician, through knowledge of the human body and of micro-organisms, works for the extermination of a disease, or a statesman, by knowledge of principles that govern human and international relations, works for greater goodwill among the nations, his actions are spiritual. I admit there are other ends which the spiritually minded seek. They seek the presence of God, but the God whom they seek is the same who is the ground of the principles and ideals of the physician and the statesman.

Finally, it seems to me that this view of the relation between the Eternal and the Temporal is a ground for hope in the present situation. It will I think be agreed that every nation of the world is at the present time confronted with great problems. The nations of the West appear to be in the trough of post-War depression, and Eastern nations to be

suffering the birth pangs of awakening life. All are confronted with problems that more than tax the minds of their greatest men. But the comfort is that our great men, although called to co-operate in the work of regenerating society, have not to depend on their own resources. They are only, by their knowledge of human relations, to create the conditions in which the forces of the Universe can carry on their work. Even this is difficult, as the members of the Round Table Conference must be aware, but it is not impossible. The situation is analogous to that which exists when disease threatens to carry away the inhabitants of a village. Then natural laws are operating for the destruction of individuals, but let those who understand change the conditions and the same forces may begin to promote their health. What the Universe demands (and in this demand it is insistent) is that the discomforting facts of the situation should be fearlessly faced. So it is with the affairs of nations. The ultimate hope is in the eternal resources of the Universe and these are adequate for the work of creating an increasingly rich and satisfying experience. There may be economic depression and shortage of many things, but there is no shortage in these great resources. If we are prepared to confront our difficulties and to make such changes as are necessary in the spatio-temporal processes which we control, the natural, moral, and spiritual forces of the Universe will carry on their regenerating work. Therefore let all who are wise strive to change conditions in such a way that the forces operate for the greatest good of men. And let us also remember the way in which they operate. They create, conserve, evolve, and enrich temporal entities and experiences. They work for the healing of divisions and the overcoming of conflicts by creating progressive advance. Unfortunately, when confronted with difficult situations such as those with which we are familiar, we are so frequently unable to see the larger issues. We concentrate too

often merely upon questions of compromise, thinking of what we have to give up to satisfy other parties to the agreement and regarding it as sheer loss. Fortunately, however, this is a very partial view. Compromise there must be, but the purpose of compromise should be to affect the situation in such a way that the great powers of the Universe can operate for the good of all parties. This must happen whenever, with faith, good men and true face difficult situations with sincerity and single-ness of purpose. By their wisdom and insight they must avoid disaster and bring into being conditions in which, from apparently discordant elements, the spiritual powers pervading the Universe will create new unities making for progress in the attainment of the good.

The Ego-Centric Paradox

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

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Gentlemen, I must begin by thanking you heartily for the great honour you have done me by asking me to preside at the metaphysical section of the Congress. I am grateful to you, however, not simply for the personal honour, but also for the opportunity it has afforded me to present for your consideration a metaphysical theory which has always appeared to me to be of vital importance in philosophy as it relates to a basic position, on the right understanding of which, depends the solution of a number of perplexing philosophical problems. And as my theory has a close affinity with what was propounded and ably defended by an important section of the thinkers of ancient and medieval India, I am glad to be able to associate it with the Indian Philosophical Congress.

It is but common knowledge that the solution of the supreme problem that was formulated in ancient India as well as Greece in the form of a command, namely, Know Thyself, was generally regarded as the *raison d'être* of philosophy. In India specially where life and philosophy were never separated from each other the attainment of the Ultimate Purpose of Existence was made conditional on a right solution of this supreme problem, while all other philosophical discussions owed their value to the light they could throw on the nature of self and the method of self-knowledge. Since the first formulation of the problem Philosophy, both in the East and the West, has thrashed it to almost the last chaff, and consequently any pretension to novelty will certainly betray one's inadequate acquaintance with the history of philosophy. While, however,

admitting that almost all possible avenues of approach to the problem of self have been already explored, I still claim that it is not yet impossible for a modern student to break fresh ground, if not in the capacity of an explorer, yet in that of an humble candle-bearer; and, in view of the importance as well as the difficulty of the problem, even the candle-bearer's office may be of some use for the philosophical pilgrims to the Temple of Truth.

The main difficulties of the problem of self, I have come to believe, have their root in a paradox. That every object of knowledge presupposes a self that knows it is almost a truism which is as clear as it is innocent. Yet this apparently innocent position has latent in it one of the most baffling paradoxes with which thought has ever been confronted. What is the self that is presupposed by every object? How is the knower known? If every object presupposes a self that knows it, should not there be another knower for knowing the first self? These are some of the simple forms in which the ego-centric paradox has been historically formulated, and it has defied the acutest subtlety of dialectical intellect. In its attempt to resolve the paradox, thought has been involved in a series of humiliating subterfuges, and the history of philosophy, in so far as this paradox is concerned, has been the history of more or less disguised prevarications. A full justification of these remarks is not to be expected within the limits of a presidential address; only a few salient points are all that can be touched upon here.

No one, I venture to think, is even in sight of the real problem of self-consciousness who fails to recognise what may be called the centrality of the ego in the knowledge situation. Though man has, like every other thing of the world, a particular origin and history of his own, yet there is a sense in which all the barriers of time and space break down for him in so far as he is connected cognitively with the world as a

whole which evidently includes and goes beyond the limited period and history of his earthly existence. In this sense, though historical through and through, he is the possessor of all eternity and of all reality. This universal attitude of man in the knowledge-situation is an undeniable fact which no theory of self can ignore, irrespective of the divergent metaphysical implications which different theories may have to draw out of it. And it is this universality which confers upon the self what may be analogically called the central function in the economy of the universe. A present fact, a past event, an idea, an instinct, the psychological complexes, the physiological glands—these are all intelligible objects; if any of them had been unintelligible, it would have been as good as nothing for us, for the assertion of its existence would have had no meaning. Now, the most universal conditions of intelligibility are just those laws of thought the validity of which is re-asserted in every attempt to deny their universal application. Though, however, they are primarily laws of thought in so far as thought cannot rest content with anything that contradicts itself, these laws are at the same time the universal features of things inasmuch as every conceivable thing must be a self-consistent unity on pain of reducing itself to nothing. If every finite thing, as Hegel and Bradley, or Nāgārjuna and Śreehaṛṣa have maintained, must ultimately break down somewhere through inner inconsistencies, thought would start on a dialectical procedure till the thing attains stability through self-transcendence, rather than stultify itself by repudiating its own laws. Hence unity is the most universal of the conditions of objectivity, to which must conform everything about which significant assertions can be made. The unity of a thing, however, implies not only self-consistency but also determinateness; that is, it must be a determinate something. Determination, again, involves in its turn relations to things other than itself, and it is through these inter-objective relations

that all objects of thought receive mutual definiteness and clarification.

There is, however, a deeper condition of objectivity than even the relational categories. If it is true that everything must conform to the categories, it is true in a deeper sense that nothing is intelligible which does not exist for a self. Even if it be granted that the world of things exists independently of knowledge, the things must have at least the possibility of entering into the knowledge relation, and as *within* knowledge they exist as objects for a subject or self. In this sense nothing on which we can hold intelligible discourse can exist except in relation to the self that is implied by the knowledge situation. Existence-for-self, therefore, is the *sine qua non* of all things; and there is an important sense in which it is a deeper condition of objectivity than the categories. The latter, though presupposed by every object of thought, can themselves be made objects of reflection through a sort of transcendental abstraction; and in so far as they become objects, the categories themselves presuppose the self as much as the things which they condition. Thus, the self is the deepest of the transcendental conditions of objectivity, and is presupposed by, and consequently overreaches, all distinctions between form and matter, reality and appearance, man and God, mind and matter, and so on. And it is this truth which I intend to express through the centrality of the ego; and, considered in this light, the self may be fitly, though still analogically, called the centre of an indefinite number of concentric circles, each periphery being occupied by one class of objects. It is perhaps clear from this centrality of the self that no theory of self-consciousness can claim to be satisfactory that seeks to resolve the ego-centric paradox by decentralizing the self and thus identifying the real self with one of the objects on the periphery.

To turn now to the problem of self-consciousness. How has philosophy resolved the ego-centric paradox? Two methods are clearly discernible in the history of philosophy, the experimental or the inductive method and the logical or the transcendental method. Of these, the former, on account of its relative simplicity, has found favour with a large circle of contemporary metaphysicians and psychologists, while the latter has yielded important results at the hands of those who are generally known as idealists or transcendentalists. The inductive method, to begin with this, is the method to which are pledged the realist and the pragmatist, the psychologist and the psycho-analyst. 'Experience' is their battle-cry, and consequently no knowledge is supposed to be worth the name that has not stood the test of repeated observations and laboratory experiments. Thus, for example, B. Russell would challenge the truth of a number of traditional notions of philosophy — e. g. the world is a systematic unity, knowledge implies the relation of subject with object, consciousness is an ultimate unanalysable fact—because they are inconsistent with the discoveries of comparative psychology. Similarly, J. B. Watson and his followers would propose to replace the terms consciousness, mental states, mind and the like, by muscular and glandular changes following upon a given stimulus, because the former are supposed to be gratuitous hypotheses for a scientific explanation of human and animal behaviours. Lastly, the discoveries of the psycho-neurotic hospital are supposed to be equally fatal to some of the traditional theories of philosophers about the unity of self or the reality of a pure ego. Neurosis following on unsuccessful repression, the pathological manifestations consequent on excessive introversion, sudden onsets of dissociation, gradual sinking into *dementia præcox*, hypnosis, dreams, and the apparently trifling slips of pen and tongue,—these are some of the hard facts guaranteed by experience and not *a priori* speculations

and mere theories. It is a careful scientific study of these facts alone, it is widely and emphatically claimed, that will ultimately answer the command—Know Thyself.

After what has been said above about the centrality of the ego, it is not at all difficult to detect the common fallacy vitiating all these empirical methods of analysing knowledge in terms of something other than itself. The fallacy is the outcome of an obstinate objective attitude of mind and may be called the fallacy of decentralization of the self which leads to the identification of the true self with the peripheral objects that may consequently be called spurious selves or pseudo-egos. And the fallacy is at least as old as the Nyāya Philosophy of India, which Locke has comparatively recently introduced into western philosophy. The conception of knowledge as a property of a particular class of things in what Alexander has aptly called the democracy of the universe is indissolubly connected with the conception of the cognitive relation as a relation between two determinate entities, one being distinguished from the other by its peculiar attribute or quality. When this mechanical notion is uncritically accepted the result is behaviourism, vitalism, pragmatism, voluntarism or some other so far nameless theories which may identify the self with mind, attention, reason or intellect. And so long as the mechanical conception of the knowledge situation is not abandoned, it matters little which of these pseudo-egos is favoured by a particular thinker, for, the decentralization is complete in any case; and decentralization has implicit in it the germ of materialism. But once the decentralization is there, it has the advantage of effectively disguising the real difficulties of self-consciousness; for then we may be said to know the self in the same way as we know, say, a chair or a table. But the price of the easy victory has always to be paid dearly. For, the mechanical theory has implicit in it the awkward *regressus ad infinitum* which

comes to the surface as soon as the real question is rightly put. When A knows B, each of which has its peculiar property, they must first be distinguished by a self which on that very account cannot be identified with one of the distincts. This latter self, again, being itself a distinct entity, must require another self for which it exists, and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus the birth of an indefinite number of selves or an infinite series of *anuvyavasāyas* has been rightly considered as one of the unanswerable objections to the mechanical theory of knowledge. It might almost be called the hard rock on which every such theory must ultimately be wrecked.

The reason, however, why even an accomplished thinker has to succumb to the simplicity of the mechanical theory of knowledge is that while offering an analysis of knowledge he unwittingly drops himself out of sight and so fails to recognise the unique relation in which he himself stands to the entities which, according to him, are present in the knowledge situation as a whole. When, for instance, knowledge is reduced to a peculiar characteristic of the total process from stimulus to reaction, or when the self is described as the causal nexus among a series of events, it is entirely forgotten that the stimulus, the re-action or the events are intelligible only in so far as his own relation to them is not reducible to any of the relations that may obtain between the stimulus and the re-action, and in so far as he himself is not the causal nexus of events. All these things are intelligible entities for him because they conform to the general conditions of objectivity, and because his own relation to them is different from any inter-objective relation.

The nature of the unique relation between the subject and the object as well as the fundamental defect of identifying the relation of an object to its transcendental conditions with an inter-objective relation may be shown in another way as a transition to the transcendental method of solving the ego-

centric paradox. Self-consistency is the first condition of conceivability, and every conceivable object, therefore, must be a self-consistent unity. But the relation of the object A, for instance, to the law of consistency is certainly not identical with the relation of A to B. Unity is the basis, the very life-blood, of both A and B, as of every other determinate thing. Consequently, the law which is the common basis of A as well as B is related to them in a way entirely different from that in which A is related to B. The former, in fact, is the unique relation of the universal to the particular as distinct from any relation between two particulars. Hence the empiricist's reduction of knowledge to the relation of comprehension between the mental acts and the objects is bound to be inadequate in the long run; and he misses the universal simply because it is not known in the same way as the particular. The experimental method which is deified by him may yield empirical generalizations, but what precisely it cannot give him is the true universal. Yet, without the universal the inductive methods of generalization lose all their meaning, and consequently every attempt to derive the transcendental conditions of knowledge by the inductive method, as in the case of Hume or Mill, is vitiated by *hysteron proteron*.

If the method of discovering the transcendental conditions of knowledge be called the method of transcendental analysis or logical reflexion as distinct from the inductive or experimental method, then these contentions may be summarised as follows. The universal conditions of experience being the basis of all objects that may stand as the subject of significant judgments, they are related to the objects in a different way from that in which objects are related *inter se*. And the inductive method which is the source of our knowledge of the particular is, for that very reason, not competent to establish the universal logical implicates of knowledge, though its own success depends upon the universality of these very logical

principles which it fails to establish. These principles, therefore, are discovered through transcendental analysis of the nature of knowledge, and their universality is proved by the *hysteron proteron* which vitiates every attempt to derive them from experience.

If, then, the experimental method has to be definitely abandoned in discovering the universal logical implicates of knowledge, its bankruptcy is likely to be more pronounced in knowing the ultimate transcendental basis of knowledge, namely, the self for which exist not only the things but even their logical implicates. This leads us naturally to the views of the transcendentalist or idealist whose distinction between the inductive method and transcendental analysis is a very valuable philosophical achievement. The self being the deepest of the conditions of objectivity, the surest way of missing it is to look for it in the wrong direction. Even the logical implicates of experience,—namely, space, time, unity, causality, reciprocity, etc.—are not known in the same way as that in which a particular thing is known. But from the fact that these universal forms of knowledge or experience are not known in the same way as we know, say, a colour or a sound, the stimulus or the re-action, it does not follow that they are not known at all; to conclude so would be worse than a mistake. Only they cannot be known in the same way as we know the particular facts which are laid out according to these universal forms. In other words, the logical implicates are the ultimate forms of thought and existence, and, though unknowable inductively or experimentally, are yet known through transcendental reflexion, and, though abstractions apart from matter, they are still the life-blood of concrete things which are always *formed* matters.

So much being granted, we must consider how these contentions bear on the problem of self consciousness. Existence-for-self, as already urged, is the highest form of objective

existence ; nothing can exist for me which I cannot conceive as existing. In this sense, idea and image, reflex arc and libido, tree and table, quite as much as space and time, unity and causality, end and means, phenomenon and noumenon, must all exist for the self, which on that very account is the centre of the universe. From this, however, the transcendentalist has jumped to the conclusion that self-consciousness is the highest category of thought and existence. If it be granted that existence-for-self is the highest *a priori* form, and if it be further granted that forms are known through transcendental reflexion, though not through the inductive method, it must, he urges, be also granted that the self is known through the same method which yields knowledge to the other universal forms of existence. Post-Kantian Idealism has, thus, sought to solve the ego-centric paradox in a way entirely different from that of empiricism and realism, and the idealistic solution of the paradox stands to this day as the most satisfactory account of self-knowledge. It has staunch advocates not only in England where Hegelianism has come to establish itself as a permanent philosophical tendency, but if is accepted as final also by many accomplished thinkers of contemporary Italy and India, where Hegelianism has very recently penetrated and is still seeking lodgment.

In commenting on the transcendentalist's theory of self, I must begin by emphasising the value of a number of permanent contributions he has made to the understanding of the place of the self in knowledge. These consist mainly in showing that the self is not a substance having knowledge as a property, that knowledge cannot be understood in terms of something other than itself, that all distinctions are within knowledge, that the subject-object relation is unique and is the presupposition of all other relations between objects and objects. These are some of the main principles which form the

core of his insight obtained by a penetrating and strictly logical analysis of knowledge ; and it is only when this valuable insight is distorted under the influence of extra-logical considerations that he forgets the results of an unbiased analysis. And in proportion to the violence done to the logical insight, he makes himself liable to the same fallacy of decentralization of the ego which he has done so much to expose. The self, according to the transcendentalist, exists as one self only as it opposes itself as object, to itself as subject, and yet transcends that opposition. In this sense the self is a concrete unity, a dual unity, or a restored unity, or, again, a transparent identity-in-difference ; and the puzzle of self-consciousness, it is held, is due to our tendency to separate identity and difference. Now, the question that I venture to raise at this place is whether this is a real solution of the ego-centric paradox. That unity-in-difference is the highest form to which every conceivable object of thought must conform may be true, but this by itself does not show that the subject for which such a form exists is itself a unity-in-difference ; in other words, even the distinction between form and matter presupposes the subject which, therefore, cannot be identified with one of the distincts. To do so would be to contradict the principle that the self is the presupposition of all objects of thought or that all distinctions are within knowledge. Again, even supposing that the self is a unity in-difference, it flatly contradicts the assertion that the subject is not a substance, for, such a self has at least the property of being a dual unity as distinct from an undifferentiated or unrestored unity and so far it is analogous to the stone though the latter has another distinguishing attribute, namely, weight. The fact is that nothing which exists by opposing itself to something other than itself can be identified with the central ego for which exist all opposites and all distincts, and which, therefore, is not to be confused with one of them.

That the categories, howsoever different from the things which they condition, are still objects for a subject follows from the centrality of the ego, and it is as illogical to identify the self with a category as to identify it with the nervous system or with the psychological complexes. Yet the identification of the self with the category of unity has been the source of the strength as well as the weakness of the transcendental theories of self-consciousness. The self has been openly claimed to be a logical form by Bonatelli and Varisco of Italy; and in so far as the British Neo-Hegelians are concerned, there seems to be some truth in Pringle-Pattison's remark that they give us the logical ideal in place of a real self. It need not, however, be denied that there is a sense in which self-consciousness is a mediated unity; that is, the consciousness of the self and of the not-self are correlative in so far as it is only in relation to the object determined as the not-self that I am conscious of myself. But my contention is that when the self is thus determined in relation to the not-self, it is just one thing among other things and not the central self for which exist all things and distinctions between things. And it is very significant that even Bosanquet is compelled by these considerations to reject the finality of the idea of subject in so far as it implies the subject-object relation. In fact, such a determined self as is implied in mediated self-consciousness cannot be anything more than what James Ward calls the spiritual self which is but one of the many presentations, and not the self to whom is presented the sensory, the ideational, the personal, or the spiritual self. It is, to adopt a very significant expression of Stout, only one of the presentational doubles or wrappings which mask the real self.

There are, however, transcendentalists who, unlike E. Caird or Dr. Haldar who have been uncompromising supporters of

mediated self-consciousness, appear to have kept more consistently to the centrality of the ego than to the Hegelian tradition. Green's genius, for instance, though nurtured in the transcendental school of Oxford, made a desperate attempt to rise above the short-comings, or rather the back slidings, of British Neo-Hegelianism. *That* the self exists as the basis of all objects of knowledge is certain, but *what* it is positively cannot be known; the only knowledge we have of the self is negative and therefore according to Green, the relations by which, through its action, phenomena are determined are not relations *of* it—not relations by which it is itself determined. Thus while Caird conceives the self as a unity of differences and as a circle of relations in itself, Green is led to describe it as a principle of union which is not one or any number of the relations. Again, while Caird accuses Kant of not seeing the absurdity of the supposition that the synthesis by which the self becomes conscious of itself as an object at the same time hides it from itself, Green accuses Locke of making the absurd attempt to know that which renders knowledge possible as he might know any other object. Thus, Caird saves his theory of a knowable self by decentralizing the ego, but Green attempts to stick to the centrality of the ego and is inevitably landed in agnosticism in so far as the self is concerned. And Caird did not fail to see and deplore this difference between his own position and that of his friend.

In fact, that an unbiassed analysis of knowledge in accordance with the transcendental method must lead to some sort of agnosticism in regard to the self has been clearly seen by Green's critics. The ego in this theory reduces itself to what Balfour calls the bare geometrical point, or, in the words of Pringle-Pattison, the ideal focus. This, however, is not the *reductio ad absurdum* of the transcendental method of analysis, as the critics seem to think. It is rather the result

of an unprejudicial logical enquiry, and is the direct outcome of the centrality of the ego. When the unique relation in which the ego is cognitively connected with the universe as a whole is clearly and consistently realised, the ego cannot but be reduced to a *focus imaginarius*, the limit to which the non-egos point, or the dot on the 'i'. Thus, Bonucci detects agnosticism in Gentile's theory of self as the subject; Stout finds the pure ego of Ward reducing itself to an empty form; and Pringle-Pattison rightly finds Green's ego to be a mere ideal focus. What this agnosticism teaches is *not* that we can lay down logic, as the critics have suggested, for to do so would be to substitute dogmatism and blind faith for philosophy. But what it does teach is that the ego-centric paradox cannot be removed by the logical method, when it is rigorously applied. This negative position, however humiliating for logical thought, is the clearest lesson of logical enquiry itself, and to have shown it was the great merit of Kant in the West and Sankara in India, for which the former has been called the Prussian sceptic and the latter a crypto-Buddhist.

Thus, the real problem of self-consciousness or self-knowledge remains unsolved to the present day. The inductive or psychological method has inevitably led to the decentralization of the self which is wrongly identified with one of the pseudo-egos on the periphery; and the result is that those who have pledged themselves to the inductive method do not even see that there is a problem of self-consciousness at all. The transcendental method, on the other hand, leads, by an inner logic, to the theory of self as a *focus imaginarius*; and in so far as the transcendentalist has succeeded in avoiding this legitimate conclusion from the centrality of the ego which he accepts ungrudgingly, he has done so only by committing the same fallacy which he has himself done so much to explode in the psychological theories.

If, then, both the methods have failed in resolving the ego-centric paradox, it is for the future metaphysicians to discover a third method of solving the supreme problem of self-knowledge, but what that method will be remains yet to be seen.

The Spirit of Indian Philosophy

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The task that awaits one called upon to preside over the Section of Indian Philosophy is by no means enviable. Paradoxically enough, an address of this kind on Indian Philosophy ushers itself as a 'stranger from afar,' and engenders at once an atmosphere of acquired unfamiliarity or academic aloofness. Accordingly, our minds are at a moment's notice switched off with a violent wrench, as it were, along new lines of thought and we seem to enter the dreary lumber-room of antiquated thought-products, or, at least, a museum of antiquities and curios, where we continually miss the warm and breathing beauty of that flesh-bound thinking which our hearts found delightful elsewhere. Besides, what renders the task doubly difficult is the immensity of the scope of Indian Philosophy in reference to which a broad, general survey, of the kind attempted here, is bound to prove rather pointless or vague, and thus fail to do justice to its individuality no less than to its myriad-minded interests. In point of fact 'Indian Philosophy' connotes not merely one department or constituency alongside of others, but an entire dominion in itself; and it is high time that we acknowledged the dominion status which it is, by its very nature, entitled to. But in justifying this higher status, and collaterally the much-prized individuality of Indian Philosophy, one need not go so far as to claim, on its behalf, an awful isolation that even defies comparison with all else. Such an attempt, launched in pursuit of a fancied

superiority, defeats its own end. For in claiming an incomparable eminence for it, its apologists remove it from the only sphere where the superiority in question can, if at all, be substantiated. Indian Philosophy has unduly suffered in the past under the pressure of an embarrassing charity and extravagant enthusiasm on the part of its well-meaning apologists, both at home and abroad. But they would be well advised to remember, that moderation is a virtue that has its efficacy, here as elsewhere. All that this exaggerated sense of the individuality of Indian Philosophy has earned for itself, as it needs must do by way of Nemesis, is a summary dismissal, by every average Historian of Philosophy, as being theology or mythology rather than philosophy. While I believe—and in that belief I yield probably to none—that Indian philosophic thought has, down the course of ages, maintained a well-marked individuality, I do yet think that it need not, and assuredly does not, suffer by comparison and that its individuality is to be assessed at the thought-exchange of the world. It is the early inspiration which I received, during my student days, from one of my revered teachers that has taught me to believe that a study in Indian Philosophy must be either comparative or nothing. The so-called comparative method, which makes out its engrossing concern to be the accentuation of the points of affinity to the utter neglect of the points of divergence between differing systems of thought, Eastern or Western, must have doubtless missed its vocation. It has the effect of bringing down all systems of thought to the dead level of a barren uniformity, and thus stultifying itself under the incidence of that Night 'in which all cows are black.' The enormity of the situation is heightened all the more when the affinities in question are sought to be explained as cases of conscious or unconscious borrowing. Believing as I do in fundamental human unity, I am persuaded to think that every such discovery of close parallelism furnishes just the evidence

needed for a belief of this kind—a unity which, as respecting differences, exhibits itself as a unity in variety, and not as a bare uniformity.

Nor is the task rendered easier by specialising in some select branch of Indian Philosophy, or by tackling some specific problem thereof with a specialist's knowledge and aptitude for research. In a task of this kind a specialised knowledge or training is too apt to act as a handicap rather than an asset. On account of his preoccupation with points of technical interest and the sectional point of view, the specialist is eventually driven to the position of one who cannot see the wood for the trees. A similar fate overtakes the specialist in science when he turns a philosopher. Much of the crude generalisation and wild theorizing that we come across in the philosophical world of to-day is traceable to this source. As a case in point, reference may be made to the growing invasion of Metaphysics by Physics or Mathematical Physics. Time was, when Physics had to beware of Metaphysics, but in view of the indecent haste and extravagant charity with which it has been the fashion, in some quarters of recent philosophical thinking, to court the categories of the special sciences, it is time we sounded the warning:—'Metaphysics! beware of Physics.' Such coquetting of Metaphysics with Physics conduces to the lasting benefit of neither, but ends in the sterilisation of the philosophical impulse. Dazzled by the glamour of a new discovery in the domain of the science—as for example, the doctrine of Relativity in Mathematical Physics—the thinkers of a particular school have not infrequently been seduced into a cosmic expansion and consequent falsification of a principle whose meaning and efficacy lie in its limited application. Like the son of Kish out in search after his father's asses and eventually founding a kingdom, the innocent time-axis, out to demonstrate its necessity over and above the already known three axes of co-ordinates, has in certain

quarters acquired a foundational importance, not at all sought for but thrust upon it. To bring Metaphysics into line with Science is unquestionably a move in the right direction, but to set up, in the name of Metaphysics, absolute claims on behalf of any of the special sciences is a monstrous aberration of philosophic thinking. The crying need of the hour is, accordingly, a 'defence of philosophic doubt' or an academic skepticism, in view of the steady advance of new-fangled categories of the special sciences threatening in the end to swamp the field of metaphysics. The enthusiasts after progress in philosophical research probably proceed upon the principle that it is the early bird that catches the worm; but what they obviously fail to reckon in their enthusiasm is that the cause of philosophical research 'they also serve who only stand and wait.' 'It is not too late in the day to profit by the acceptance, even in its restricted application, of the Hegelian dictum that 'the owl of Minerva takes its flight, only when the shades of night are gathering'

Happily Indian Philosophy has never in any age fallen an easy prey to the Idol of the scientific method or of scientific specialism in the domain of philosophical thought, and a faithful presentation of Indian philosophy must see that it does not succumb to this temptation. Kindred herewith is the danger that proceeds from an intemperate passion for historical scholarship which, instead of keeping within the legitimate bounds of Indology, has invaded the sphere of Indian philosophy. In a dissertation on Indian philosophic thought mere historical, and even philological scholarship, have undoubtedly their respective use. But they are made grotesque, if they are thrust into the forefront and made to do the duty of what a philosophic interpretation of thought-types primarily stands for. In a task of this kind handling of original texts and citation of accredited commentaries have assuredly their proper place, but a philosophic interpreter must at all costs refuse to

remain in the outskirts of Indian philosophy as a mere hewer of texts and drawer of commentaries. Indeed, accumulation of texts is one thing and illumination quite another : where many are the accumulators, only a few are torch bearers. Philosophy, as it has been truly remarked, is largely a question of proportion ; and it is reassuring to note that Hegel saw things in their proper perspective when he observed that 'in thought and particularly in speculative thought, comprehension means something quite different from understanding grammatical sense of the words alone, and also from understanding them in the region of ordinary conception only.' The writers that are lacking in this indispensable qualification of 'comprehension' or 'knowledge of the matter, about which so much ado has been made,' are to be compared, in Hegel's opinion, 'to animals which have listened to all the tones in some music, but to whose senses the unison, the harmony of their tones, has not penetrated.'

To one gifted with this innate sense of 'comprehension,' the spirit of Indian Philosophy becomes all the easier of comprehension. If, as Prof. Whitehead puts it, 'the safest general characterisation of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato,' I should like heartily to endorse the statement and take it as the very text of my discourse—subject of course to the substitution of the word '*Indian*' for European and '*Vedantism*' for 'Plato.' Truly, that is where the heart of India beats ; and it is that devout student of Indian thought, namely, Max Müller who has, by virtue of his invaluable gift of intellectual sympathy, recorded this heart-beat in his well-known verdict that the Vedānta 'is clearly the native philosophy of India.' Indeed, if philosophy is but 'life brought to the focus of self-consciousness, then, there could be no more accurate characterisation of the Vedānta. His concluding reflection, that "with the Hindus, the fundamental ideas of the Vedānta have pervaded the

whole of their literature, have leavened the whole of their language, and form to the present day the common property of the people at large" may further be taken as an excursus on the initial statement. Now, the phrase 'native philosophy' may, for aught we know, easily be paraphrased into the much too complacent assurance that we are all 'born Vedāntists.' If it means no more than that ideas of the Vedānta permeate and enliven the cultural atmosphere in a way in which those of other indigenous systems of thought do not, then the interpretation is clearly beyond challenge. Indeed, it is no senseless exaggeration to say that every Hindu is suckled at the breast of the Vedāntic *ethos*, but it is just possible to gloat upon a mere possibility and thus for ever remain a suckling in the realm of mature philosophic thinking. While it is true that of all persons it is the Hindu that has in him, *ceteris paribus*, the making of a true Vedāntist, it is none the less true that a mere potentiality may be glorified into an actual possession, and thus rendered abortive. In the sphere of intellectual achievements—least of all in that of philosophic pursuits—there is no established law of inheritance whereby one can claim to be a born legatee of a traditional faith; in fact philosophic persuasion, like freedom, can never be made a gift of, it has always to be earned.

That there has gone on steady evolution of Indian thought, culminating in the Vedānta as its *terminus ad quem*, is also the pronounced verdict of *Vijñānabhikṣu*, the classical exponent of the Indian attempt at philosophical synthesis. According to *Vijñānabhikṣu*, three distinct levels or grades may be distinguished in the evolution of Indian philosophical thought—the *Nyāya*, the *Sāṃkhya*, and the *Vedāntic* level of philosophical thinking. On the *Nyāya* level (*bhūmika*) what is established, on the refutation of the *Chārvāka* doctrine of the Soul as the bye-product of Matter, is the distinctness of the individual soul from the body, the senses, and the mind.

The *Sāmkhya* level goes beyond it so far as it holds that the subject is distinct from the cosmic matter of experience and primal source of all, the *Prakṛti* as the equilibrated state of the three Reals or *Guṇas* of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*. Finally emerges the level of the *Vedānta*, at the furthest limit of this process of differentiation, where it comes into full view of the 'truth' of all such differentiation in the non-difference of *Prakṛti* from the principle of subjectivity which is unitary in character—the absolute oneness of Being which is spiritual in essence. According to a more detailed scheme,¹ the systems (*Darśanas*) may be arranged in a *logical order*, the *Nāstika*, the *heretical* or *atheistic* set in three divisions: *Chārvāka*, *Bauddha* and *Jaina*, ascending from a naïve Naturalism or Materialism through a critique which grew more and more subjective and negative and ending in absolute relativism (*Anekāntavāda*); and the *Āstika*, the orthodox or theistic group in three main divisions: the *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika*, the *Sāmkhya-Pātañjala*, and the *Mīmāṃsā* (*Pūrva* and the *Uttara*, the prior and the posterior), ascending from a pluralistic Realism through a Critique of Experience (in the form of *viveka* or logical discrimination) to a Pragmatic or a Rationalistic Absolutism.

Now, it would be nothing short of mid-summer madness to suppose that the Vedāntic absolutism—the doctrine of the oneness of Spiritual being—sprang perfect into existence, like Minerva from the head of Jupiter, and may be found in a full-fledged form in the Hymns of the *Rigveda* which, by common consent, mark the germinal beginnings of Vedāntic thought and culture. While it is true, as a matter of principle, that there is a continuous development of thought from the *Rigveda*, which is but Vedānta in the making, to the *Upanishads* or the *Vedānta* proper, one must not construe this principle of

¹ As worked out by Dr. B. N. Seal in his illuminating *Syllabus of Indian Philosophy*.

thought continuity with a literalness that strikes at the very root of the notion of development. In fact, it is not possible, within the meaning of the law of all development, to have the flower along with the fruit for the simple reason that the decay of the flower is the condition of the appearance of the fruit. The attempt, on the part of those well-meaning apologists of the Vedāntic thought as a whole and in detail, to claim immutable perfection on its behalf is symptomatic of the absolutist's Absolute which, on Bradley's rendering of it, 'has no seasons, but all at once bears its leaves, fruit and blossom.' Nothing is more to the point in this regard than the dictum of the late Prof. Wallace that 'all development is by 'breaks' and yet makes for continuity.'

The genetic study of the Vedānta and of the Systems or *Darśan*'s, in their historical affiliations, unquestionably points to the *Rigveda* as their common philosophic ancestor. Although there is scarcely to be found a more sympathetic expositor of the Hymns than Max Müller, his characterisation of these as 'the babbling of child-humanity,' when read out of its context, may appear to have made no allowances for all the crudity and immaturity that must necessarily appertain to all embryonic existences in a state of gestation. Justified essentially as this estimate is, yet the discerning student of philosophy would discover in this so-called 'babbling' the primeval utterance of those truths 'which we are toiling all our lives to find.' It is no wonder, then, that the average critic in whom this gift of sympathetic understanding is conspicuous by its absence will discover in the *Rigveda* nothing but the symptoms of a low and degenerate type of civilisation—in which the entire gamut of animism, spiritism, ancestor-worship and the like is traversed, along with the constant concomitance of a prevailing polytheism, bringing in their train the worst form of sacerdotalism and priestly tyranny. But the fact remains that despite the child-like naïveté characterising most

of the Hymns, they do, for the most part, reveal a philosophical frame of mind in 'those obstinate questionings of sense and outward things' that sooner or later press upon the mind, alike in the history of the individual and of the race. Distracted by innumerable demands on his allegiance to the gods of the Vedic pantheon, the Rigvedic thinker in a mood of sceptical despair has insistently harped on the strain—"*Kasmai Devāya havishā vidhema*"? "To what God shall we offer our oblation?" One need not be anxious for a defence of 'philosophic doubt' as expressed herein; nor need it be construed as a 'Hymn to the Unknown God' together with the Pauline associations as found in the *Acts*. Is it not that doubt which paralyses all enquiry at the start, but is, strictly speaking, a methodological doubt which, as the indispensable prelude to all inquiry, has everywhere proved so fruitful in the service of a philosophic construction. Viewed in its proper perspective, it stands at the cross-ways of two divergent trends of thought. It heralds, on the one hand, 'the twilight of the gods' in a far more radical sense than what Nietzsche could have understood by the phrase in question, and on the other, the dawning of a new era of philosophic earnestness which at once revealed the main drift and crowning achievement of Rigvedic speculation. The effort at philosophic comprehension of the diversity of experience—which is typical of this celebrated Hymn—at once admits its author into the ranks of philosophic thinkers of all ages and of all climes. Take, for example, the beautiful line—"*yasya chkāyāmṛtam yasya mṛtyuk*" or "(the being) whose shadow is immortality as well as mortality (*i.e.* deity and humanity)—which impresses as much by the elegance of its expression as by the depth of insight, and we cannot help admiring the first fruits of the effort after comprehension.

The prolific myth-making of the *Rigveda* has often been made a target of attack by its critics. For better or for worse,

the first flutter of the new-fledged philosophic impulse on the Indian soil clothed itself in poetry of unending charm, with an abundance of myths, as the machinery just meant for the purpose, standing to the credit of a fertile imagination or creative phantasy, native to the soil. This characteristic of early Indian speculation, by no means uncommon in the history of speculative thought in other lands, attests *inter alia* the truth of Vico's dictum that 'poetry is the first operation of the human mind.' Now, no one need be apologetic for the poetic or mythical representation of philosophical doctrines as systematically carried out in the *Rigveda*. Even the purists among dialecticians, while labelling the myths of Plato as mere lacunæ or lapses in his otherwise rigorous logic, have yet to acknowledge that there is in all of these a rich kernel of truth concealed under what is mere myth. The relation of the two, viewed in a time-perspective may be pithily expressed by saying that the myth is but truth in the making. There is, however, no denying the fact that a poetic or mythical representation of philosophical doctrines at the present day would at once be tabooed as being a matter of historical anachronism. Even Plato refers in the *Republic* (Bk. X) to an 'old feud between poetry and philosophy' and condones the 'noble untruth' of poetry and the imitative arts in general in so far as they tend to lead one astray from the strict pursuit of truth. The so-called 'feud' to which he refers is an interesting study in psycho-analysis. It is only an objectification of a crisis in his mental history precipitated by a growing conflict between the two fundamental tendencies of his nature. For, it is no mere exaggeration to say that Plato was primarily and temperamentally a poet, but a philosopher by profession. When, therefore, he was ordaining the exile of the poets from the ideal Republic, he did not know—such was the irony of the situation—that he was signing the warrant of his own extradition from the Ideal State. Indeed, much of the authority that attaches to Plato's

pronouncements on the 'first truths' is due to the dual rôle in which he appears, and the double voice with which he speaks. It is Plato, the poet, that conceived or had the vision of the world of Ideas or archetypal Forms; it is Plato, the philosopher, that sought to justify the 'vision' with regard to the things of sensible experience. Accordingly, the poetic or mythical presentation of the Hymns of the *Rigveda* has nothing *prima facie* to invalidate their truth-claim.

It is not merely as a stepping-stone or prelude to what was destined to crystallize later as the Spiritualistic absolutism of Vedāntic thought, but within the frontiers of the *Rigveda* itself, we notice no less than three well-recognised strata or levels of speculative thought—namely, Naturalistic polytheism, Spiritualistic monotheism and Speculative or Agnostic monism. Even this tripartite division fails to do justice to Rigvedic speculation, and, for the matter of that, to Indian thought and culture as a whole. There may, roughly speaking be distinguished six stages in the history of human civilisation and culture, and it is usual to reckon six stages in the development of a philosophical doctrine or thought-type, the second half recapitulating the first half on a higher plane and thus constituting what has been aptly called the method of spiral progress.² The first in the original (first) half is the Magic stage which invariably expresses itself in social instinct and postulates embodied in rituals. The second is the Myth stage in which the ingained mythopœic activity of the race bursts forth in the form of myth, folklore, beast fables, etc. The third is the Symbol stage which evinces a growing maturity in symbolization and sublimation of myth and ritual. Now, the fourth stage in the series (which is but the reproduction of the first on a higher plane in this spiral of progress), is the stage of Dogma manifesting itself in varying degrees of conceptual abstraction—in

² *Vide* the illuminating notes on this point in Dr. B. N. Seal's 'Syllabus' already referred to above.

pictorial imagination, in *vorstellung* and in creeds. The fifth is the stage of Rationalisation proper with its elaboration and perfection of the conceptual apparatus in the form of Critique and Dialectic—of *Pārvapakṣa*, *Uttarapakṣa*, and *Siddhānta*. The sixth and final stage in the series is the stage not of θεωρία merely, but of πράξις, of *sādhana* or realisation. Applying this formula to the famous doctrine of *Karma* and its evolution in the history of Indian Culture we have the following series. The first stage is that of *Yajña karma* as ritual drawing its inspiration from the instinct of continued personal existence or will-to live and expressing itself in ritualistic performances for heaven (*svarga*), and from the instinct of race-preservation and manifesting itself in rituals for fertilization, fecundity, or race-multiplication. The germinal beginning of this law of *Karma* makes itself felt also, in this very first stage, as certain *saṁskāras*, family and tribal customs, as sacraments and the like. The second is the stage of myth-formation which crystallizes as the myth of the double path of *prayāṇa* (outward journey) and of *punarāvṛtti* (return journey), of Heaven and Hell and the like—pointing unmistakably to what is known as the doctrine of the transmigration of souls or metempsychosis. The third stage in the evolution of the law of *Karma* is that of symbolization or sublimation of *Yajñas*, *Tapas*, *Samśkāras*, as rituals—such as we have in the different Upanishads, and the Gītā. The fourth stage which marks the beginning of conceptual formulation naturally expresses itself in the Dogma of *Karma* conceived as a Law along with the entire paraphernalia of *saṁchīta* and *prārabdha*, accumulated and initiated, *Karma* together with the idea of a cyclical existence. The fifth stage is that of Moral causation and its dialectic revealing itself in a code of injunctions and prohibitions (*vidhinishedhau*), *niyoga* or injunction being the ground of *Karma*. It is on this stage that a rational enquiry into the relation between *karma* as

Law and free-will of man and *karma* and *Īśvara* or Moral Governor of the universe, is fully envisaged. The sixth and final stage in the development of the law of *Karma* is the emergence of the notion of value (*purushārtha*) intrinsic and instrumental, of *πραξις* and *Sādhana*, and of the relation of the Way of *karma* (*karmamārga*) to the *Summum Bonum* (*Paramapurushārtha*) and Redemption (*Moksha*) as a final release from the domination of the inexorable Laws of *Karma*.

Reviewing the growth of *Rigvedic* speculation as a whole and its importance for all subsequent thought in general, and of the *Vedānta* in particular, one may justly observe that the significance of the *Rigveda* in the making of the *Vedānta* lies not so much in any positive contribution towards it, but in preparing the field for the reception of the *Vedānta*. Although the main lines, on which Indian thought was destined to develop hereafter, lie prefigured herein, the value of the *Rigveda* is to be measured by what it aspired to be and was not in actuality. It begins with that infantile wonder, and its native hue of creative phantasy, which is not, as yet, 'sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought.' Later, reflective thought supervenes and seeks to introduce system and order into the reign of riotous fancy and lawless myth-making. Once criticism is aroused, the mongrel method of allegorizing is steadily on the wane until the repugnant elements in the patched up unity break asunder and dissipate it altogether. Before the noon-day glory of the achievements of reflective thought, the twilight of mythopœic activity does admittedly pale away into insignificance, and thus all its findings are safely relegated to a forgotten chapter in the history of human search after truth. Nevertheless the *Rigveda*, with all its backwardness, may truly be said to have succeeded in what it seems to have failed in : its twilight of god-making and allegorizing eagerly anticipates the dawn of a new intellectual era. Its failure, if it is to be called at all by that name, is but

a triumph's evidence—an evidence of the perpetual urge of reflective thought in the eternal quest after truth. In this long and arduous pilgrimage, the truth-seeker is too apt to be deterred on the way-side by alluring allegories and myths masquerading as philosophic truths. Accordingly, in the making of the Vedānta no prayer is more to the point than the one that has gone forth from the heart of *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad*:—
 “The face of truth is covered up by a shining disk; that do thou, O Sun God, remove so that the true essence of Being may be revealed.”

Now, the whole point in referring to the Vedānta as the acknowledged *terminus* or end, indicating the high-water mark of Indian philosophical thought, is to force into prominence the philosophic import of the category of End—which is but the insight that the end is not the final stage of a process of development that merely succeeds or supersedes its predecessors, but is the informing spirit of the whole, distilled, as it were, into its successive phases, all and sundry. Hence, the End in its interpretative function is as much operative at the beginning as at the *de facto* end of anything. Verily, the first shall be last and the last shall be first! This is precisely what the Aristotelian *telos* implies on a judicious rendering of it. Premising, therefore, that the Vedānta is just the focal point where a vast range of thought gathers itself up into internality and epitomises itself, we place ourselves at the *πύκνω* of Indian philosophy wherefrom alone it is possible to command a synoptic view of the whole. Barring the few heretical schools, what all the other schools of Indian philosophy unite in enforcing is the message of the autonomy of the Spirit—that spiritual freedom which is born of ‘self-recognition.’ To know and to be free—this has been the message of all alike; and, as the orthodox schools will add, to know in a corporate as well as individual capacity, to know in the company of seers handing on the torch of enlightenment from age to age, and to bring

that corporate wisdom to a luminous personal focus. Such a knowledge alone can have a redemptive grace in itself. This is clearly the message that sits enthroned in its majestic simplicity at the heart of the *Vedānta*, and has at all times its ready appeal for those that have ears to hear. There is hardly any serious student of the *Vedānta* who has not felt the direct impact and edifying influence of the well-known passage in the *Īśopāniṣad* where the mighty seer of old, bathed in the full-orbed splendour of the life-giving message, exclaims with an invocation to the Sun as the very symbol in the world without of that greatness or sublimity which is the soul's all own : "O thou all-sustaining, solitary, all-controlling Sun, descended from the Lord of all beings, do restrain and centralise all thy streaks of light that I may behold thy blissful countenance ;—forsooth, I am the very Being that abides in thee." Assuredly, this is a pregnant utterance of unique historical importance and charged with epoch-making significance for the entire history of Indian thought and culture. But evidently more is meant here than meets the ear ; and it was reserved for the illustrious Saṃkarāchāryya to rise equal to the height of this great argument and to give the exact bearings of this historic pronouncement. Quite in keeping with the underlying spirit of the utterance, Saṃkarāchāryya has voiced in unmistakable accents what was left unvoiced, but none the less clearly suggested. He avoids, on the one hand, the aberrations of devotionism which imports a 'feeling of absolute dependence' up to the liminal intensity of a 'creature-consciousness' and, on the other, he steers clear of egotism which, by a misplaced emphasis easily slips into the egotism that is at the farthest remove from the attitude of worship itself. Proceeding thus he brings to light the edifying implications of the cult of spiritual worship when he sums up his comments in the forceful words : " Moreover, I do neither beg of thee in the manner of a slave " (*kiñcha, aham na tu tvām bhṛtyavadyūché*).

Cryptic and negative as it is in formulation, the statement is clearly symptomatic of a radical change in outlook. Figuring as the dividing line between the Rigvedic and the Upanishadic age, the change in question bespeaks a momentous influence in the history of Indian religion and culture—a spiritual Renaissance in ancient India that compares, not unfavourably with the no less significant transition from the bondage of the Leviticus unto the freedom of the Gospels. What is specially noteworthy in this spiritual awakening is that there is no more of that paralysing spectacle of the human worshipper being awed into submission—no more of coaxing and cajoling, petitioning and propitiating beings, supposed to possess benevolent as well as malevolent impulses. In place of stupefying admiration that thrives by working upon the baser instincts of man—fear of retribution and hope of reward—one has here that elevating trust in the spiritual dignity of man which is the best ministration to religious worship. ‘Fear of the Lord,’ as it has been truly observed, ‘is the beginning of all wisdom.’ But it is only the *beginning*—and neither the end nor the essence of wisdom. The cult of spiritual worship must necessarily be in a minor key where man shrinks into the comparatively insignificant position of a bare point on the circumference, bereft of the central importance he is by nature entitled to. On the contrary, a cosmic expansion of the soul of the worshipper, an identification of it with the Spirit behind this mighty frame of nature, is the surest way to kindle those higher emotions and aspirations that possess the specific flavour of worship. The atmosphere of spiritual freedom, which the Vedānta at least breathes, does not come within the range of the cheap criticism that it means no more than that there is freedom outside the prison-house—a gospel that ‘comforts while it mocks’ those that lie imprisoned. It is, truly, a gospel of freedom that greets even those brows that languish behind the prison-

bars, provided they would enter into a conscious participation in a birth-right that is eternally theirs. The orient light that once shone forth still shines undimmed with the passage of time that makes history; and the voice that once was heard, hushed as it is to eternal silence, still cries out from its own ashes: "Seek ye first this freedom of the spirit and then all else shall be added unto you!"

While discussing the ideal of a free man's worship in *Vedānta*, one is inevitably reminded of the nature of 'a free man's worship' as understood by Mr. Bertrand Russell. Strangely enough there is not merely verbal similarity but remarkable doctrinal affinity between the two up to a certain point, beyond which there is a complete parting of ways. Both begin by emphasising the primary need of the emancipation of intellect from 'interest' or 'desire,' its 'last prison-house.' The free man, in Mr. Russell's view, is to be freed from 'sick men's dreams,' such as rewards in heaven and the like, and thus qualified for the ministration in question. Indeed a relentless rejection of all petty private interests, and the cultivation of a temper of judicial neutrality must undoubtedly be put in the forefront as being an essential pre-requisite for a votary of truth; for, these alone have the efficacy of purifying the intellect, and predisposing it in such a way as to make it a fit recipient of truth. That is just the reason why, among other pre-requisites, the renunciation of all self-centred interests and apathy towards enjoyment of the fruits of one's actions, whether here on earth or hereafter in the life to come (*ihāmutraphala bhogavirāgaḥ*) is demanded of the student of the *Vedānta*. By way of justifying, as it were, this initial injunction, Śaṅkarācāryya observes to the following effect: "If men's inclinations were not regulated, establishment of truth would be impossible on account of endless diversity in their power of apprehension." Then, again, both are firmly lodged in the 'subjective' or 'parochial' character

of moral or practical life which is rooted in the distinction between good and evil, and they discover the essence of wisdom or spiritual freedom in that 'contemplative life' which, as a distinctly 'higher good than that of action' goes 'beyond good and evil.' Accordingly what Mr. Russell recommends is 'that the elimination of ethical considerations from philosophy is both scientifically necessary and—though this may seem a paradox—an ethical advance.' The Vedānta would readily acquiesce in this position but with a difference of emphasis. Although, the *Mundaka Upanishad* (III. i. 3) lays down that 'the wise before entering into the taintless, supreme, unitive life, leave behind them all good and evil,' the Vedānta does not subscribe to an unqualified rejection or 'elimination of ethical considerations,'—no matter if such elimination be construed an 'ethical advance.' The Vedānta does not go in for such 'advanced' views on the subject and prefers to rest in a sublimation rather than elimination—as clearly evidenced by the verdict of the *Bhagavadgītā* (XV. 15) that 'the entire practical or moral life finds its consummation or fulfilment in the theoretical.'

Now, as to their respective divergence. The freeing of the intellect from 'desire,' its 'last prison-house,' is, admittedly, a salutary prescription so far as it goes, but one has to see that it does not go too far, and end by throwing away the babe along with the bath. In carrying out this purificatory rite, one stands in danger of making a holocaust of the abiding or permanent interests of life—in a word, the values, along with the changing or ephemeral interests—and thus carrying the process beyond the saturation-point of a total indifferentism. Such is, indeed, 'a free man's worship,' which, in the phraseology of Mr. Russell, represents the typical outlook of a 'weary but unyielding Atlas'—with its faith pinned to what he expresses with the force of an epigram, 'the gospel of unyielding despair.' It may have an 'austere beauty' to recommend itself; but its austerity turns out, on closer

inspection, to be mere 'sham heroism' and its beauty only a borrowed glory. There is surely no heroism in renouncing things which a man has no right to renounce; nor is there any moral grandeur about a martyrdom that is as gratuitous as it is foolhardy. Indeed, if we care to read between the lines of a 'free man's worship'—without allowing ourselves to be carried away by its insidious rhetoric—we cannot fail to detect in it a morbid passion for passionlessness, a sentimental yearning after martyrdom for its own sake, which has neither sanity nor seemliness about it. 'But if martyrdom is to be proclaimed as a gospel for man, it must be more than courageous; it must be in the best sense wise and profitable.' There is at least no justification for the sorry exhibition, and that in the name of intellectual honesty and scientific disinterestedness, of that spirit of bravado that lies on the surface of the gospel of 'unyielding despair.' There is no doubt a species of courage that is born of despair. But bravery is one thing and bravado quite another. There is, accordingly, more sanity in the counsel "Because thou must not dream, thou needst not then despair!"

Moreover, the 'gospel of unyielding despair' is but a sad travesty of what man has, during the ages past, understood by religious faith and worship. Indeed, it is only by straining the resources of language that this phrase can be made to serve as the keynote of a free man's worship. Truly, it is neither deserving of the name of '*worship*' nor that of a '*free man*.' On the one hand the 'proud defiance' labelled on its face is at the farthest remove from the attitude of worship; on the other, a stupefying admiration for, and a craven submission to, an 'unconscious power,' trampling on our cherished ideals, give the lie direct to the spirit of '*worship*,' and that of a '*free man*.' In point of fact, the gospel of 'unyielding despair' is not the gospel of a '*free man*,' but of a bond-slave, enchained like Prometheus to the bedrock of naturalism,

For, what is exactly missing here is that Promethean spark that can by a miracle, as it were, transform the gospel of 'unyielding despair' into an evangel of elevating hope—a hope that has potency enough to re-create itself out of its own wreck. The fear of relentless matter rolling along—and, as the psycho analyst will assert, the proud defiance is but the paralysing fear turned inside out—may faithfully reflect the scientific temper, but it is conducive neither to intellectual honesty, nor religious edification. Summarily speaking, the sense of being overwhelmed and paralysed into submission by an unconscious, albeit stupendous, power and the sense of defeatism, born of despair, negate the very spirit of worship. The free man in the republic of the *Vedānta* does not confess to an indigence of this kind. He does not appear as one craving a kind consideration, nor does he stoop to conquer. He appears as one asserting his spiritual birth-right, and that is what invests his pronouncement with an authority and importance all its own. When all is said and done, the fact remains, however, that whatever we may choose to think of its merits as a philosophical dissertation, there is no disputing the point that 'A Free Man's worship' is destined to rank, by sheer force of its 'austere beauty' and stylistic charm, if not, also, in respect of its philosophic depth or vigour, as one of the masterpieces of English literature, and, 'certainly, as one of the philosophical classics of our age. Passages after passages may be quoted to show the consummate artist he is, and it will be readily discovered that their appeal lies not so much in any lure of intellectualism, but in the æsthetic effect produced by words of chiselled beauty and vivid imagery. While, therefore, we feel unconvinced by his logic, Mr. Russell impresses us with a peculiar persuasiveness that defies analysis into reasons.

Now, as the critic will probably interpose here and make the pertinent enquiry, how does all this tall talk about

spiritual freedom square with the ingrained authoritarianism of Indian philosophy? Does not the dogmatism, inherent in the inveterate habit of appealing to the *Śruti*, which has its necessary counterpart in the strait-jacket method of clothing itself in the age-long *Sūtras*, suppress free thinking and thus sound the death-knell of all philosophy? Is not this faith in dogmas an unconditional return to Authority which runs counter to the very spirit of the times, to the very spirit of modernism in thought and culture—modern philosophy itself being ‘Protestantism in the sphere of the thinking spirit, the story of a philosophic pilgrim’s progress from Authority to Freedom? Admittedly, there is much force in this criticism. But we so often forget that there are always two sides to a question. It is undeniable that knowledge or truth in the keeping of Authority proves an initial handicap for the philosophic inquiries. For when truth hardens into tradition, it stifles the very life-breath of the free spirit of inquiry which alone is the inspirer of all philosophy. A tradition may be true; but only a living insight can be philosophical. Thus the very essence of philosophy is a studied unconcern for all kinds of tradition so far as they are merely traditional. Indeed, nowhere is the maxim ‘follow precedents’ treated with scant courtesy as in the realm of philosophic thinking, so that it appears as if for every such thinker there is only a foreground and no background. Well might the philosophers claim on this count precedence over the scientists and historians and say to them: “With you ‘follow precedents’ is the working motto; while ours is the task to create and not merely to follow precedents.” Accordingly, the Authority that acts as a deadweight and impedes the free movement of thought, the Authority that predisposes and proselytises the intellect of man and thus prejudges the philosophical issue, spells the very death of the life of free thinking. It becomes all the more sinister and dangerous when it comes to be invested with a

glamour of sanctity as being the ancient depositary of all wisdom or truth, and before that august Presence man with his questioning impertinence is browbeaten into submission. Here Authority comes to acquire an honorific sense, charged with emotional value, and demands allegiance not because it is old or traditional but because of its possessing superlative or transcendent merits.

On the other hand, we cannot afford to forget or minimise the importance of Authority or of dogmas in the economy of our spiritual life. Surely, Authority, as the custodian of dogmas that prescribe the limits beyond which the private judgment and mysticism of man may not go astray, is an invaluable asset for humanity. What blurs our vision of this home-truth is the haze of emotional hypnosis induced by the witchcraft of the magic phrase 'This Freedom!'—the craze of the modernist. But freedom from what?—one may pertinently enquire. Not surely an 'unchartered freedom' to drift endlessly which leads nowhere and 'tires' at the end. Humanly speaking, such a freedom cannot be sought for its own sake. Here, as elsewhere, freedom has to be saddled with safeguards so that it may be pressed into the service of philosophic thinking. That is why unbridled reasoning (*nirām-kusātarkaḥ*) or argumentation for the sake of argumentation—wherein the license of free thinking so often terminates has never found favour with the Indian mind; and, as a matter of fact, it has been placed by Śaṅkarācāryya under a perpetual ban. For, in India at least, philosophical thought has never been an intellectual pastime merely, cut off from the moorings of all other values of life. This is a fact that has to be accepted as such, and the judgment in question should not be surreptitiously converted into a judgment upon fact.

The much-needed adjustment of the respective rights of Authority and Free thinking, of Dogma and Criticism, or of Faith and Reason, has been effected, once for all, in the

domain of Indian Philosophy. Here, again, Saṃkara appears in his representative capacity. Assuming at the very start that even ratiocination or dialectic is recognised by us so far as it is ancillary to *Śruti* or revealed knowledge (*Śrutyaiṇa cha sahāyatvena tarkasyāpyabhyupetaṭvāt*), he proceeds to lay down that 'it is only such dialectic or reasoning as is subservient to the *Śruti* that is accepted here, as being contributory to experience' *Śrutyānugrhitā eva hyatra tarko'nubhavāngatvenāśrīyatē*). Thus while it is true 'that Saṃkara took up a fairly submissive attitude in regard to the authority of the Upanishad texts,' ³ his 'subjection to authority is not necessarily inimical to philosophical spirit' and the much too common imputation of unphilosophical authoritarianism stands redeemed in the recognition of what has been accurately described the 'internalizing of authority.' ⁴ This is evident from the frequent insistence on Saṃkara's part on *anubhava* or *anubhūti*, that is, experience in its integrity which personalises the impersonal certitude of *Śruti* (*Anubhavārasānam cha Brahmagiṇṇanam*). Nothing short of the certitude of personal experience will meet the requirements of the situation. As it has been rightly observed, 'the human mind is so constituted that only intrinsic evidence necessarily compels assent. No matter how great the authority of the witness, assent is impossible unless the truth in question is luminous to us, is felt as such by us.' ⁵ Accordingly, Authority ostensibly imposing a bond does not, after all, bind, for the fetters that are thus forged are of our own making, and the undoing of these is also ours. Likewise, one can subscribe to dogmas without being a dogmatist. A dogma works not by mechanical dictation but by illuminating inspiration—not by annexing or annulling the rights of private judgment or

3 W. S. Urquhart, *The Vedānta and Modern Thought* p. 75.

4 *Ibid*, p. 84.

5 Coffey, *Epistemology*, Vol. II.

mysticism but by giving ungrudging recognition to these. Dogma is thus experience in the making, and faith or belief which has an air of dogmatism, to begin with, is but reason cultivating itself. Thus is also struck a balance between Dogmatism and Criticism, which have so far appeared in irreconcilable antithesis. Rooted as he was in inflexible orthodoxy, Śaṅkara had yet the sufficiency to assign to reason its proper rank and function even in the matter of attaining unto the highest bliss of mankind. So runs his verdict that 'a man who somehow espouses a creed without prior discussion or critical reflection is dispossessed of beatitude and incurs evil.' (*tatrāvichāryyā yat kiñchit pratipadyamāno niḥsreyasūt pratihanyetānarthāñcheyāt*). So far as Śaṅkara is concerned, it is a pronouncement which is hardly ever given the prominence it deserves in respect of a foundational importance attaching to it. This is typically illustrative of the spirit of Hindu orthodoxy which, though depending in the end upon a provisional faith, employs a faith that *enquires*. This is clearly indicated by the function and importance of *jijñāsā* or critical inquiry in the making of Indian philosophy. Thinking always proceeds by questioning experience, and unless there be in evidence this questioning spirit or *jijñāsā*, the search after truth becomes an impossibility. Now, what is it exactly that this *jijñāsā* stands for? By *jijñāsā* the author of the *sūtra* "*Athāto Brahmajijñāsā*" suggests, as the *Bhāmati* declares, a 'doubt' and a 'value' that is an object of our quest (*jijñāsayā sandehaprayojane sūchayati*). Thus the enquiry (*jijñāsā*) is the *ratio cognoscendi* of doubt, while doubt is the *ratio essendi* of enquiry (*jijñāsa tu saṁśayasya kāryyamiti svakāraṇam sūchayati*). It is this very doubt, finally, that gives the impulse to philosophic inquiry (*saṁśayaś-chu mīmāṃsārambhaṁ prayojayati*).

The 'steel frame' of the *sūtra* as so the critic will further contend, serves as the natural embodiment of the spirit of

Indian philosophy, which is largely under the controlling lead of Authority ; and the natural affinity that is noticeable in this regard argues a pre-established harmony between the two. Now, the *sūtra* has been defined as 'a short aphorism of minimum possible words, of unambiguous meaning, of the nature of epitome, possessing omniformity, unbroken continuity and flawlessness.' "The *sūtra* is so called," observes *Vāchaspati*, "because of its multivocal character." It is exactly here that lie at once the strength and weakness of the *sūtras*. The extreme terseness of the *sūtras* which spells their congenital weakness has its own historic justification. In the absence of present-day printing facilities, the entire mnemonic, (*i.e.*, *sūtra*) literature that had to be improvised could not but invoke a rigidly compact form despite the risk of obscurity and ambiguity. The same enforced necessity of abbreviation that engenders this anæmic helpless state of the *sūtras*, invents a remedy in the prescript of periodical infusion of new blood from concrete flesh-and-blood existences of commentaries and scholia. Thus embodied and vitalized the *sūtras* prove to be a tower of strength and fountainhead of inspiration for the commentaries with which they appear in constant conjunction—by providing a mariner's compass to the individual commentators who might otherwise navigate in an uncharted sea without being ever brought to definite moorings. Hence it is not merely from an historic necessity that the *sūtras* came into being, but the recognition of their need proceeds from a principle. They are mainly designed to arrest the rampant growth of unfettered free thinking that leads nowhere, at least, not to the establishment or discovery of truth. Thus the *sūtra* form has the effect of pruning away the rapid accretion of rival commentaries and expositions, destitute of a survival-value. The temperamental bias of the Indian mind against chronicling or conserving historical data or individual peculiarities explains this natural predilection for the *sūtra* form. In a

wider reference the same tendency expresses itself in the instinctive preference not for personal, but corporate, immortality.

The *sūtras*, accordingly, are conservative—illustrating in a limited manner what we understand by ‘conservation of values.’ ‘So careful of the type’ the *sūtra* seems, ‘so careless of the single life.’ It is this very conservatism that has ensured the historic continuity and perpetuity of the doctrines of a particular school in defiance of the spoil of ages. ‘For the Western philosopher,’ as writes Dr. Urquhart with the added authority of one representing Western philosophy, “it is true that our little systems have their day and cease to be” whereas “in the Vedānta, as well as in other Indian philosophies, we may notice a remarkable unity of development more closely knit than in Western philosophy.” Indeed, the *elan vital* of Indian thought has from time immemorial carried forward the undying past into the living present which it interpenetrates, and thus, pressing on the frontiers of the unknown, created fresh channels of thought. Viewed thus, the *Sūtra* form stands close to the formula of ‘creative evolution.’ That seems to be also the drift of Prof. Rādhākṛiṣṇan’s suggestive phrase—‘the constructive conservatism of Indian thought.’ This innate conservatism of Indian thought, with its retrospective outlook towards antecedent conditions, does not, however, land us in sheer emptiness. The *sūtra* does not leave us, in the end, with a barren, abstract, colourless universal that rides roughshod over the particular. It is the universal in the particular and the particular as embosomed in the universal,—or to use the oft-quoted phrase ‘the concrete universal’—that is not merely the ‘secret’ of Hegel, but the ‘open conspiracy’ of the Real. So does the *sūtra* justify its essential character as *viśvatomukham* emulating, in capacity and function, a myriad-minded personality. Furthermore, it

is in reference to the *sūtras* in their constant conjunction with *bhāshyas* or commentaries, that Indian thinkers have achieved a much-needed solution of the standing conflict between the timeless or unhistorical and the temporal or historical character of truths. If the vocation of the philosopher is to be a 'spectator of all time and all existence,' he must have the eye to discern in time 'the moving image of eternity.' This clearly reveals an attempt to take time seriously, and at the same time not to lose touch with eternity. If truths 'wake to perish never,' neither antiquity nor modernity can either add to, or detract from the validity of these. Mr. Bertrand Russell's dictum that the recognition of 'the unimportance of time is the one gateway of wisdom' surely has its force in this regard. What the *sūtras*, finally, seek to emphasize is just this interplay of timelessness as well as historicity of truths—this dance of eternity before the foot-lights of time—and the guarantee that all our temporal strivings after truth survive in the *sūtra* 'when eternity affirms the conception of an hour.'

In assessing the spirit of Indian Philosophy at the thought-exchange of the world, one must see that it does not undervalue its own thought-currency in order to secure an international credit. Metaphors apart, the individuality of Indian philosophy is a priceless legacy which must be maintained in its integrity. It is simply its demand to be spiritual or spiritually free. It may or may not be in tune with the spirit of modernism or of antiquity, but it is there and must make itself heard across the centuries. In the spiritual economy of the universe there can be no meaningless duplication of functions. It is because and so far as East is East, and also West is West that they can and must meet to their reciprocal advantage at the philosophical exchange. No one knows what cross-fertilisation may mean in the world of thought. It has been said that the Ancient (Greek) philosophy is thoroughly national, the Mediæval is

un-national or cosmopolitan through and through, while Modern philosophy is international in outlook. "The roots of modern philosophy," as writes one European historian of philosophy, "are sunk deep in the fruitful soil of nationality, while the top of the tree spreads itself far beyond national limitations. It is national and cosmopolitan together; it is international as the common property of the various peoples which exchange their philosophical gifts through an active commerce of ideas." Nothing could be a more accurate transcription of the cult of internationalism that has its roots struck deep in the soil of nationality. Ah, there is the rub! Mischief, they say, always lies about the root. Nor is the root a faithful index of the thing in question. "By their *fruits* ye shall know" and not by their *roots*. If, however, we refuse to abide by this *a priori* injunction, let us have the courage of facing facts, fair and square. An International outlook is the cry of many, but the prize of the few. It remains a pious hope until and unless the making of the international mind is an accomplished fact. The method of working it out from the roots upwards has been tried and found wanting; why not try the other—namely, of working from above downwards? That is why the Upanishadic sage, with unerring prophetic vision, declares that this ancient holy fig tree (symbolising the Infinite and the Eternal, the *Bhāmā*) has its roots in heaven and its branches spreading downwards (*Urddhvamūlo' vāksākha esho' śvatthaḥ sanātanaḥ*). This is, however, no mere dream of some future possibility, of some 'far off divine event,' no mere vague aspiration of the Futurist but is verily the everlasting Real, dwelling in us 'nearer than our hands and feet,' as 'the abiding presence and persuasion of the Soul of souls.' It is easy to deride the notion and take to the blunt Johnsonian method of refuting an ideal by kicking against it. If, in short, it is contended that such a vision of the Infinite in the finite is too good to be true, the *Vedāntist* at least will meet that contin-

gency by saying that the vision is too good *not* to be true. It is no mere remote theological mystery but, God be thanked, it is interwoven with the very texture of our everyday experience. Accordingly, the Vedāntist starts on his career with *Brahmajijñāsā*, enquiry into *Brahman* as the supreme good of man, sustains our interest therein with the perpetual reminder that it is the *Bhūmā* that alone is to be enquired into (*Bhūmātveva vijijñāsitavyaḥ*), and closes on the high-pitched key:—"Do thou enquire into that. Verily that is Brahman." (*Tadvijijñāsasva tad Brahmeti*).

To the pragmatist mentality such a high-strung faith will hardly make any appeal; it will confess to a still lingering scruple as to its workability on the weekdays of 'ordinary thought' despite its usefulness on the Sundays of 'speculation.' It is neither the place nor the occasion to attempt a detailed examination of the pragmatist creed, but what one should like to point out, by way of criticism of the incorrigible pragmatic method of rule and-compass, is its insufficiency in determining the truth claim of a philosophical doctrine. In the region of metaphysics—which is, even on the realistic hypothesis, an empirical study of the non-empirical—there could be found no better guide than the precept:

"Not on the vulgar mass

Called 'work' must sentence pass."

If we are persuaded to believe that "'tis not what man *does* which exalts him, but what man *would do*," it applies with all the greater force to the case of a metaphysical creed.

Sanatana Dharma,
OR
The Moral Life as Conformity to Law.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

OF

Prof. N. VENKATARAMAN.

(Ethics and Social Philosophy Section.)

Introductory.

I thank the authorities of this Congress for the honor done to me in inviting me to preside over the Ethics and Social Philosophy Section.

The most important Philosophical problem today is the Ethico-Social problem of the re-adjustment of men's ideals and of modern Society to the changed outlook inaugurated by modern Science and the new Industrial and Economic conditions engendered by it. Especially during the brief period since the termination of the Great War, there have been tremendous changes experienced all over the world both in men's ideals, and in their Social and Economic environment. As in early centuries, primitive tribes with their exclusive manners, rigorous customs, and inter-tribal feuds, were absorbed into the modern nations of the World, today we are witnessing the slow breaking up of national barriers, and the outlook widened, vaguely as yet, of a larger humanity striving for, and achieving, a common purpose, and settling its disputes by common consent, and not by international wars. Problems that have been slowly evolving in previous decades and calling the attention of thinking men, have been recently precipitated, demanding urgent solution; and it behoves the moralist and the Philosopher to take stock of the present situation, and

examine carefully the objective of the present World-movement and its Ethical and Social implications. And the feeling is gaining ground that our moral philosophy and spiritual conceptions should be readjusted to meet the formidable scientific progress and social evolutions of the present age. If we fail to do this we are likely to be overwhelmed by the very forces and apparatuses that we call into being, and it is the task of the moral philosopher of today to make these forces subservient to the supreme purpose of human life on earth, instead of the latter being determined by material forces and scientific discovery. If we fail to conserve the forces of Dharma, and ahimsa, of Love and Peace, mere Science is likely to destroy all that is beautiful and spiritual in life—there has never been a time when ethical and spiritual values must be insistently and forcibly brought to the notice of mankind—when the true *purushārtha* for man should be upheld above the needs of mere *Artha* and *kāma*.

To my mind, two things stand out in the midst of the present restlessness—viz. a reaction against the individualistic ideals of the 19th Century, both Ethically and Socially; and a revulsion against appeal to physical force to settle disputes among sections of mankind. On the one hand, Mahatma Gandhi is trying to rid the World of its evil by pure Soul-force; and on the other, European reformers seek to elevate mankind by a readjustment of Social and Economic Laws. To the moralist must occur the reflection whether these are not superficial remedies of symptoms that appear on the surface, and whether there are not deeper causes for the travails of mankind, and if there is not something objective and deep-lying that causes and regulates the happiness and sufferings of mankind. We are led to ask—"What is the fundamental relation between human life and World forces? Are they at war, or in harmony, with one another?"

Modern Science with its conception of the purely mechani-

cal origin and causation of things, refuses to deal straightforwardly with the spiritual and moral forces of Life, and treating them at best as mere epi-phenomena, beyond the region of physical causation and Scientific Explanation. But, we cannot disregard or ignore our inward experiences and moral values, any more than we can disregard the authentic conclusions of Science. Like Kant, we are, therefore, confronted by the problem of a double world—a deterministio phenomenal world, governed by laws of causation and amenable to Scientific explanation, and a transcendental world of freedom or kingdom of ends, not subject to physical laws or to mechanical principles—with no bridge to connect the two Worlds.

To my mind, a more satisfactory view is the ancient Indian conception that the World is fundamentally one and indivisible, that it is at the same time Physical and Spiritual ; and that it is governed by the same set of laws which operate both ways ; and nothing, not even the Gods, are beyond the Law ; and that neither the moral life, nor Iswara himself, is lawless or capricious.—This is the conception of *Sanatana Dharma*, according to which the entire World belongs to one order, and is sustained and governed by one set of laws, which are both Physical and Spiritual. Hence, Mechanism is no more true than Anthropomorphism ; and the Spiritual is not in any kind of conflict with the Physical, both being subject to the same law, or Dharma.

(i). Concept of Law and Dharma in Indian Philosophy.

The idea of a Cosmic Law or *Dharma*, which is not purely mechanical, but Ethical also in its operation, is a universal and common tenet of different schools of Indian Philosophy. Its beginnings can be traced to the Vedic hymns. It is an erroneous view that Vedic Religion was purely mythological and anthropomorphic. Thus Macdonell says in his "Vedic Mythology"—"The foundation on which Vedic Mythology

rests is the belief that all the objects and phenomena of nature with which man is surrounded are animated and divine. The true gods of the Vedas are glorified human beings, inspired by human motives and passions, born like men, but immortal. They are almost without exception, the deified representatives of the phenomena or agencies of nature" (p. 2). But this is not a true account of Vedic thought and religion. The mythology and anthropomorphism, so apparent at first sight through the Vedic hymns, must be regarded rather as the high-flown fancies of the Vedic Singers and Poets, than as the confused view of pre-scientific men incapable of apprehending the rigour and majesty of the cosmic order, and the operation of Law in the phenomena that surrounded them. For the Rishis often speak of '*Rita*', or the uniform sequence of phenomena, which is under the control of the highest gods.

'*Rita*', originally meaning merely the "Course of things", came to mean "what is straight" "what is proper". Later on, it connotes "what is true" (as opposed to '*an-rita*' = Untrue). With reference to physical phenomena, '*Rita*' means the 'orderly', and in human life, it means 'what is right'. It was the belief that the correct performance of the sacrificial 'rites' automatically brings their ordained fruit or consequences, that gave the Rishis the conception of '*rita*', or orderliness in all the affairs of this universe, spiritual as well as mundane. The Rishis were not only poets and singers, but close observers of nature and of Life. They noted the daily and seasonal revolutions of the planets and stars, and were greatly impressed by their regularity and orderliness. While the particular phenomena of nature like rain and wind are subject to much change, the uniform sequence of their occurrences is not itself susceptible of change. Therefore, the '*rita*' is Supreme, and superior to the very gods who represent the natural phenomena and the Rishis often speak of it as the parent of the gods.

The Vedic Gods are all moral ; they never transgress the law of 'rita'. All the gods are true, and not deceitful, being throughout the friends and guardians of honesty and righteousness. They are angry with the evil-doer.

As illustrating this Vedic conception of the oneness of nature, and the entire subordination of the physical and the spiritual worlds to the same 'rita' we may give the character of Varuna. By his ordinances, "the moon shining brightly moves at night, and the stars placed on high are seen at night, but disappear by day". "By his power, he establishes the mornings or days". "He knows the twelve months". "He causes the rivers to flow ; they stream unceasingly in accordance with Varuna's ordinance." "By his power, the rivers flowing into the Ocean do not fill it with water." Varuna's ordinances are always fixed ; he among the gods being called *Dhritavrata*. The gods themselves have to follow Varuna's ordinances. "Mitra and Varuna are lords of order, (rita) and light ; who by means of order are the upholders of order" (*ritsyagopta*). The gods in general are cherishers of order or light. Varuna is a moral governor, His anger is aroused by sin or infringement of his ordinances, which he severely punishes. He binds sinners with his fetters. He with Mitra forms barriers against falsehood.

Thus the Vedic conception of Law or Dharma comprehends the physical, moral, and spiritual realms. The gods are embodiments of the law and order observable everywhere in the Universe. They are the upholders of the Law ; they never violate it ; and they themselves are bound by it. They are all righteous, just and moral ; they enforce the right, and punish the wrong. The whole universe is based on, and governed by, one law, which is its 'ritam' or 'Dharma', from which it can't swerve an inch, and without which it cannot exist.

The Mimamsa School of Philosophy carried this conception of Natural Law found in the Vedas to its logical consequence, and held that law is superior to personality. They did not believe in an Iswara or Supreme being, who could create the Law or unmake it either—the Mimamsakas do not believe in the possibility of miracles. No one is needed to enforce the Law, or to bestow on individuals rewards and punishments in accordance with it. The Law is its own executor—it operates automatically, without the help of any human or super-human agency to uphold it. Thus, the Mimamsakas came nearer to the scientific conception of Natural Law than the Vedic Rishis; but with them also, the Law is both Spiritual and Physical. This Law or Dharma finds its expression in the Vedas, it is conformed with by the gods and men have to regulate their conduct in accordance with it. The Law is complete in itself; and automatically fulfils itself; the very gods being subject to its majesty. This idea is given expression to by Bhartrihari, according to whom even the members of the Hindu Trinity have to obey the Law of Karma—"One's destiny is nothing but the fruit ordained by one's Karma—Therefore, what of the host of gods? and what of Destiny?"

From the Mimamsa point of view, as from that of modern science, the personal factor was entirely eliminated. An act produces its consequences, irrespective of the pleasure or displeasure of any god. Every karma is potent in itself, capable of yielding fruit thro' an '*apurva*', or invisible effect produced by it. The Vedic rite was conceived to be a "kind of machinery in which every piece must tally with the other". When rightly performed, there was no power which could prevent the fruition of one's Karma in its appointed time, and in the ordained manner, and the fruit of one's Karma was earned and enjoyed, not by the favour of any god, but as a direct consequence of the act itself. It is the analogue

in the spiritual world of the natural fulfilment of physical laws in the material world. The one is as eternal and immutable as the other. The Mimamsakas believed, with J. S. Mill, in the absolute Uniformity of nature ; of the future with the past ; of the unknown with the known. They held that the world was never very much unlike what it is today ; and miracles are impossible. Such a system, eliminating entirely the personal factor, can have little appeal to the popular mind. But it emphasises the essentially ethical foundation on which this world is built. It is a form of rationalism both of nature and of conduct, like what the Stoics dimly believed ; and Kant more elaborately explained. For the Mimamsakas, as with Kant, the diligent discharge of one's duty is morally superior to everything else, including love and devotion ; and the nature of the external world not only makes this possible, but makes it imperative. In this latter point they differed from Kant.

The ultimate nature of the world, and therefore, the foundations of human conduct and righteousness, are based on an eternal order or Dharma, and its Corollary, the Law of Karma ; and there is no being or authority over it. The Vedas are the embodiment and revelation of this Dharma.

It is easy to be dissatisfied with mechanism in Ethics, or with the conception of the moral life as mere conformity to Law ; and the reconciliation of the mechanical and personal factors in moral matters is the most outstanding problem today, as it is the most outstanding one in metaphysics also. It is the problem dealt with in his recent discourses by Prof. Radhakrishnan, and to which a solution is attempted by Gen. Smuts in his presidential address to the last British Association Meeting. The conception of mechanism and natural Law has been overemphasised owing to the one-sided development of the physical Sciences. But more recent advances in the Biological Sciences have led to a change in

the view-point of Modern Science, and brought about a modification in the rigour of the mechanical Category hitherto successfully employed by Physical Science. It was the bent given to modern European Philosophy at its commencement by the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter that has given rise to so many difficult problems, including that of personality *vs.* causation, in Kant. To my mind, the ancient Indian view that there is but one Law or Dharma governing both nature and human conduct seems to offer a solution of the problem. If all force is indestructible, why should moral force be an exception? If all nature is one and Uniform, why should we admit caprice and chance in our moral Nature? Can we not regard moral and spiritual Phenomena as equally subject to laws of causation with the physical and material phenomena of nature? Indian Philosophy has always answered these questions in the affirmative.

(ii) The Law of Karma and the Doctrines of Metempsychosis

These two doctrines, tho' separate, go together. The former is a mere extension of the reign of Law and the postulate of causation to the sphere of human conduct—a natural corollary of the belief that nothing in the Universe is a matter of chance and caprice; that every thing that exists and happens takes place in accordance with some eternal and immutable law, whether it is a fact of human experience, or a phenomenon of the natural world. Just as in Physical Science, it is a commonly accepted maxim that every action and reaction are equal and opposite, so, in moral matters, every act of virtue and of vice leaves it ever so little scar on human character, changing it for the better or for the worse. Nothing we ever do is completely wiped out. No one can take exception to such a doctrine.

The doctrine of Metempsychosis or Re-birth, on the other hand is a hypothesis invented to account for the inequalities of Life, man's varying opportunities and fortunes and the erratic distribution of happiness and misery. If we believe in a Universal and cosmic Dharma, then we cannot regard our individual lives and its incidents as isolated occurrences—either we must believe that there is no ultimate Law of Righteousness governing the Universe; or we must conclude that the particular conditions that govern one's life, from its commencement, and all the ups and downs in the way of success and failure, joy and sorrow, are the outcome and natural sequence of prior actions that have justly earned us this particular kind of life and destiny, and not another. The claim of the Law of Dharma or Karma is the claim of Justice and of desert, and the doctrine of Metempsychosis extends it to the past as well as to the future, instead of confining it to one's visible life on earth, as man-made laws generally do. It says, "If this man is such and such, and has these experiences, pleasant or painful, it is because he has done something in a previous life to deserve it all, as nothing he has done in this life alone will account for it all"—unless this claim for justice and desert can be satisfied, one is bound to end in moral scepticism.

In spite of modern democracy and the attempts of civilised states to improve the conditions of life especially of the masses, the inequalities of life and its opportunities are as glaring today as at any other time. Unmerited happiness and misery are as much the order of the day as, at any other period of human history.

As illustrating my point, I will quote not from an ancient pessimist, but from a modern English author, a brilliant writer of contemporary fiction, and a keen observer of human Life (Oppenheim). He is speaking of an industrial city in 20th century England, and of the condition of the working classes

there ; and the conversation is between a mechanic in one of the factories and an anglican divine— "It is quite picturesque, inst' it, with all those lights shining thro' the mist ? Now, I tell you the truth. I will tell you what I see day by day. Miles upon miles of dirty streets lined with small red brick houses all of a pattern, all hopelessly ugly ; public houses at every corner like flies upon a carcass ; stunted and weary-eyed men, vicious because their eyes are forever fastened upon the hideous side of life, because for ever they must look downwards ; drink-sodden and foolish women, leaving their children to struggle as best they can—and may your God help 'em ; for they 'll need it ; pavements crowded with sickly looking youths, aping the sins of their elders ; immature girls ever hovering around the fringe of vice, drawn into it sooner or later as into a maelstrom. You think I am exaggerating—I 'm not. It 's true. You may walk for miles, and they shall stream past you in hordes. You shall look at them one by one ; and you will be amazed. It is as tho' the devil has smeared them all with one great daub of his brush. They are all of the same hopeless type, ever with eyes looking downwards, down into the Nether world. They are worse than cattle. They are like the swine possessed of the knowledge of evil things.

" It is not the slums alone. In their way, the suburbs are as bad. There is the manufacturer, a snob, because he had made his bit of money, forgets his shopmates, builds his big house, sticks a crest upon his carriage, warms to his wife's petty schemes for social advancement, goes to church, and heads a subscription list. Eats too much, drinks too much, but worships respectability—Narrow, ignorant ! There are no words to describe how narrow and ignorant such a man can be. He too looks ever downwards.

" I am not speaking of the exceptions. I speak of the majority. The world is governed by Majorities. Slum and

suburb, our cities are beastly places. There is your humanity. What's your God doing ?”

We must agree with the writer that if there is a just God, if there is a Law of Righteousness in the Universe, and if the world at large is not entirely out of harmony with our moral aspirations and the demands of justice and equity, we cannot look upon our individual lives as self-centred and dis-connected units ; but as forming infinitesimal parts of the vast whole—Life's struggles, modern competition, our systems of government, communal laws, and the incidents of our up-bringing, are all the products of the Universal or Cosmic order, which is the order of Dharma or Righteousness, of ultimate equity and justice. Caught up by the maelstrom of Life, we may forget this law, and turn moral sceptics.

The law of Karma only asserts the continuous effectiveness of all rational action. Carlyle says, “If I throw this small pebble on the bosom of this lake, it does not stop short of affecting the most distant star.” The Karma-doctrine says that this is true of moral life as well. The world is not a mere physical system, but a moral system as well. No action, good or bad, is ever really lost in it—man's responsibility for every thought, work or action of his, never ceases in it. If he does not experience their consequences at once, they have certainly modified his character for better or for worse, and he may experience them at any time.

Unless the world is altogether non-moral, it must give expression to this Law and find a fit medium for one's character at the end of one's life, in a different environment, give one a new organism and surroundings wherein that character can appropriately manifest itself. Such is the justification for the hypothesis of metempsychosis. Our births and deaths are mere incidents, entrances and exits, in different scenes of the world's stage, in different costumes, and with different parts to

play. That a man who dies is going to be re-born is as certain a proposition as "Man is Mortal".

In illustration of this conception of a Cosmic Dharma or Law of Righteousness, traceable to the days of the Vedic Seers, and held in common by all schools of Indian thinkers, I will conclude by quoting a Modern thinker and profound student of human affairs—Thomas Carlyle (French Revolution). "Apart from all Transcendentalism, is it not a plain truth of sense, which the duller mind can even consider as a truism that human things wholly are in continual movement; and action, and reaction, working continually forward, phases after phases, by unalterable laws, towards prescribed issues? How often must we say, and yet not rightly lay to heart; the seed that is sown, it will spring! Given the summer blossoming, then there is also given the autumnal withering; so is it ordered not with seed—fields only, but with transactions, arrangements, philosophies, societies, French revolutions, what-so-ever man works within this lower world. The Beginning holds in it the End, and all that leads thereto, as the acorn does the oak and its future. Solemn enough did we think of it—which unhappily and also happily we do not very much. Thou there canst begin, the beginning is for thee and there, but where, and of what sort, and for whom will the end be? All grows, and seeks, and endures its destinies. Consider likewise how much grows, as the trees do, whether *we* think of it or not—All that is without us will change while we think not of it, much even that is within us."

Again, "How true that there is nothing dead in this Universe. Our whole Universe is but an Infinite complex of forces; thousand-fold, from Gravitation upto thought and will, Man's freedom environed with necessity of nature. The word that is spoken, as we know, falls irrevocable; not less, but more, the action that is done. "The gods themselves

cannot annihilate the action that is done.' (Pindar). No : this once done, is done always ; cast forth into endless time ; and long conspicuous or soon hidden, must verily work and grow for ever there, an indestructible new element in the Infinite of Things."

Fact and Fiction.

BY

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We usually make a distinction between fact and fiction. On a closer view the distinction becomes so thin that it is difficult to make out where exactly it lies. For what is called a *fact* always involves elements of fiction. The term *fiction* is to be understood here in its original sense as that which is fashioned by the mind—by imagination or conception. Used in this sense, it is to be distinguished from what is *fictitious*, implying falsehood. The question of truth and falsehood is a larger and different one, as is that of the real and unreal. A fiction need not necessarily be false, if it works successfully, though not exactly in the pragmatist's sense. I adopt here the meaning given to the word by Prof. Vaihinger in his '*Philosophy of As If*.'

The World of Experience, as we take it at any moment, is a world of objects as they have been fashioned by the mind out of their primary stuff—the basic matter or content—into their present forms, so that we fail to make out what that stuff was originally. This is true both of our outer and inner experience. It was perhaps in this sense that Kant held that Understanding makes Nature, and it is in this sense that Bergson regards our knowledge of things, whether ordinary or scientific, as conceptual. The error of Kant was that he disregarded in his theory the historic side, maintaining that the world of experience, at least in its formal aspects, is as we individually make it with our ready made framework of conceptual categories. Bergson, too, does not appear to have taken due notice of the historic side. They have not,

it seems, considered adequately the fact that we are inheritors of a language embodying ideas of the race to which we belong. These ideas influence our experience in a manner without our knowing how they do it. We endow the objects of knowledge with name and form as our ancestors have done it. The same truth is emphasized in another content, and with a different purpose, in the *Chhandyogya Upanishad* where Uddālaka Āruni is described as instructing his son Svetaketu about the ultimate reality underlying the ordinary view of things. The point there brought is that the objects of experience are mere names and forms (*Nāma Rūpa*) the real stuff of which lies behind and far to seek.

The assertion made above is likely to cause some surprise and the question will arise here—are the common objects of knowledge mere fictions, i.e. are what we make them to be, having no independent reality belonging to them? Here lies the fundamental issue between the Realists and the Idealists. But both Realism and Idealism cover a wide field, each being presented in various forms, both in the East and the West, into the history of which it is not my purpose to enter here. I would only mention that pure forms of either, at least in the West, is difficult to find. The Berkeleian type of Idealism is realistic in a way, as the present-day Neo-realists claim. So is the German type in its different presentations, so far as the world of outer experience is concerned. The case is not otherwise with the Realists. The extreme form of critical Realism on the question approaches almost the position of Kant regarding the *thing in-itself*. The real significance of the Kantian position here is that the original stuff is unknown and unknowable by the ordinary means of knowledge. The same thing is said, in a way, by Bergson where he demands a sympathetic merging of oneself into the flow of reality in order to be able to apprehend reality as it is in its pure nature. But when we become *one* with it,

as Bergson would have it, what would be there to know and who would know it ? (*Vijñātāram arē kena vijāniyāt—kenā kam paśyet*)—as is well-put in a different context in our Brihadāranyaka Upanisad.

A good deal is being made, in the present-day psychology on the subject of our sense-knowledge, of the doctrine of Meaning which, if interpreted rightly, would come nearer to our point here. For what are meanings but ideas or fictions that we put into our experience of objects. The question is—what was the original stuff before it acquired meaning in our mind ? Can we hope to go behind our meanings in our ordinary experience ? The Gestalt psychology of the day, as presented by its staunch advocate Köhler rejects this doctrine as a final solution of the difficulty here, and it does so rightly as far as it goes. But on a closer view it would appear that this new psychology too is in the same dubious position here : It does not escape the influence of the mental (even in the sense of physiological) in the building up of our usual experience of things ; rather in a way it supports and emphasises the same conclusion.

Now the fundamental assumption made here remains still to be justified, namely, that the world, as we experience it, is a *fiction*. Do the objects as we know them, whether ordinarily or scientifically, support the assumption ? They do, if we would but view them critically with an open mind. This can be easily and widely illustrated by examples drawn from our sense knowledge itself, commonly supposed to be direct and free from any influence of mind. The attitude of present-day physical sciences towards sense-objects points to the same conclusion. But scientific knowledge also is not free from fictions which are supposed to abound in the common-sense view of things. The superiority of scientific knowledge to the common-sense way of regarding objects of experience lies in the wider application of its ideas and

conceptions. But these are still fictions, and as such limited in extent and consequently relative in their application. No science can claim absolute truth. This is shewn conclusively by the history of the different sciences which in the course of their development, have uniformly proceeded by modification or rejection of old hypotheses and theories (fictions in themselves) and adoption of new ones in their place. There has been no finality here, nor can there be. The usual complaint is that philosophy too has no finality. Yes, but science, has less, if one may be allowed to say so. The wider efficiency of scientific ideas depends on the cautious procedure in selective analysis and relevancy of application which are wanting in the common-sense mode of handling things. But the *things*, as we call them, are no less fictions. The question now is, supposing that scientific ideas are mere fictions, how do they work as they are found to do. This is a deeper question indeed still remaining to be solved. The pragmatic one is no real solution, but rather an evasion of the difficulty. Even our staunch Schiller is found to have stumbled over it in his desperate attempt to find a solution. Yes, scientific fictions work. But, sooner or later, there comes a limit—a *crucial instance* as it is called, when one theory succeeds, for the time being, against a rival one and goes on occupying the field until its own doom comes up eventually. The difficulty here is soluble neither by common-sense nor by science itself. This is one among many other mysteries by which we are surrounded.

Now taking the common-sense position, we find that the various aspects of the world of experience are regarded as real facts without question. But a closer and critical view would disclose that here too there is relativity everywhere. And every phase of relativity is subjective involving a fiction of the mind. Who can say how far this relativity extends, and when to stop it facing absolutely *pure* facts. The shapes, sizes, etc.

and the colours, tastes, smells etc.—the whole lot of the so-called primary and secondary qualities of matter—are supposed to be *bare facts*. Are they really so? The scientific view of the day, regarding the ultimate nature of matter tells, however, a different story. There is nothing there but the play of protons and electrons underlying the so-called sensible qualities. But their own protons and electrons, what are they? Are they not ideas (fictions) put into the situation to handle it better until they come to be replaced by more successful ones? Our traditional psychology is still very naive in its outlook. It has proceeded on certain assumptions (fictions again) which require a justification not yet sufficiently made. No wonder, therefore, that the traditional position here is coming to be replaced by others attempting to go deeper into the situation. But even in these new departures the *bare facts* are not touched yet. They remain still far to seek.

It would perhaps be asked now—is there anything of this kind—a bare fact behind the appearances? The Phenomenalists, from David Hume down to the present day radical empiricists, are welcome to deny it. But their *phenomena*, what are they? Bare facts or fictions? Are they not also what we make them to be? What is their original stuff here? They would perhaps say in reply—there is nothing of the sort there. Then the whole world of sense comes to be reduced to mere fictions—an extreme form of personal and subjective idealism. The question would still arise—whence come these fictions, and why and how, again, the fictions assume a similar type in different minds giving what is called a common objective world. Thus the phenomenalist attitude can hardly be called a satisfactory one here. For a true solution of the mystery, if it can be solved at all by the usual ways of knowledge and discourse, we have to look elsewhere.

The point which raises a serious difficulty here is that the phenomena of common experience have a character of their

own that appears to have an independence of the minds to which they are presented. This is the case also with the law and order in which they appear. They may be fictions of the mind. But the law and order, is it also a fiction? If it is, the fictions must have their origin in a deeper level than what we regard usually as our mind. As a matter of fact what we usually call matter and mind in their characteristic contrast are themselves fictions, which have had a long vogue in philosophy since Descartes formulated their dualism. The whole course of philosophic thought since his time has been ego-centric in this sense. And unless we can rise above this prevalent tendency of thought, we cannot hope to find a solution of this difficulty here. Hence both the Spiritualist and the Materialist, as the Idealist and the Realist, would have to divest their minds of the usual conceptions of mind and matter in their respective approaches to the solutions of this problem. The deepest thoughts of some philosophers have recognised this, and so they have tried to face the problem by boldly admitting a source of knowledge other than the commonly accepted ones.

The nature of the ultimate reality underlying its appearances can never be realised by the usual methods of handling experience, which have but to do with the world as already fashioned by inevitable fictions. The mystery would ever evade our grasp unless we can rise above these fictions with which we endow our experience both inner and outer. Behind both these lies the original stuff which is mysteriously worked out into the forms we are familiar with and deal with practically. The level again from which this work proceeds is not always apparent to us—it lies deeper somewhere else than what we usually take our mind to be, which is itself a fiction among other fictions. The ultimate source of the original forms—even the sensible data and the laws of their appearance—eludes our grasp by the usual modes of approach. The psychological

account of their origin that we find in the current text-books is too crude and superficial. It does not touch the main problem here. The new departures from the traditional lines of explanation that we find in the day are indeed a hopeful sign of what is to come in the future indicating at least a recognition of the problem, if not its solution. A true solution will come, however, when we give up the usual time-honoured path of approach and seek it in another source of knowledge, little recognised as yet in the field, call that by whatever name you would—*msystic vision*; Higher Intuition, Immediacy, Reason, *Aparoksha*. Some of the greatest philosophers, both in the East and West, have recognised it under one name or other, and there are signs already of its recognition in the present day. There is, of course, no unanimity yet in their statements regarding the ultimate nature of reality—the pure fact—the original stuff. Is it due to the inevitable influence of fictions they cannot avoid in giving expression to their direct experience? Or is the last word here “*Nèti, Nèti*”—not this, not this?

Schopenhauer as a Forerunner of Pragmatism

BY

MIR VALIUDDIN.

“ Knowledge generally rational as well as merely sensuous” says Schopenhauer “ proceed: from the ‘will’ itself as a means of supporting the individual and the species, just like any organ of the body. Originally destined for the service of the will, for the accomplishment of its aim, it remains almost throughout entirely subjected to its service: It is so in all brutes and in almost all men.” ¹ It is through this conception of the nature and origin of thought as subordinate to the needs of life that Schopenhauer seems to prepare the way for Pragmatism, according to which our thought, however subtle, delicate and elaborate in the last instance aims only at purely practical effects. In the above mentioned passage, as Prof. W. P. Montague ² points out if we substitute for “will”, the “concrete organisms” whose needs and wants are in conflict with one another and with their environment we could take it as a tolerable formulation of the theory of genetic psychology which is lucidly set forth by Prof. John Dewey and also in the writings of the Chicago School. It is on this changed conception of the nature of thought that Pragmatism also bases its changed account of “truth”. And these two problems constitute the very essence of the pragmatic theory of knowledge. I shall proceed to consider here Schopenhauer’s view of the nature of intelligence and its function in order to determine in what sense he may be regarded as founder and the best interpreter of the pragmatist conception of intelligence.

(1) *The World as Will and Idea*—Haldane and Kemp ; p. p. 199.

(2) *The Ways of Knowledge or the Methods of Philosophy*—p. p. 154 and 155.

II.

According to Schopenhauer the "Will" is the absolute and ultimate reality. It is neither mind nor matter but a blind and unconscious principle which manifests itself in the temporal world. It is conceived as a 'blind urge' ("ein blinder Drang") towards activity and change, towards individuation, towards multiplication and "diversification" of the modes of concrete existence and towards a struggle for survival between these modes". Schopenhauer designates it as "Wille zum Leben" and he further characterises it as "ein endloses Streben", as "ein endloser Fluss", as "ein ewiges Werden" without 'rest' and without 'purpose'. It objectifies itself in a gradual progression and cumulative order. Every objectification pre-supposes the preceding one but adds to it some new trait. Now this conception of the Will to Live readily lends itself to an evolutionistic construction and it is interesting to find that Schopenhauer himself, though in the beginning of his speculations he did not put such a construction in his later writings did adopt such an interpretation quite explicitly and emphatically, and connected with his metaphysical principles a thorough-going scheme of cosmic and organic evolution. This has been fully brought out by Prof. Arthur O. Lovejoy in an essay entitled "*Schopenhauer as an Evolutionist.*" *

By the year 1850 Schopenhauer had *reformulated* his conception of the objectification of the Will in thoroughly evolutionistic terms. It is strange to find that this fact has been ignored by most of the historians of philosophy, and Schopenhauer's position has been represented as consistently anti evolutionistic. †

(3) Cf. *Monist*, Vol. XXI, p. p. 195—222.

(4) Cf. It is however noticed by Volkelt in his works on Schopenhauer.

In his "Wille in der Natur" in 1854 we find Schopenhauer setting down a brief and unequivocal affirmation of the origin of species from one another through descent. This alone, he thinks, would explain the unity of plan manifest in the skeletal structure of a great number of diverse species. In other words, Schopenhauer argues in "favour of transformism by pointing to one of the most important and familiar evidences of the truth of the theory of descent, viz. the homologies in the inner structure of all the vertebrates". The number and arrangement of the bones (called the 'anatomical element' by Geoffroy de St. Hilaire) continues in all essential points unchanged in all the vertebrates, though they possess the greatest susceptibility to modification according to the varying environment. In the neck of the giraffe (for example) the same seven vertebræ which in the mole were contracted to such an extent as not to be recognisable are prodigiously prolonged enabling it to browse upon the tops of tall African trees. This unity of the plan, argues Schopenhauer, cannot be accounted for as one of the aspects of the adaptation of the organism to the environment. For this adaptation might have been in many cases as well or better realised by means of different structure and different numbers and disposition of bones in different species.

Thus here we find a clear formulation of the evolutionary doctrine and Schopenhauer himself adds a reference to a passage in *Parerga and Paralipomena* in which he expounds at much greater length his own particular form of organic evolutionism. This passage occurs in the small treatise (Chapter VI of *Parerga and Paralipomena*) entitled *Zur Philosophie und Wissenschaft der Natur*. With the publication of this work (1850) Schopenhauer "unmistakably announced that the philosophy of nature to which his metaphysics of the Will led was of a frankly and completely evolutionist type".

III.

As an evolutionist Schopenhauer also held that the function of the intellect has been evolved to meet the pressing demands of life just as the eyes and the stomach and the other organs have been developed and preserved through the agency of natural selection. Thus like every other character of complex living organism, thought has its history and its origin. It is the complexity of the wants of the situation or environment that demands a certain amount of intelligence. As Schopenhauer puts it: "Die Nahrung muss daher aufgesucht, ausgewählt werden, von dem Punkte an, wo das thier dem Ei oder Mutterleibe in welchem es erkenntnisslos vegetirte, sich entwunden hat. Dadurch wird hier die Bewegung auf Motive and wegen dieser die Erkenntnis nothwendig" ⁵ It is obvious that as the animal rises higher and higher in the scale its wants and needs also become more and more complicated and it becomes more and more dependent upon opportunity and thus it stands in need of a greater degree of intelligence in order to survive in its struggle for existence. And when the objectification of Will reaches the stage of humanity we find that in the case of man—that "complicated, many-sided imaginative being"—the needs and requirements of life become so bewildering and confusing that a perfect development of intelligence becomes the *conditio sine qua non* of his very existence.

Thus the development of intelligence keeps pace with the development of the needs of life. According to Schopenhauer then knowledge is only a "secondary added thing"; it is "secondary and subordinate everywhere", and as he puts it, it was not necessary for the maintenance of things in general, but merely for the maintenance of individual animal beings. He emphasises the fact that the faculty of knowledge, like every

other organ, has only arisen for the purpose of self-preservation and hence every animal possesses intelligence to find out the means of its own existence, thus to conserve its own being and to propagate the species. With man the case is not different. And if there is any difference at all it is just this; man has infinitely more wants than the animals and consequently his maintenance is much more difficult and therefore a much higher degree of intelligence is required in order to enable him to meet the demands of life. *The intellect however springs from the "will to Live" and is nothing but a tool for its service.* It has been provided simply to meet the essential demands of life—nourishment and propagation. It is, in the words of Schopenhauer, "a thoroughly practical tendency", ("durchaus praktischer Tendenz" iii, 333), which remains almost throughout entirely subjected to the needs of life. It is further designated by him as "Notbehelf" and "Krücke" which is simply meant to help the individual in its struggle for life.

This account of the genesis and nature of intelligence is, according to Schopenhauer, "primarily zoological, anatomical, physiological." How the unconscious "Wille zum Leben" gives rise to intelligence is, indeed a problem. But the intellect, Schopenhauer maintains has come into being in response to practical and biological needs of the organism and, therefore, it is designed merely for the practical purposes, that is to say, for "the comprehension of those ends upon the attainment of which depends the individual life and its propagation". Two things stand out prominently in this account of the nature and function of the intellect; first the *purposive character* of the intellectual activities and second, *the importance of conflict*. The *raison d'être* of thought is, as indicated above, to enable the individual organism to react successfully on the external impulses and influences and thus to conserve its being. From this point of view

intellectual processes are *useful* in the highest degree. "It is a tool of the most various utility." And since the intellect is provided only in consequence of the practical needs of life its only function will be the satisfaction of those needs and in this way both our action and cognition will be controlled throughout by this purpose alone. The doctrine is thus thoroughly teleological, not indeed in the wider sense of a cosmic purposiveness but in the sphere of mental life only. Not less important is the motion of conflict. Consciousness, as has been fully emphasised arises out of *conflict*. It is the conflicting and intricate situation and also the complexity of the wants and needs of the organism that lead to the more and more perfect formation of the faculty of formulating ideas and its organs until, in the course of the struggle for existence, arose consciousness itself.

Now it is through this conception of the nature and genesis of the intellect, as we said above, that Schopenhauer paves the way for Pragmatism. The pragmatist is a biologist and an evolutionist. He looks upon mind and its products as biological instruments. He is interested to show how knowledge has arisen in the evolutionary movement and in pointing out the function of the intellect. He, therefore, assumes outright the existence of the organism with its vital needs and wants—its "will-to live", so to say,—and he assumes also the presence of environment with its natural energies. He does not try to rise (as Schopenhauer does) beyond the phenomenal experience which is for him merely an intercourse between the organism and the environment."⁶ The fundamental questions, why organisms exist, why they strive and wish to live and propagate their species, which are in themselves exceedingly interesting

6. Cf. *Creative intelligence* pp. 36-37—*Influence of Darwin and other Essays*, pp. 155-157. **Essays in Experimental Logic* pp. 226, 332, 425 etc.

problems, do not interest him as much as they did Schopenhauer who, as we have seen above, grounded these biological needs in the will to Live, the ultimate reality which is an endless striving after life, and which individualises itself in animal organism. The pragmatist, then, taking for granted the organism and its needs goes on to show how thought arises. He shows that the environment, in which the organism is placed, being not always friendly, the individual tries to mould it so that the needs of life and the desires corresponding to those needs may be realised. In such an enterprise, memory, imagination and thought arise as a help in the struggle for existence and being of priceless advantage are, according to the Darwinian laws, encouraged and preserved. It is thus the complicated needs of the organism that call forth thought and reflection. It would, in all probability, never have arisen and certainly would never have thriven "if the affectional life of the *genus homo* had always been serene and blissful without alloy." The entire business of thought is to remove the discordances and discrepancies that arise in the problems confronting us in our daily life. Logic is, thus, for the pragmatist, a group of changing and flexible rules which themselves arise and end in the needs and exigencies of life. It is *not* to be considered as "a set of immutable and eternal laws to which any and every judgment must conform on pain of being condemned as false." Thought is a process of experimenting with the materials of our experience, changing and moulding it for the satisfaction of our desires.

In the pragmatic psychology we find the same two prominent features which we saw in the account which Schopenhauer gave of the nature and genesis of the intellectual activities—viz. the *purposive* character of thought and the importance of *conflict*. All thinking is *purposive*. Pragmatism recognises thoroughly that the "purposive

character of mental life generally must influence and pervade also our most remotely cognitive activities", and it is guided by this principle in the construction of its theory of knowledge."⁷ This view point had been stated much earlier by Prof. James in his *Psychology, Briefer Course*, as follows; "...mental life is primarily teleological, that is to say...our various ways of feeling and thinking have grown to be what they are because of their utility in shaping our reactions on the outer world...Primarily, then, and fundamentally, the mental life is for the sake of action of a preservative sort."⁸ We have also seen how the presence of conflict is of equal importance. Our whole conscious life arises in conflict. Thought is born in struggle and in tension, in discords and discrepancies. It solves the problems, it overcomes the difficulties. The pragmatic theory of intelligence is thus a forward-looking theory. "Intelligence as intelligence", says Prof. Dewey, "is inherently forward looking."⁹ Pragmatic intelligence is a "creative intelligence" in the sense of moulding experience in view of the needs of life (i.e. "in the service of the will") and determining the future qualities of experience. It is thus a process of *experimentation* and trial, and is, therefore, different from the creative work of the artist who is striving after an ideal.

Thus for Schopenhauer as well as the pragmatists the intellect is a biological instrument for improving human behaviour. But whereas Schopenhauer thus reducing the intellect to the level of a mere tool for action in the service of the will has recourse to 'instinctive feeling' or, a kind of 'intuition' to satisfy man's passion to experience the ultimate reality, the pragmatists elevate intelligence to the

7 Cf. Schiller's *Humanism*, p. 8.

8. *Psychology, Briefer course*, p. 4.

9. Cf. Dewey's *Essay in "Creative Intelligence"*

place of supreme instrument which enriches the whole of human life and "deny and reject that intelligence which is naught but a distant eye, registering in a remote and alien medium the spectacle of nature and life."¹⁰ They further deny the *value for life* of investigating the ultimate metaphysical problems and theories of philosophy in the past. They point out that since thought has been "evolved in the human species simply to remove the biological wants and needs of the organism the "attempt to discuss the antecedents, data forms and objective of thought apart from reference to particular position occupied and particular part played in the growth of experience, is to reach results which are not so much either true or false as they are *radically meaningless*."¹¹ Therefore from the standpoint of the pragmatistic theory of knowledge "the taking of something whether that something be thinking activity, its empirical condition or objective goal, apart from the limits of a historic or a developing situation, is the essence of metaphysical procedure—in the sense of metaphysics which makes a gulf between it and science."¹² Thought arises in a psychological situation and its relevancy is entirely limited to it. The evolutionary doctrine treats every distinct organ or structure as an instrument of adaptation to a special situation so the pragmatists insist that the logical theory ought to be regarded as an account of thinking as a "mode of adaptation to its own generating conditions",—these conditions being, as has been indicated above, the inner distractions produced by the complicated and jarring needs and desires of the organism.

To sum up: The pragmatists, taking Schopenhauer's premises that the intellect is evolved for the service of life

10. Ibid p. 66.

11. *Studies in Logical Theory*—p. 8.

and is inherently incapable of knowing the ultimate reality, seem to derive a different conclusion from what Schopenhauer himself meant to draw. What according to Schopenhauer is to be regarded as the *failure* of the intellect is from the point of view of the pragmatists exactly its *proper function*, for philosophy, according to them, can do nothing but to "identify itself with questions which actually arise in the vicissitudes of life." Philosophy does give insight into existence; it does render things more intelligible; but "these considerations are subject to the final criterion of what it means to acquire insight and to make things intelligible, i.e. namely, service of special purposes in behaviour and limit by special problems in which the needs of insight arises."¹² Schopenhauer *condemns* intellect and offers a way of escape for the metaphysical craving of man for the experience of union with the ultimate reality; the pragmatist *extols* intellect because the action which approves intelligence "has an *intrinsic value* of its own in being instrumental"—it enriches human life, and the investigation of problems of the ultimate reality, as has been said, has according to the Pragmatists, no significance or value for life.

12. Dewey's "Some implications of Anti-Intellectualism"; "Journal of Philosophy, Psychology of Scientific Method. Vol. VII, No. 182, pp. 477-481.

What is Relation ?

By

G. H. RAO.

No one of us can think or converse for two seconds without making use of the concept of relation. Yet few of us can say that we have a clear and distinct idea of such a pervasive concept. The reason is that there is no intrinsic interest in the study of the concept. Philosophers are not interested in studying it for its own sake, they are interested in it in so far as it supports monism or pluralism, spiritualism or materialism. One is more mindful of what he should say of it, if monism should be maintained or pluralism should be maintained rather than what he should say of it, in order to render it intelligible. The study of relation has thus become a mere side-issue in philosophy and it is no wonder that the concept of relation has proved to be the vaguest term in philosophical vocabulary. To free the term from this vagueness it is necessary that attention should more and more be directed to the understanding of what it is rather than to the constructing of paradoxes and puzzles about it.

What is Relation ?

The question is answered variously. But we may take as a basis for discussion four representative answers.

1. A relation is the way that one thing has to do with another.

2. A relation is the mutual dependence of two or more subjects upon a common principle, fact or truth, of such a kind that any assertion regarding one modifies the meaning of the other. Every predicate of each term depends upon and influences the other.

3. (a) A relation is not an objective existence but a mental form superimposed upon things.

(b) A relation is the identity-difference function of judgment whether this judgment is a growing and developing judgment or an absolute and permanent judgment.

4. (a) A relation is any law that holds between facts.

(b) Different things form natural classes, families or kinds and it is in virtue of membership in the same sort of genus that things stand related to one another.

Let us consider each of these one by one.

1. *Relation as the way one thing has to do with another.* This view reduces relation to the mere means and end function ; it holds good only of modes of action rather than of forms of structure ; it holds good of dynamic relations rather than of structural relations. Hence it is too narrow as a definition.

2. *Relation as mutual dependence* narrows down the sphere of application of the term to merely the relation of dependence.

3. (a) *Relation as a mental form superimposed upon things*, makes relation subjective. On this view, it is difficult to explain how knowledge is possible. Even if we grant that relation is mental the view is unsatisfactory in other respects ; it fails to bring out the distinctive character of relation. It is not relations alone that are mental ; there are other things that are mental. In what does relation differ from other mental things ?

(b) *Relation as the identity-difference function of judgment.* We can grant that, in knowledge, is revealed the identity-difference function of reality. We can also grant that it is only when this function is revealed in and through judgment that knowledge and truth are possible. We can also grant that the identity-difference function is a relation. Knowledge has meaning to us only when it is taken as related to reality that is distinct from it. Being thus related to a reality is the function of judgment

and this function may be regarded as a relation of judgment to reality. But what we cannot grant is that all relations can be reduced to this identity-difference function of judgment. For, if all relations are reduced to merely the identity-difference function of judgment, we can hardly speak of different forms of judgment. But even the most extreme of idealists do distinguish between different types of judgment. We cannot account for different types of judgment unless we assume that there are different types of relation expressive of wholes in reality.

4. (a) Relation as identical with law confuses between a statement about a relation with a relation stated.

(b) Relation as that which entities have as members of a whole, lays emphasis on the fact that terms have no relations apart from a whole. But it does not tell us as to what it has to do with a whole or what significance it has in a whole.

Thus from our analysis of the prevalent views about relation no clear conception of relation has emerged. Let us see if the analysis of the usually recognised relations at least gives us a better lead. As examples of relations which may serve as a basis for analysis the following may be taken :

In-out, above-below, near-far.

Before-after, earlier-later, slow-fast.

Ground-consequence, cause-effect, substance-attribute.

Identity-difference, whole-part, genus-species.

Implication, opposition, necessity, contingency, objectivity, constitution, evaluation, means and end.

Though the above list is not exhaustive, I believe it is representative enough for purposes of definition. If we carefully study the above relations, the following features will come out prominently before us.

Each relation has reference to a certain order of being. Apart from this or that order neither relations nor terms have

any meaning. In-out, earlier-later etc. imply the spatial order, before-after, earlier-later, the temporal order, cause effect substance-attribute etc. the physical order, implication, opposition, objectivity etc. the logical order, means and end, evaluation etc. the spiritual order.

A relation implies at least two distinct terms which may be substantives, adjectives or relations. But it is neither a term alongside of other terms, nor an expression of terms characterising terms. It is, on the other hand, an expression of terms, a function of terms. It is that by means of which terms express themselves ; it is that by means of which terms attain a form which by themselves, they did not possess ; it is that by which terms get to have a status which they did not otherwise possess.

It is only when a relation is not taken as an expression or a function of terms but as an independent element that lies alongside of terms or as a quality characterising terms that Bradley's paradox about relation arises. If X and Y are terms and R an independent entity existing between them, the question inevitably arises : What relates R to X and R to Y ? We shall have then to find R_1 to relate R to X and R_2 to relate R to Y and in order to relate R to R_1 and R to R_2 we shall have to find R_3 and R_4 and so on ad infinitum. If on the other hand relation is taken as expressive of terms it will no longer lead to any regressus. Bradley does not take into account the possibility of understanding a relation as a function or expression of terms. Had he taken this possibility into account he would not have thought of a relation as infested with contradiction or a relational whole as ultimately untrue ¹. From the fact that relation is a form in which terms express themselves it follows that neither terms can be taken without relations, nor relations without terms. Terms are always terms

(1) A. R. Page 34.

in relation and relation is always relation of terms. As long as terms are expressed in relation and relation is expressive of terms, the relation pervades the terms and constitutes the terms to the extent of at least one dimension. When the terms express themselves through a relation, only some of their characters need change ; it is not necessary that all their characters should change. For example, changes in the physical dimension of a term need not affect the vital dimension and changes in the vital dimension need not affect the psychical dimension of a term. There is a certain element of abstraction involved in the very nature of things. In fact, evolution is only possible through such abstraction. Even a creative act must in the long run imply a certain amount of analysis and abstraction. But the difference between the analysis and abstraction that is involved in nature is not absolute, it is restricted only to some one dimension and is restricted to some one function. The recognition of this fact that analysis and abstraction are not imposed upon nature from without, but are immanent in nature, has led to a new view of science and to a new method of science. According to this new view, science is not a study of arti-facts of the laboratory, but a study of phenomenal patterns, a study of live wholes and the method employed in studying these patterns is the method of functional analyses. This new view of science is represented by Von Kries in the field of physics and Wartheimer, Koffka and Kohler in the field of psychology.

Another feature of relation is that it is always relative ; it has more than one direction. The number of directions it has depends upon whether it is dyadic, triadic or polyadic.

A third feature of relation is that it implies a whole. Anything that is expressive cannot be conceived apart from a whole. Relation is the formative or creative phase of a whole and may to that extent be considered as identical with a whole.

The whole which is implied by a relation must necessarily be a concrete whole. A whole that is devoid of distinction, is a homogeneous whole or a whole of only one dimension, has no place for relations. Take any whole, a rainbow, a flower, an animal or an organization. Every one of them is indivisible. We cannot divide any one of them without destroying the whole. Yet their indivisibility does not consist in being void of distinctions. Indeed, the distinctions that we see in each whole, help us to perceive more and more clearly the indivisibility of the whole. Though all of them are one in being indivisible wholes, yet no two of them have the same form. Each one of them has a certain individuality all its own, a uniqueness all its own. To bring out the distinctive feature of each whole, we call one whole physical, another biological, a third psychological and so on. Each distinctive form of expression bears testimony to a distinctive type of relation of the terms. Each new whole is indicative of a new relation ; it becomes richer accordingly as it is expressive of more orders of relatedness. For example, Brahman as expressive of the order of life, is richer and more expressive than Brahman as expressive of the physical order of relatedness, in so far as it includes and goes beyond the physical order of relatedness. Brahman as mind is richer and more expressive than Brahman as expressive of the physical and biological orders of relatedness, in so far as it includes and goes beyond the physical and biological orders of relatedness. Brahman as knowledge is more expressive than Brahman as matter, life and mind, in so far as it includes and goes beyond physical, biological and psychological relatedness. Finally, Brahman as bliss is richer and more expressive than Brahman as matter or life or mind as it includes the physical, biological, psychological and logical forms of relatedness and goes beyond them. The wings of the spirit are always wide open and they may carry it into other and richer orders of relatedness than we know of.

To think of a whole as a relational whole was considered as a mark of degradation in the past. In order to elevate a whole, it was thought necessary to transcend all relations and distinctions and get at a non-relational whole like the Absolute. Thanks to Einstein, that he has invested the concept of relation with a new dignity. He has pointed out in his own special field that the physical universal matter is no longer to be conceived as a homogeneous entity floating in two uniform voids—space and time but as a four dimensional space-time continuum which becomes more and more concrete, more and more universal in so far as it is expressive of more and more relations. Matter as expressive of infinite relations has dropped its old and worn-out attire of passivity and finiteness, and has donned the attire of creativity and infinity. It is thus fit enough to become the first moment of the spirit (Adishakti) on the basis of which other moments can thrive. This new attitude towards relation born in the field of physics has now been slowly extending itself to other fields. A conception which was once infested with contradiction is now invested with creative power.

If this view of relation is accepted, it leads to a new conception of philosophy. The function of philosophy will not consist merely in elucidating a universal which is expressive of the actual dimensions of experience, but in elucidating a universal expressive of newer dimensions which the actual dimensions implicitly point to. Matter dreams of the plant, the plant of the animal, the animal of man and man of the superman. The meaning of experience consists in the expression of what is fuller and richer ; to explain experience is to expand and enrich it ; and to unify experience is to elaborate it and elevate it.

Are Difference and Identity relations ?

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1. A consideration of Relations is called for, though a full-fledged inquiry is clearly out of the question in a paper, which proposes merely to consider whether Difference and Identity are relations. This preliminary task is forced upon us as there does not seem to be anything like unanimity with regard to the conception of relations. Relations in the objective have been denied altogether or they have been reduced to the status of adjectives. In either case the result is the same—the disappearance of relations.

Against all this we have to maintain that relations are as much objective as the terms ; whether they are or are not constituted by the terms alone is a further and different question. Perhaps it is possible to maintain either of the theses. In any case the objectivity of relations will not be affected.

Another set of objections against relations is based either on the impossibility of housing relations or on their essential similarity with adjectives. The first is stated as the view of Lotze and criticised at some length by McTaggart in his "Nature of Existence".¹ The nerve of the argument against relations consists in the alleged impossibility of finding a place, a locus for them to be. "They are not it is clear in either of the terms without being in the other. Nor are they in each of them taken separately. They are it is said *between* the terms, and not *in* them. Then it is asked, is there anything in which they can be. And when this is answered in the negative, it is concluded that they are impossible".

(1) "The Nature of Existence"—Vol. I. p. p. 80.

Dr. McTaggart thinks that this is invalid because it assumes that a relation is impossible unless some one thing is found in which it is, or inheres like a quality. It takes as the test of the possibility of relations, the question whether they can behave exactly like qualities, and when it is admitted that they cannot it concludes that they are impossible and that in a true view of reality judgments of relation would be replaced by judgments of quality. He takes the conception of *between* as ultimate as that of *in*.

The second view is advocated by some logicians and Johnson can be taken as an example. He thinks that there is no intrinsic difference between adjectives and relations—the latter being but a species of the former. Relations are ‘transitive’ adjectives as opposed to the intransitive such as red, cold, good etc., instead of qualifying one substantive they qualify a substantive-couple. “There are”, he says, “two distinct points of view from which the treatment of a relation as of the same logical nature as an adjective may be defended. In the first place, the complete predicate in a relational proposition is, in my view, relatively to the subject of such proposition, equivalent to an adjective in the ordinary sense. For example, in the proposition ‘He is afraid of ghosts’, the relational component is expressed by the phrase ‘afraid of’; but the complete predicate ‘afraid of ghosts’ (which includes this relation) has all the logical properties of an ordinary objective, so that for logical purposes there is no fundamental distinction between such a relational predicate and an irrational predicate,”² Secondly, the component ‘afraid of’ can be treated as an adjective predicated of the substantive couple, ‘he’ and ‘ghosts’. In other words a relation cannot be identified with a *class* of couples but must be understood to characterise couples, i. e. be conceived intensionally.

Granting that a relation is but an adjective, it is clear that it does not, like any other adjective, qualify a substantive; for, here it admittedly qualifies both the terms at once. Nor does it do so as a universal does. Redness may be said to characterise a book as well as a rose; the book may be burnt and with it the redness but the redness of the rose will not suffer even by a shade. Even in the case of symmetrical relations as similarity or difference the transitive adjective cannot be said to characterise the terms in an identical way. For, A will be characterised by its similarity to B, and B by its similarity to A. Nor are they two adjectives entirely different and disconnected as red and green. We also note that the relational component 'similar to' is repeated when we posit a character of A as well as of B. There is also the further difficulty of relating this transitive adjective to the substantive. Johnson calls this relation a 'characterising tie'. We may agree to call that a relation by which we can pass from the substantive to the adjective, and vice versa, and by which we assert that they only are in some specific way together and not any others. The confusion between relation and adjective arises because it is possible, in almost all cases, to have, what Mc Taggart calls, a derivative character generated by the relation. A admires B is a statement of the relation between A and B. But its truth implies the truth of the statement 'A is an admirer of B' and 'B is an object of admiration to A'. And further that A is related to the quality of admirer of B and so on.

The essential character of relations is exhausted in their transitivity, in the passage from one term to another. To regard that itself as a resting place, to give it a content is the best way of inviting an infinite regress, desired or undesired. It is, therefore, seen that a genuine relation, a tie, cannot be a predicate or be a substantive, without losing its relational character.

2. Is difference a relation in the sense of a characterising tie? Prima facie it is evident that some difference between the relata is required to constitute a relation. Take away all difference, even numerical difference, the relation in question would have vanished too. McTaggart thinks that it is possible to have a relation with but one term, and cites as examples 'Every substance has the relation of identity with itself' etc. But this statement derives significance only as a denial of a previous statement about its change or difference. Far from leading to any relation, it refutes all relation. 'Self-identity' 'Self-related' etc. are either expressions which need further analysis to bring out their dual character or but modes of indicating non relation.

Disparity or contrast cannot also be taken as difference as it is not primary enough. Contrast implies that we have two complex objects; the characteristics of the one we compare with those of the other, and exactly note the degree of difference. It already presupposes the relation of the character and the characterised and their difference. Two substances can be distinguished on the ground of the qualities which the one possesses and the other does not and vice versa. What is the ground of the distinction between the substantive and the adjective? If this distinction were based on difference, can we further try to conceive it as either a quality or a relation or of the nature of things themselves?

To take the alternatives in order. If otherness or difference were a quality, it is clear that it must be present in both, in the substantive and the adjective; but mere otherness cannot serve to make them different, for it is identical in both. Taking A and B as substantive and adjective, we shall have to say that A possesses 'otherness of B' as a quality, and B 'otherness of A'. Reduced thus we see that the quality asserted is really a derivative quality and presupposes the relation 'otherness'. The first alternative has

thus reduced itself to the Second. It is futile to conceive Difference as a term.

Nor are we much helped if difference is conceived as a relation; for does not the intelligible use of the word-combination 'other than' already presuppose a distinction between the relata. In order to assert a relation we must be able to traverse from one of the relata to the other and vice versa, i.e. bring before our minds successively and simultaneously the relata. And this presupposes a distinction within the field of presentation between the relata.

To escape all this shall we say that otherness is just a name for the uniqueness of each existent? Each entity, as such, is different and not because it possesses some quality or stands in some relation to other entities. The entities are inherently different. It is evident that any one asserting such unique and universal difference cannot depend upon empirical data or arguments, but must have recourse to certain *a priori* arguments. As far as we know only two independent and original attempts have been made to establish such a position. One is the famous formula of Leibniz—the Identity of Indiscernibles and the other is the 'Kṣhaṇika Vāda' of the Buddhists.

The first asserts that "there are not in nature two indiscernible real absolute beings" or that no two substances are completely similar or differ *solo numero*". More unambiguously, a plurality of existents is impossible without the diversity of the predicates of each. This does not mean difference in space and time, for Leibniz holds that places and times are distinguished by means of things and not vice versa. Hence there must be an internal and inherent principle of distinction. The formula applies only to the Monads or substances, but not between the substance and its predicates. "The substance is by its very nature, destitute of meaning, since it is only the predicates that give a meaning. Even to

say "this" is to indicate some part of space or time, or some distinctive quality ; to explain in any way which substance we mean, is to give our substance some predicate. But unless we already know which substance we are speaking of, our judgment has no definiteness, since it is a different judgment to assert the same predicate of another substance. Thus we necessarily incur a vicious circle. The substance must be numerically determinate before predication, but only predicate gives numerical determination." ³

The Buddhistic position is more far-reaching than the Leibnizian. The former not only demands diversity of substance but a diversity of content as well. It maintains three distinct theses viz. the momentariness, unitariness, and uniqueness of all things in general. The first of these militates against permanence, the second against complexity i.e. against substances and wholes in which qualities and parts inhere, and the third against identity or repeatability. The main nerve of the argument in each case is that 'that is not one which is invested with two or more opposed characters (*Yo viruddha dharma adhyāsavān nāsāvekaḥ*), or more positively, diversity of content implies diversity of entity. For instance, the acceptance of the permanent implies that it is at once efficient and inefficient ; it cannot be the cause of any change. The conception of substance involves its difference and non-difference from its attributes and parts. Without entering into the merits of the arguments we can take note that such a universal momentarism and unicity which guarantees difference guarantees nothing else. Nothing can be said to change for what changes now is not what *was* present unchanging as this would involve the position of two mutually opposed characters. On this view, change is not a change of something, but the contiguity of

3. Russell—"The Philosophy of Leibniz"—p.p. 60.

two discrete entities. Likewise, nothing can be said to be *in* something; nothing can be predicated *of* something. Though each entity's position in a series of moments is fixed, it cannot, however, be said to possess the characters—'between', 'before', and 'after'; these are nothing but a particular disposition of the entities themselves. There is also no whole of which there are parts. It is clear that on such a theory, because the subject (Dharmī) is denied, there cannot be any predication. This is to pour the child with the bath; unique otherness far from leading to any relation negates and repels all of them. But we just wanted 'otherness' as a basis for relations e. g. between the substantive and the attribute.

All the alternatives, as they stand, are found defective, for they essay to base the distinction between the substantive and the adjective on a previously determined difference,—quality or relation. In both the cases we are thrown upon either an infinite regress or a vicious circle. The solution that can be suggested is to take the difference between the substantive and the attribute which is presupposed by any determinate difference between two substances as nothing else than the difference between the indefinite and the definite, i.e. the difference between the determinant and the determinandum. This difference itself is not arrived at through any mediation, but lies at the very basis of all our attempts to characterise something, to formulate judgments. We shall accept that this primary difference is itself a relation, but with this proviso that it is not one relation beside many, i.e. one specific relation which excludes all others, but which makes all others possible. Whatever be the specific nature of any relation, say the causal relation, it is essential that there should be difference between the relata. Otherness or primitive difference can best be conceived as a category, being relational, pervasive, necessary and formal. Otherness by itself will not give us any specific relation, but will always

compel us to seek for it, just the category of causality cannot in any given situation inform us about the specific cause or the effect but impels us to seek one.

§ 3. The foregoing considerations about Difference apply *mutatis mutandis* to Identity. It is meaningless to consider it as either a quality or of the nature of things. It is also clear that if Identity were to be a relation—and it cannot be anything else—it has to put up with some difference, as this is required of all relations. As we have already seen, 'self-identity' or 'self-related' cannot be the proper meaning of Identity, for we are left with only one term. Similarity too is not identity, for it is a relation holding between two entities which have been analysed into some determinate characters. Two entities are compared, if their characters are compared, and this presupposes the identity of each entity with its characters. Further, it is universally accepted that similarity is not the same as identity.

It has been long held that the proposition in some way or other asserts the relation of identity. This relation is not one of complete identity but involves also a relation of difference. A recent writer on Logic has suggested the formula that in every proposition 'S is P' there is the identity of denotation with difference in connotation. Johnson criticises this view at some length in his 'Logic' ⁴. On this view, says he, the proposition 'Socrates is mortal' is first to be turned into 'Socrates is a mortal being'; secondly, the indefinite article has to be introduced; since it is clear that Socrates is not identical with every mortal; thirdly, the indefinite article has to be carefully defined as meaning *One or other*; fourthly, the relation of the adjective 'mortal' to the substantive 'being' which it characterises still remains to be elucidated; fifthly, another adjective (a relational adjective) namely *identical* is introduced in the

4. Jhonson—Logic; Vol. I. p. p. 13.

compound phrase 'is identical with'. The proposition finally becomes: 'Socrates is identical with one or other being that is mortal'. Here the two adjectives 'mortal' and 'identical with' are each introduced after *is*. Now 'if identical with' is to be substituted for *is* in each case, then we shall arrive at an infinite regress."

Johnson's own account of Identity⁵ is that "when A is identical with B in a certain sense, then A is different from B in some other respect". Even when we say, 'X is identical with X', identity applies to what is *meant* by the word and otherness to its several *occurrences*; identity applies to what constitutes the *object* of thinking and otherness to the several *acts* of thought. Or identity may apply to things or their qualities, say, colour, shape etc. But in no case is anything both identical and different. On this view, identity comes to mean repetitive occurrences of the thing or its quality in different collocations; difference is either linguistic or psychological; in any case the difference is epistemic while identity is constitutive. No relation is involved between the occurrence of an entity at a certain place and time and its repetition in some other situation, for they are not two entities, unless we mean to assert that occurrence in different situations somehow changes the entity. But then, the entity in question is not really one; the two are different and the relation of identity is false. To take the prior occurrence as substance and its later ones accidents is but to restate the problem.

Can we take Identity as equipollence? The latter is a notion which applies properly to two propositions; we can say that two entities are equal only when the properties which belong to them are so. And this presupposes that each entity is identical with its properties; equipollence is itself based upon the more primitive relation of identity

5. Ibid. Vol. I. Chap. on "The Relation of Identity."

between the substantive and the adjective. Besides, if it is defined that two propositions 'p' and 'q' are equipollent if what is true or false of the one is also true or false of the other and vice versa, it will be difficult for any two propositions to satisfy this condition. For, 'other than q' is true of 'p' but not of 'q'. To take a concrete example, the sum of 2 and 3 equals 5; 'the sum of 2 and 3' contains as its constituents the 2nd and 3rd prime integers, but this is not true of the sum 5.

Thus all attempts to conceive identity as a relation,—it cannot be conceived as anything else, have proved abortive, because they are not primitive enough, or ask us to perform the impossible feat of holding to determinate distinctions and abolish them at once. As in the case of Difference, we are again forced to have recourse to the indefinite or the determinandum. Any character that we assign is asserted of the subject which appropriates and owns it up. The subject of each and every proposition which is not itself an incipient proposition is indefinite, is the determinandum, and the predicate is its determination. When we say 'The table is brown', the table stands either for all the qualities or determinations taken together, or any prominent quality that may strike us at first sight, say its rectilinear shape, or the brown itself, or something totally different from all these. In all these alternatives the predicate either becomes a wrong ascription, or is absolutely useless. To escape such a predicament we have to conceive the subject as sufficiently indeterminate. Predication itself requires it.

The indefinite is thus, logically, the subject of any and every proposition, while psychologically it can be identified with the presentational continuum, which becomes definite and articulate as attention is turned upon it. There can be a relation of identity between the indefinite and its determinations, because the indefinite itself does not stand for any warring content, but for the general field of presentation at

each particular time. Nevertheless, the predicate is not useless, for without it our knowledge would remain indefinite. Thus a movement of thought, and a distinction of terms in a proposition are ensured on this view.

4. Identity requires difference but the converse is not necessary ; therefore, it should be possible for us to make significant statements which do not involve identity. Arithmetic which is a good example of a pure science of series is such a case. The relation of identity is applicable when something is predicated of a subject.

It seems curious that both primary difference and identity should rest upon the indefinite, as both are but the different modes of the relation of the indefinite to the definite. This is to say that the relation of the definite and the indefinite is itself indefinite, i. e. it is equally identity as well as difference. The relation between an imaginary and a real object is itself imaginary. To subsume or synthesise both these relations under a third will result either in an absolute negation of these as in the Vedānta or in a mere restatement of the problem.

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Philosophical Explanation.

BY

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Whenever we seek to have explained a certain situation, we imply that there are reasons which being known, the situation becomes intelligible and not otherwise. Different kinds of reasons will satisfy us in different cases. But those reasons are held to be quite intelligible in themselves. They consist in certain propositions which are self-evident, or propositions which we are bound to assert about the nature of reality in conformity with our experience.

Explanation in mathematics is the setting out of certain self-evident propositions which being granted, the conclusion automatically follows. In empirical sciences, the only thing self-evident are the facts of experience that set the problem of explanation. Explanation may take either of the two forms : (a) It may be in the nature of a generalisation which is not in itself completely verifiable. But it brings together different facts under a general rule. Such generalisation is satisfactory as an explanation of the facts as long as no facts are found which challenge its validity. Where certain facts of experience seem not to square with the general principle, there is consciousness of the inadequacy of the principle, and a demand for a more comprehensive generalisation which will completely cover all the known cases. This may be called explanation by hypothesis. (b) The explanation again may take the form of a law that is based on actual experiment. The experiment can be repeated ; and the law is valid in so far as no incalcul-

lable element enters to vitiate the inferential process. In both cases, the explanation is strictly limited to our capacity for formulating a problem and supplying the interpretative ideas. The explanation does not explain why things happen as they do. We have to start with facts as they happen. All we can do is to render them "practically" intelligible by subsuming them under certain unities of thought. The explanation serves the immediate purposes of the understanding, notwithstanding the fact that an ultimate explanation of things is never forthcoming.

In philosophy, we seek an ultimate explanation of things, and not the provisional explanations with which empirical sciences are concerned. Two different kinds of questions may be distinguished here : (a) What things are in themselves or in their true nature ? (b) How things come to be ?

The first question implies a distinction between the real thing and the apparent thing. The second, a final cause of things as against the secondary and empirically determinable causes. Let us suppose that the latter question is answerable. In that case, it is evident (1) that the cause will not be homogeneous with the effect ; if it were, we should have to ask, what caused it ? It must therefore be uncaused (2) Secondly, it cannot be a cause operating in time. If it is in time, we cannot stop with it ; there must be an antecedent cause. (3) Thirdly, the cause must not be distinct from the effect, but identical with it. If the cause is in any way distinct, it does not explain the effect. The connection becomes inexplicable and artificial. In actual experience we do find such connection. But there at least there is evidence for it. We have no empirical evidence of any connection between the world course and an ultimate cause. Besides, nobody presumes that the empirical cause really explains the occurrence of the effect.

We may substitute the idea of an ultimate ground for that of the cause. The ground does not bring forth anything

in time. It is timeless. The so-called effects are contained in it as certain consequences are contained rationally in their premises. The latter do not bring forth the former in time. The consequences are in fact timelessly contained in their rational ground. We may therefore suppose that there is an absolute idea which is similarly the ground of the actual world-appearances. But while it is possible to evolve certain general conceptions from a more comprehensive concept, it can never be satisfactorily shown that the actual contents of experience—the specific connections between things and the particulars of sense,—can be similarly evolved out of a most comprehensive concept. The exact definition of this concept is a supremely difficult task. It is beyond the power of reason. But even if we somehow got over this difficulty to our own individual satisfaction, the farther we went from the concept and descended to particulars, greater will be the uncertainty and the obscurity of the deduction. The world of ideas with their “sequential” clearness may be eternally valid. But nobody can presume that its relation to the realm of changing relations between endlessly varied elements of the actual world is rationally intelligible, or that the latter is unrelated to the complete self-realisation of the former. We conclude that it is impossible to deduce the world of our actual experience from a general ground.

We now turn to the other question of philosophy, and suppose that the real problem is to get at the true nature of things as opposed to their apparent nature. The problem may be capable of solution. I do not want to enter into the question how it may be solved. I take it for granted that it is somehow soluble. But even though we may know the true nature of things, the question cannot be dismissed as to the relation of that nature to the apparent nature. Two different ways of regarding this relation may be considered.

(a) It may be argued that the appearances are not nothing. Reality without appearances has no content. The appearances alone constitute this content. Only, in the reality, the appearances have lost that self contradictory character which made them less than the real; they have attained that harmony and unity which is the essential nature of reality. The appearances are never wholly divorced from reality. They constitute, in an ascending series, the different degrees of reality:

Now what made the appearances "Appearances" was their self-contradictory character; and as there can be no degrees of self-contradictoriness, there can be no degrees of appearance and of reality. But even if we admitted these degrees, it is no explanation of the self-contradictory that the self-contradiction is progressively removable. We should have to admit in the end that what is self-contradictory is inexplicable by what is not self-contradictory. The possible existence of the self contradictory has not been explained.

(b) The other view is somewhat more outspoken. The appearance because it is an appearance has no place in reality. It is not something more or less real. Like the illusory snake seen in the place of a rope, it does not exist and cannot be said to be real. No element of it that constitutes it as appearance is retained in the reality. The snake is completely non-existent in the rope.

This view of the relation of reality and appearance can well be taken to be more rational. Let us suppose that it can, in fact, be carried out. The question might still arise: But how does the false appearance come to occupy the place of reality? Or in other words, reality being what it is, how does the appearance at all become possible?

It is quite evident now that reality by itself can never explain the possibility of the appearance. The true nature of a thing is in no way rationally connected with the false

and therefore non-existent nature. We cannot therefore mean by the above question that the real nature of a thing should be such that it should supply an explanation of what is admittedly unreal and non-existent. The question in order that it should be answerable, should be a rational question. Interpreted in the above way, it is evidently not a rational question.

It will be admitted that whenever we are faced with a situation in which the real nature of a thing appears different from what it is, we attribute the false appearance not to the thing itself but to the erroneous apprehension of the thing. We may therefore be tempted to account for the false appearance by saying that there is erroneous perception of reality. But is this the explanation that we want? Is the appearance at all explained? Does not the question still arise: but what gives rise to the error? It is clear that we have not explained. This last question must at least be answered if we are to have an ultimate explanation of things; and yet, in order to answer it, we must point to something in the nature of things themselves or in reality. This, we have already seen, would not explain error, but explain it away by dispelling it.

The truth is that the question as to the rational basis of error is itself not a rational question. It would be rational if the nature of error were such that it admitted of some form of explanation. But error does not admit of an explanation. It is, in its essential nature, an irrationality. It is opposed to reason. To give reasons for an error is to dissipate the error. It is to keep error "error" no longer. Error is error because it has no explanation. It is essentially inexplicable. In fact, it does not need an explanation, and cannot consistently with its nature have one. This question then which seeks for an explanation of the possibility of error is once again irrational.

How shall we then formulate our ultimate question? It is clear that the false appearance is not explained. There appears to be a demand to have it explained. And yet we cannot formulate a rational question with regard to it. Philosophy may be expected to answer all our ultimate questions. But we cannot expect of it to answer questions which are seen on analysis to be spurious in as-much as they have no conceivable answer. That there is no answer for such questions is the best answer that can be given. A philosophical system then is not complete because it can supply a direct answer to all possible questions. No system can ever do that. There will always remain certain questions which can never be answered. But the highest system of thought will meet every question by a concept which either directly resolves it, or renders it ineffective by an analysis of its inherent irrationality. This ultimate unanswerability of the most perfect philosophical system however is not a matter of despair for the human reason. It would indeed be a matter of despair if the ultimate truth of things were incapable of being known. But when by an analysis of our experience we are brought in possession of it, we are no longer shadowed by doubt and can no longer be said to have a real question left. The questions which we have found to be unanswerable are real and insistent only to those who have not followed with understanding the original process of discriminating truth from falsehood. Reason can never call halt to itself unless it has first been made the instrument of an insight into the nature of reality that is above reason. The only true ultimate explanation then is this insight and not an abstract process of justification on the plane of static ideas.

On Negation.

BY

R. DAS.

When we make a negative judgment, e. g., 'a horse is not as ass' or 'John is not wise', we certainly mean something. If such a judgment were quite meaningless, no purpose of knowledge would be served by asserting it, and it would be taken as no judgment at all. But negative judgments are quite common in life and they certainly convey some meaning.

Now, the meaning of a judgment should be contained in the judgment itself. A judgment may presuppose certain other facts, some other judgment or judgments, interests and other conditions of the mind of the person who makes the judgment. A judgment may lead to certain consequences in the form of some other judgments or some activities. But the meaning of a judgment cannot lie merely in what is presupposed by it or what follows from it. If all the meaning, that a judgment has, were to lie outside the judgment, in its presuppositions and consequences, the judgment in itself would be quite meaningless. But being meaningless, it cannot in any sense presuppose anything nor can anything follow from it. For a meaningless judgment says nothing and when it says nothing, we cannot still suppose that it presupposes or implies something. Hence it is clear that a judgment must have its meaning contained in itself. But a meaning is always something positive, and so the problem arises as to how a judgment, which is professedly negative, can yet contain a positive significance.

The first step towards the solution of this problem is to realise that there is no such thing as absolute negation. There can be no attitude of knowledge towards any content, simple or complex, which is an attitude of mere denial or rejection. Any content, which is presented, cannot be

altogether denied. By the fact that it is presented, it forces knowledge to recognise its positive character. If there is a proposition, merely proposed for consideration, and if we find that we cannot accept the proposition, even without knowing what we can accept in its place, our attitude, as knowing subjects, towards the proposition is not that of mere denial or pure negation. In the first place we are forced to recognise (accept in knowledge) the meaning of the proposition. If we do not accept the meaning, we cannot even reject it as false. Secondly, what is rejected or denied is not the proposition itself or its meaning as such but its truth or validity. Having accepted the positive meaning, we only recognise its negative relation to fact or reality. So our attitude towards the proposition is not of pure negation.

It should be further noted that we deny something of something. If there is no subject to begin with, of which something may be denied, denial would not be possible. We may deny wisdom of John and say 'John is not wise'; but if there is no John, we cannot say 'John is not wise'! Even when we know only what a thing is not and not what it is, and say that it is not such and such, our attitude is not of mere denial. We know positively that it is something, although its specific character may not be known to us. But its positive character as something is never doubted or denied. The subject, therefore, of any negative proposition has to be accepted as positive and what is denied of it is only some possible predicate.

But can we not say of a thing that it is not even a possible subject of any predication? What about a circular square which does not exist at all and which, therefore, we reject altogether?

A circular square is not anything for us; it is not even an idea. So it is neither accepted nor denied. When we say 'a circular square does not exist', what we mean is that a

circle is not a square or that a square is not a circle, and in each case we posit a subject of which a certain predicate is denied.

But the positive character of the subject does not bring out the exact significance of a negative judgment. The subject is present also in a positive judgment. So the peculiar significance of negation cannot be explained by it. What is it exactly, then, that we mean in terms of positive knowledge when we say that a horse is not an ass or that John is not wise?

Let us first see whether negation is a possible act of knowledge. In the above judgments we are supposed to negate or deny something. Now, in 'a horse is not an ass' what is it that is negated? An ass as such is not negated, because we do not mean to say that there are no asses. It might be said that in 'a horse is not an ass' we deny the truth of the proposition 'a horse is an ass'. But this would not be a correct interpretation of the proposition 'a horse is not an ass', in which we are speaking of a horse and not of a proposition or of its truth. From the proposition 'a horse is not an ass' may follow the proposition 'it is not true that a horse is an ass'; but the latter proposition is not identical in meaning with the former. Moreover this interpretation would not help to solve the problem of negation. What can we mean when we say that in a negative judgment the truth of the corresponding positive judgment is denied? Is the denial possible? Is the judgment 'a horse is an ass' true? If it is not true, where then is the truth which we can deny?

It may be said that in 'a horse is not an ass' what is denied is the identity of a horse with an ass. But on this hypothesis, too, it is easy to see, identity as such is not denied. The identity of a horse with itself or of an ass with itself is not the object of our denial. What is denied is the identity

of a horse with an ass. But is there any identity of a horse with an ass ? If not, then nothing is denied.

It will be readily granted that a horse has no real identity with an ass. If it had, it would not be denied. What is denied, it may be argued, is the supposed identity of a horse with an ass. By 'supposed identity' is probably meant an identity which is merely an object of thought. But can we really think of the identity of a horse with an ass ? Even if (confusedly) think of such an identity, is it (as thought) really denied ? Do we mean to say in the judgment in question that there is no supposed identity between a horse and an ass ? If there is the supposed identity between them, it cannot be denied ; if there is no such identity, then there is nothing to be denied.

The matter is probably more simply conceived in this way. When we say 'John is not wise', what is denied of John is not the wisdom which he has or the wisdom which is possessed by those who are really wise. If he had any wisdom it could not be denied ; and the wisdom of other people is not of course the object of our denial here. So we suppose that the idea of wisdom, which we have, is denied of John. There is the idea of wisdom in our mind and we deny it of John.

But this does not carry us very far. When we have the idea of wisdom, how can we deny it ? We do not mean to say that we have no idea of wisdom. It may be said that the idea of wisdom is denied in respect of John. But, surely, by saying 'John is not wise' we cannot mean that John has no idea of wisdom. What is meant at best is that the quality of wisdom, of which we have an idea, is not possessed by John. The quality of wisdom as such or as existing in wise people is not denied. What is denied is John's possession of this quality. But there is no possession by John of the quality of wisdom. Hence we find that our denial has no real object.

and without an object denial in the true sense of the term is not possible. If an object is real, it cannot be denied. If it is unreal, there is nothing to be denied. In either case denial is not found possible.

It may be objected that we are going about in the wrong way. We are trying to find a real object of denial. But the reality of an object is inconsistent with the fact of its denial. Hence we should suppose that there are many concepts which can be applied to certain things only and cannot be applied to others. In saying 'James is wise' we apply the concept 'wise' to James and in saying 'John is not wise' we withhold the same concept from being applied to John.

But if to affirm anything of a thing is to apply a particular concept to it and to deny something of it is to withhold a certain concept from being applied to it, then in negative judgments we do not say anything at all. For merely to withhold a concept from being applied to a thing is not really to give any character to it. The concept itself is not denied; it is denied only of the subject (in a negative judgment). But what is the meaning of 'of'? It certainly stands for some connection between the subject and the concept. If the connexion is there, there can be no denial. If it is not there, there is nothing to be denied.

From all these considerations, it is clear that denial or negation is not a possible mode of knowledge. It is not enough to say that negation presupposes affirmation and is not a co-ordinate mode of knowledge with affirmation. We have to go further and say that mere negation is not a form of knowledge at all, and the supposed negation gets its meaning only when it can be viewed as a form of affirmation. The fundamental function of knowledge is to determine and characterise (affirm) things and it can refuse to do so (deny) only by rendering itself meaningless.

But to say that mere negation is not a form of knowledge is not to say that the so-called negative judgments are untrue or meaningless. We shall now try to find out the meaning of such judgments.

The things of the world are many, and there are qualitative differences as well as numerical differences between, them. They stand in various relations with one another and come to possess many relational properties. One of the most fundamental relations of things is that of difference. There could not be a plurality of things in the world if they were not different from one another. When we say that A is not B, we only recognise and assert the relation of difference which A maintains in respect of B. To say that a horse is not an ass is merely to say that a horse is different from an ass. This relation is as objective (and so positive in a sense) as any other relation. Difference may also be conceived as a relational property generated by the relation of difference, just as fatherhood may be conceived as a property of the person who stands in the relation of being a father to some other person or persons.

This interpretation of the proposition 'A is not B' as 'A is different from B' is fundamentally different from the interpretation which makes 'A is not B' equal to 'A is not B'. In the latter case we do not learn anything definite about A. Not-B is an infinite class and by including A in this class we do not at all know what it really is. But in our interpretation we know A in a determinate relation to B which is definitely known.

It will not be convenient to introduce the notion of difference in all negative propositions. We cannot interpret the proposition 'John is not wise' in the sense that John is different from 'wise'. For if 'wise' means the class of wise men, then any member of the class being different from the class (because an individual is not a class), even a wise man

would not be wise. If we take 'wise' in the sense of all wise men taken severally as A, B, C,.....then 'John is not wise' would mean 'John is different from A, B, C,.....'. But the number of wise men cannot be exhaustively enumerated and so the relation of difference here asserted would not be really determined. Moreover in the interpretation of an apparently simple proposition a vast number of entities would be introduced, which goes against the principle of Occam's razor. If we take 'wise' in the sense of the quality of wisdom, then even of a wise man we should say that he is not wise, because a wise man is certainly different from the quality of wisdom. We can more conveniently suppose that in 'John is not wise' we assert the *absence* of wisdom in John. Absence is also an objective relational property which things possess. From the fact that there are qualitative differences in things it follows that all qualities cannot be present everywhere. Some qualities are present in some places only and absent in others. Just as an affirmative proposition asserts the presence of some quality in the subject, so does a negative proposition assert the absence of some quality in the subject. That absence is an objective property can very well be verified from experience. We find the absence of various things in many places and in many cases the bare look of a thing does come to us as a positive character of the thing. It may be said that when we do not find a thing in a particular place, we say that it is absent there, so that absence is not something that is met with as a positive character but is only another name for our not finding the thing in any particular place. But when we do not find a thing in a place, it is not that there is no finding at all. If there were lack of finding, there would be no knowledge and we should make no assertion at all. 'We do not find the thing' really means 'we find the absence of the thing'.

It may be objected that, by making difference and absence objective, we are endowing things with an infinite number of

attributes, and if all differences and absences are objective, if, that is, they exist in the thing to which they are referred, how is it, it may be further asked, that we do not know them when we know the thing? And how, again, is one difference or absence to be distinguished from all the rest?

This is not a very serious difficulty. Our knowledge of things is never exhaustive. When we know a thing we do not necessarily know all the properties belonging to it. But because we do not know them, it does not mean that they do not exist. Both absence and difference are relational properties and so they cannot be known unless the correlative terms of the relation are brought to our knowledge. Various differences and absences present in a thing are to be distinguished from one another by reference to the things from which it is different or which are absent in it. If a person has two sons, A and B, he is said to be the father of both A and B. Now to be the father of A is not the same thing as to be the father of B, if B is born later. So the person in question has two fatherhoods which can be distinguished only by reference to his two children. Similarly in the case of absences and differences.

What we have spoken of here as absence and difference may be conceived as varieties of non-being. Non-being pure and simple, in the sense of absolute negation of being, is not something that can even be conceived. But the non-being of X may be conceived as that to which X stands in not-relation. We may take not-relation to be a fundamental relation of thought. It holds between two terms which cannot be referred to the same locus and of which the absence of the one implies the presence of the other. 'White' and 'black' cannot be referred to the same place but the absence of 'white' does not imply the presence of 'black', for a thing, which is not 'white' may very well be 'red' instead of being 'black'. So they do not stand in not-relation. But X and the non-being of X.

cannot be referred to the same thing and the absence of one implies the presence of the other. They, therefore, stand in not-relation to each other. This relation is symmetrical but is neither reflexive nor transitive.

Absence of anything is simply the non-being of that thing. Difference is the non-being of identity. The proposition 'A is not B' means 'there is in A the non-being of the identity of B'. There is the identity of B with itself and we find its non-being in A. These non-beings are all particulars determined by the correlative terms which stand in not-relation to them. They are objective and also positive in the sense that they are definite contents for our thought. In all negative judgments we refer these not-relational positive contents to their respective subjects.

Rewards and Punishments

BY

A. F. Markham

Leibniz believed that all spirits whether of men or beings superior to men are members of the City of God, "that is to say, of the most perfect state, formed and governed by the greatest and best of monarchs : in which there is no crime without punishment, no good action without a proportionate reward, and in short as much virtue and happiness as possible." (Principles of Nature and Grace ; Engl : trans : Latta, section 15.)

The moral consciousness postulates a necessary connection between virtue and reward, vice and punishment. We consider that it is right, fitting and proper for crimes to be punished and virtuous acts to be rewarded. Punishment is justified not because it satisfies man's natural instinct for revenge, nor because it deters men from committing crimes, nor even because it serves to reform the characters of the persons punished

McDougall rightly says that the desire for revenge is a powerful and persistent motive of human action at all levels of culture. (An Outline of Psychology, page 434.) Legal punishment probably originated when the state tried to prevent injured parties from indulging in acts of indiscriminate vengeance. It is idle to deny the great social utility of punishment in controlling the passions of men. Moreover in determining the severity of punishment the law takes into account the extent to which popular indignation has been aroused. Among primitive peoples it is not uncommon for a murderer who is lucky enough to avoid arrest till angry passions have subsided to get off with a fine instead of paying the extreme penalty. (R. R. Marett, Anthropology, page 192).

Punishment however cannot be justified on the ground of popular indignation. The execution of the Athenian admirals

after the battle of Arginusæ and of Byng after the loss of Minorca in spite of the protests of Socrates and Pitt was an act of gross injustice. The question is as to what makes indignation "righteous indignation". It is not indignation which gives the right to punish, but the fact that a man deserves punishment makes the indignation felt against him righteous. We may regard punishment as the expression of righteous indignation, provided we realise that what makes the punishment just is not the indignation but the wrong committed. If I commit a crime I am rightly punished by the law whether any man feels righteous indignation or not. This point seems to have been overlooked by Dr. Inge who wrote: "I can see nothing immoral or unreasonable in regarding the criminal law as the instrument of the outraged conscience of the nation. This was St. Paul's opinion. He speaks of the magistrate as "the minister of God, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil." Of course, if we suppose that the Deity himself never feels wrath and never punishes retributively, the State cannot claim the right to do so either. In that case, in the strict sense, nobody ought to be 'punished' at all. (Lay Thoughts of a Dean. page 149).

According to Hobbes the end of punishment is not revenge but terror. He defines punishment as "an evil inflicted by public authority on him that hath done or omitted that which is judged by the same authority to be a transgression of the law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience." (Leviathan Chapter XXVIII).

It should be remembered that Hobbes denied the existence of the social instincts and thought that society was held together by self-interest and fear. "It must," writes Dr. Thouless, "of course, be recognised that fear is one motive in socialised conduct, and that this motive is utilised by the method of legal punishment to reinforce the social impulses when these are not sufficient. There is no evidence, however

that legal punishment plays any more fundamental place in the determination of social behaviour than that of supplementing the social instincts where these fail. It is unlikely that the fear of punishment alone could weld men together into an effective society, unless their loyalties, their disinterested emotions, and their sensitiveness to social approval and disapproval, had already formed a social organisation which merely needed buttressing at points of weakness'. (Social Psychology pages 118 to 119).

The theory that deterrence is the sole justification and purpose of punishment is open to serious criticism. Let us examine the consequences which should logically follow from this theory. When the state finds that a penalty is insufficient to deter men from committing a crime, the severity of the penalty should be increased. If the gallows does not prevent murder, then murderers should be put to death by slow torture, and executions should be public so as to inspire terror in the hearts of would-be assassins. If students cannot be prevented by rustications and expulsions from using dishonest means in examinations, they should be mercilessly flogged. When the police are unable to arrest the true culprit, they should burn down all the houses in the village where a murder has been committed. Children should be taught from infancy to fear the terrible torments which await the souls of the damned in hell.

The late Professor Bosanquet held that the promotion of morality by force is an absolute self contradiction. Many men glibly assert the impossibility of making men better by act of parliament. This view is I think largely erroneous. In the moral development of children and nations alike punishment plays an important part. "The existence," wrote Dean Rashdall, "of punishment for an offence may create a state of feeling in which the act is looked upon as wrong in itself. The individual who begins with abstaining from fear of punish-

ment may end by regarding the act with hearty and spontaneous dislike : and the individual born into a society already permeated with that feeling may simply not be aware that the existence of punishment for the offence has anything to do with his own dislike of it." (The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol : I page 299).

The reformatory theory of punishment is attractive and extremely popular to-day. Jails, we are told, should be maintained in order to improve the characters of criminals and the death penalty should be abolished. Punishment is justified as a kind of compulsory moral education. We should avoid inflicting pain and try to make the lives of prisoners as happy as possible.

That in punishing an offender we should so far as possible try to choose a form of punishment likely to reform his character we should probably all agree. Nevertheless I submit that men are not justly punished simply because a benevolent government wishes to reform their characters by compulsion. It is the duty of the state to preserve the rights of its members as persons capable of moral choice. If the state has a right to punish me simply in order to make me a better man, there is no limit to the extent to which the state may interfere with my liberty. The state has a right to punish me ~~because I~~ have done wrong, not in order to make me better than I am.

"We pay," wrote Bradley, " the penalty, because we owe it, and for no other reason ; and if punishment is inflicted for any other reason whatever, than because it is merited by wrong, it is a gross immorality, a crying injustice, an abominable crime, and not what it pretends to be. We may have regard for whatever considerations we please—our own convenience, the good of society, the benefit of the offender ; we are fools, and worse, if we fail to do so. Having once the right to punish, we may modify the punishment according to the useful and the pleasant, but these are external to the matter ;

they cannot give us a right to punish, and nothing can do that but criminal desert." (Ethical Studies, quoted by Rashdall op : cit : Vol : I. page 287).

According to Paulsen the wrong committed is not the ground but only the occasion of the punishment inflicted. He finds the ground of punishment in the effect which is not in the past, but in the future. "Punishment is an evil which is inflicted upon the criminal by the authorities of the state *in order that* crime may not be committed in the future." (A System of Ethics, trans : Thilly, page 608).

The question in dispute is as to whether the ground of punishment is retrospective or teleological. With Kant, Hegel and Bradley I hold that it is the wrong committed which justifies punishment, while I agree with Bosanquet that "the true place of deterrence and reformation is simply to determine the method and degree of details which no estimate of moral guilt can supply." (Some Suggestions in Ethics, page 203).

To understand the significance of legal punishment we should remember that a state exists for the promotion of the good life—the corporate life of persons living together in unity, peace and good will. When an individual member injures a fellow citizen he deserves punishment because his action if condoned would show that the state was indifferent to the ideal which it ought to promote. "When the supreme authority," wrote Spinoza, "constrained by desire of preserving peace, punishes a citizen who injures another, I do not say that it is indignant with the citizen, since it is not excited by hatred to destroy him, but punishes him from motives of piety." (Ethics, Part IV Prop : LI schol : Engl : trans : Hale White.)

In the city of God of which all rational beings are members it is necessary for the Supreme authority to show its marked disapproval of every action which violates the moral order of the universe and its marked approval of actions which help to promote the true ultimate good of all spirits. Failure to

bestow rewards and punishments would show the moral indifference of the Supreme Authority calculated to make men have no respect for the sanctity of the moral law.

Professor Taylor well says, "We could not draw any real inspiration towards good from whatever relations we may have with a being who thinks so little of us that he does not care what we may do. Indeed such a being would be morally on a lower level than ourselves, who may not care what we do as profoundly as we ought, but at any rate do care to some extent. A 'great first cause' of so unspiritual a kind would plainly be no fit recipient of respect, to say nothing of adoration, from beings with a moral nature." (The Faith of a Moralist Series I pages 189 190.)

Though in our view it is right and fitting that virtue should be rewarded and vice punished, we consider that an action of which the motive is hope of reward or fear of punishment has no *moral* value, though it may have great value of another kind. Kant was probably right in maintaining that an act is morally right only when done *because* duty commands. (See an article by Professor de Burgh on Right and Good in Journal of Philosophical Studies, July, 1930).

That virtue will be rewarded and vice punished is a hope based on a belief in the ultimate rationality and goodness of the Universe. It is good for morality that there is no certainty that the belief is true. Let me conclude with the closing words of Kant's *Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason*: "Thus what the study of nature and of man teaches us sufficiently elsewhere may well be true here also; that the unsearchable wisdom by which we exist is not less worthy of admiration in what it has denied than in what it has granted." (Abbott's Translation page 246.)

Mill's Objection against Syllogism

BY

S. N. KUNDU.

Generally Mill's objection against Syllogism is stated under two separate heads; for example, Mill's objection not intended to be separated in two. Dr. P. K. Roy puts it thus: "There are two essential points in Mill's view of Syllogism

(1) that it is not the usual process of reasoning, (2) that it involves the fallacy of *Petitio Principii*". (Deductive Logic, part 3, chap 8 sec 3). In fairness to Mill's position it must be stated, however, that he himself makes no such division and aims only a single blow at Syllogism.

In order to understand Mill's position it is first of all necessary to remember, what is very often forgotten by most of our Logicians, that Mill is not a thorough-going opponent of Syllogism. He is not for the total rejection of syllogism (vide his Logic, Book 2, chap. 3, sec 1). (Recently Mr. Johnson has also pointed this out, vide his Logic, part 2, introduction, sec 7). Mill only pleads for a re-interpretation of the syllogistic form. The ordinary interpretation of it that would represent syllogism as a process of drawing the particular as a new truth, from out the general proposition he does not accept. But this does not mean that he rejects in toto either its "Deductive" or its "Inferential" character. He simply disjoins the two aspects: according to him so far as it claims to be deductive in character (i. e. so far as it pretends to draw out the particular from the universal) syllogism lacks the essence of inference: in his own language, "no reasoning from generals to particulars can as such prove any thing". This is the nerve of his famous charge that "syllogism considered as an argument to prove the conclusion involves *Petitio Principii*". This however does not mean that according to Mill we do not infer

any conclusion at all in syllogism; all that he does say is that "the conclusion is not an inference drawn from the formula but an inference drawn according to the formula. Taking as an example of syllogism, All men are mortal, The Duke of Wellington is a man, Therefore, The Duke of Wellington is mortal, Mill says "the proposition that the Duke of Wellington is mortal, is evidently an inference ; it is got as a conclusion from something else ; but do we in reality conclude it from the proposition 'All men are mortal' ? I answer No." (Book 2, Chap 3, Sec. 3).

(1) It should be clear from the above that one very common argument that is urged against Mill (i.e., by De Morgan and others) viz that syllogism could not be a *Petitio* since new knowledge is possible through it, as in Geometry, has no relevancy at all ; Mill never denies that inference is possible through syllogism, his only contention being that in that case not the traditional but his own interpretation of syllogistic inference must be accepted. As he plainly puts it "Though there is always a process of reasoning or inference where a syllogism is used, the syllogism is not a correct analysis of that process of reasoning or inference." (Book 2 chap. 3 Sec. 3).

(2) Another misunderstanding of Mill's position is to think that Mill looks upon the Deductive form of inference as useless. (Welton for example commits this mistake ; Vide his Manual of Logic, Vol. 1, Sec. 139). Mill distinctly says that "the syllogism though not the type reasoning is a test of it" ; in language plainer still he writes "I must enter a protest against the doctrine that the syllogistic art is useless for the purposes of reasoning. The reasoning lies in the act of generalisation, not in interpreting the record of that act ; but the syllogistic form is an indispensable co-lateral security for the correctness of the generalisation itself." (Book 2, chap 3, sec. 3).

It will be seen that Mill impugnes neither the Deductive nor the Inferential aspect of syllogism. But to each he would give his own interpretation : according to him, as deduction it is not the type but only the test of inference as reasoning ; as an inference it is not eductive, but entirely deductive (i. e. from particular to particular). It is against the joining of these two aspects together that Mill has directed his great attack : according to him to say that deduction is an inference, or inference is deductive is to commit *Petitio Principii*. Any effective refutation, therefore, must be directed against this last point. The two other points—that deduction can be a test of inference and that inference (in Mill's sense of the term as used here) can be eductive hardly admit of any serious doubt.

In Mill's own language his objection to the syllogism may be stated thus : "When we say,

All men are mortal

Socrates is a man

Therefore, Socrates is mortal, it is unanswerably urged by the adversaries of syllogistic reasoning that the proposition, Socrates is mortal, is presupposed in the more general proposition, all men are mortal "

The refutation of this charge has generally taken the form of admitting, on the one hand, that "if a universal proposition were a mere 'universal of fact' or a summary of examined particulars the cogency of this objection to the syllogism could not be denied", and of asserting, on the other hand, that there are ways of arriving at the universal proposition (for example by imperfect induction) without knowing this particular conclusion to be true, so that a syllogism with such an universal as premise will not be fallacious. (Vide Keynes, *Formal Logic*, sec. 38F. Walton's *Manual*, Vol. 1, sec. 129). Even Johnson, so acute and accurate a logician on other occasions seems to support the same method of refutation. It follows

from his (i. e. Mill's) exposition that a syllogism whose major is admittedly established by induction from instances, can be relieved from the reproach of begging the question or circularity if and only if, the minor term is not included in the ultimate evidential data." (Johnson's *Logic*, part 2, intr. p. lxx.) This however is no real answer to Mill; Mill himself knew not less than any body else, that complete enumeration is not at least the only way of establishing universal truths. Indeed Mill's charge against syllogism, whether valid or invalid, has a meaning only when the universal premise is put forward without knowing all the cases under it. As Carveth Read finely puts it, "If all the facts of the major premise of any syllogism have been examined, the syllogism is needless (and not fallacious) but if some of them have not been examined then (and then only) it is *petitio principii*." (*Logic* chap 13, sec 3) (The bracketed words are our addition). As Mill himself stated it "I do not say that a person who affirmed, before the Duke of Wellington was born, that all men are mortal, know that the Duke of Wellington was mortal, but I do say that he asserted it" (sec 3 footnote). Mill's whole point lies here: "Whoever pronounces the words, all men are mortal, has affirmed that Socrates is mortal, though he may never have heard of Socrates; for since Socrates whether, known to be so or not, really is a man, he is included in the words 'All men' and in every assertion of which they are the subject" (sec 8 footnote).

There is no way out of this charge unless we are able to show that in the major there is no assertion about "All men"; that is, unless we are able to show that not only the denotative but also the predicative interpretation of the major must be rejected. The major must be interpreted through and through in intension, so that the major, all men are mortal must mean to assert a necessary connection between the attributes.

humanity and mortality ; it is then not a judgment regarding " all men " and can not therefore, be said to include the particular judgment regarding ' Socrates '. Only then there will be no *petitio principii* involved in syllogism.

But is this connotative interpretation of the major, though necessary for the defence of syllogism, at all available ? Ordinary Logic of course allows us the liberty to interpret a term either in extension or in intension ; but that position is really unacceptable here ; for if both the interpretations were equally possible, it becomes simply inexplicable how the syllogism would become fallacious on one interpretation and quite valid on another. The connotative interpretation then must be the only permissible interpretation for the universal proposition and any other interpretation like the predicative or the denotative must be inadmissible. And this is exactly what we find from a careful consideration of that method of induction—viz causal induction—from which these universals are obtained as conclusions. The conclusion of such an induction is always an abstract connection between attributes or phenomena. The form in which such a conclusion is ordinarily put, the denotative form belies its real meaning ; it should therefore be given a different expression. Sigwart and others have suggested the hypothetical form (like, if humanity is, then mortality is) as the best expression for a necessary connection of attributes. But whether that expression be selected or not, the denotative and predicative readings of the generic universal are utterly misleading.

This connotative interpretation of the major however involves important consequences : the entire Aristotelian theory of syllogism must be recast in the light of this interpretation ; for that theory is based on the denotative interpretation of the subject of the proposition. For example, Aristotle's *Dictum De Omni Et Nullo*, the general syllogistic

rules (like the rules of distribution) and the special rules, lose all their applicability unless the terms, especially the subject term, can be taken in extension. What changes the syllogistic form must undergo under the necessity of this connotative interpretation of the major, can only be the subject of a subsequent paper.

Appearance and Reality.

(An Examination of Shankara's position)

BY

E. AHMED SHAH.

His Position :

“This entire apparent World, in which good and evil actions are done, is a mere *illusion*, owing to the non-discrimination of (the self's) limiting adjuncts, viz., a body and so on, which spring from name and form, the presentation of Nescience, and does *in reality not exist at all*. (Shankara's Commentary on Vedanta Sutas II. I. 23). Thus Shankara in a very telling manner and in an unambiguous language states his position as regards Appearance—the entire apparent World.

Since the question of illusion is discussed in general by Shankara, I shall follow him in his attempt to prove the illusory character of the World, and comparing his views with the view of another great commentator of the Vedanta, Ramanuja, and supplementing their views with the critical remarks of modern scholars, I shall finally draw a conclusion as to the nature of Reality and its Appearance, thus offering a critical exposition of Shankara's position.

Shankara's two Supports.

He maintains the illusory character of the World from two points of view, namely, the philosophical and the Scriptural. (1). Philosophical :—The philosophic reason is presented by him in many places as he comments upon the Vedanta Sutas. One prominent version of it occurs in his commentary on the 14th Sutas of Pada I of Adhyaya II. An opponent raises the question “ How can you make the assertion that the creation, sustentation and absorption of the world proceeds from an omniscient, omnipotent Lord, while all the time you maintain the absolute unity and non duality of the self ?” To this

Shankara replies :—" Listen how. Belonging to the self, as it were, of the omniscient Lord, there are name and form, *the figments of Nescience*, not to be defined either as being (i. e. Brahman), nor as different from it, the germs of the entire expanse of the phenomenal world, called in 'Sruti' and 'Smriti' the illusion (Maya) power (Shakti), or Nature (Prakriti) of the omniscient Lord. Different from them is the omniscient Lord himself, as we learn from scriptural passages such as the following : ' He who is called Ether is the revealer of all forms and names ; that within which these forms and names are contained is Brahman'. (Chand. up. VIII. 14. 1.) ' Let me evolve names and forms ' (Chand. up. VI. 3. 2). ' He who makes the one seed manifold ' (Svet. up. VI. 12). Hence the Lord being a Lord his omniscience, his omnipotence etc. all depend on the limitation due to the adjuncts whose self is Nescience ; while in reality none of these qualities belong to the self whose true nature is cleared by right knowledge, from all adjuncts whatsoever." Vedanta Sūtras 11. 1. 14 ; S. B. E. Vol. 34, pp. 328, 329).

Shankara's philosophic position is an attempt to explain the nature of reality as one. That alone is, nothing else is. All that is other than that, all that presents duality and diversity is really apparent, but not apparently real, is an appearance, an illusion, Maya. His idea as to the nature of reality he obtained from scriptures, as is abundantly manifest to a reader of his Bhasya on Vedanta Sūtras. This brings us to his second reason for the illusory character of the World.

(2) Scriptural—The scriptural basis of his argument is supported by reference to the older scripture, chiefly the Upanishads. There are four important references, viz., :—(a) " He (the Lord) became like unto every form and this is meant to reveal the (true) form of him (the Atman). Indra (the Lord) appears multiform through the Maya (Appearances), for his horses (senses) are yoked, hundred and tens." (Brih. up.

11. 5. 19). (b) "That which is perishable is the Pradhana (the first), the immortal and Unperishable is Hara. The one god rules the perishable (the Pradhana) and the (living) self (individual soul). From meditating on him, from joining him, from becoming one with him there is further cessation of all illusion in the end. (Svet. up. 1. 10.) (c). "That from which the maker (Mayin) sends forth all this—the sacred verses, the offerings, the sacrifices, the penances, the past, the future, and all that the Vedas declare—in that the other is bound up through that Maya (art), and the great Lord (maker) the whole world is filled with what are his members." (Svet. up. IV. 9. 10). (d). "To them belongs that pure Brahman World, to them, namely, in whom there is nothing crooked, nothing false, and no gile." (Prasna. up. 1. 16).

There are 24 references to eight other minor Upanishads, and two important references to the Gita 7. 14, 15, and 18, 61.

Examination of the two Supports.

A critical examination of these two supports for the illusory character of the world advanced by Shankara will enable us to find out how far his position is tenable.

1. *Of Scriptural Support*:—Of the two supports philosophical and scriptural—the former is based on the latter, therefore we will consider the latter first.

He maintains the illusory character of the world by claiming that the scriptures say so. The four principal passages on which the doctrine is based have been given above. The word Maya does appear in every one of them. But there is a difference of opinion amongst scholars both Indian and European as to its meaning in the older texts of the scriptures. I will quote Ramanuja's explanation of the word. A critic raises an objection by saying: "The word Maya is synonymous with Mithya, i. e., falsehood, and hence means illusion." Ramanuja answers in the following words: "This

we cannot admit ; for the word *Maya* does not in all places refer to what is false ; we see it applied, e.g., to such things as the weapons of *Asuras* and *Rakshasas* which are not false but real. *Maya* in such passages really denotes that which produces various wonderful effects, and it is in this sense that *Prakriti* is called *Maya*. This appears from the passage *S'vet. Up. IV. 9*. For this text declares that *Prakriti*—there called *Maya*—produces manifold wonderful creations, and the highest person there is called *Maya*, because he possesses the power of *Maya*, not on account of any *Avidya* (Nescience) on his part.” (*Vedanta Sūtras* 1. 1. 1., *S. B. E.* Vol. 48, pp. 125, 126) At another place *Ramanuja* remarks “What *Maya* actually denotes here is abundance, pervailingness, in agreement with *Panini*, *V. 4. 21*.” (*S. B. E.* Vol. 48, pp. 92, 93.)

Besides *Ramanuja* a majority of modern scholars are unanimous in declaring that the word *Maya* as used in the older *Upanishads* does not mean illusion, but power, wonderful power, creative power, mysterious power. As for instance *Dr. Thibaut* writes :—“It is well known that, with the exception of the *Svetasvatra* and *Maitrayani*, none of the older *Upanishads* exhibits the word *Maya*. The term indeed occurs in one place in the *Brihadaranyaka*, but that passage is a quotation from the *Rik Samhita* in which *Maya* means ‘Creative power’ (*S.B.E.* Vol 34, pp. CXVII). Professor *Max Mullar* writest “The power which enabled *Is'vara* to create was a power within him, not independent of him, whether we call it *Devatmasakti*, *Maya* or *Prakriti*. That power is really inconceivable, and it has received such different forms in the minds of different *Vedantists*, that in the end *Maya* herself is represented as the creative power, nay, as having created *Is'vara* himself.” (*S. B. E.* Vol. 15, pp. XXXVII). Professor *Macdonell* strongly endorses the view held by *Dr Thibaut* and Professor *Max Muller* by saying that if the historical development of a language is given any consideration, as it certainly should

be given, then the word *Maya* has come to mean illusion after gradually passing through three distinct stages of meaning, namely, creative or mysterious power, skill like that of a magician, and appearance, i.e., the phenomenal appearance. Of these four meanings the older Upanishads used the word in the sense of Creative or Mysterious power.

It is abundantly clear that Shankar's scriptural basis, when judged in the light of scholarly historical evidence, does not seem to stand the test.

2. *Of Philosophical Support* :—His philosophic reason is based on an assumption as to the nature of reality, which he obtains from the scriptures. Reality is one. Whatever is, is in reality one. There exists only one Universal absolute being called Brahman.

In the first place, he takes for granted the nature of reality, and then in order to justify that assumption an explanation is offered showing the illusory character of the world. He takes his stand on a priori grounds. But when an attempt is made to understand that reality on a posteriori basis, starting inductively from that which is given in experience, it becomes difficult to maintain such a view. For, if the nature of reality is one, an absolute unity, then, either the given something, the Many of human experience, is unaccountable, or the nature of such a reality cannot be conceived, known, thought or even named by men. (Compare *Mund. up.* III. 1. 8; *Brih. up.* III. 9. 26 ; *Taitt.* 11. 7; *Mund.* 1.1.6). Such a conception of reality is as unprofitable as it is inapprehensible. The logical consequence of such a position is its unknowableness. Truly nothing can be said of such a being but *Neti Neti*.

Secondly, is not the philosophical argument regarding the illusory character of the world in view of his conception of reality as 'One without a second' refuted on its own basis? Does it not contain a self-contradiction? Shankara the

upholder of the theory that all that is other than Brahman is an illusion (Maya) says the theory of Maya is true. But the theory itself being a theory of something other than Brahman stands disproved on its own ground.

Edward Caird has expressed the same truth in the following words: "If the world we behold without is an insubstantial pageant, we ourselves to whom it appears must be such stuff as dreams are made of." Locke's words on the point cut the foundation of the edifice on which such a theory is built. He writes: "If all be a dream, then he doth but dream that he makes the question; and so it does not much matter that a waking man should answer him."

Thirdly: Having seen that the metaphysical result of his position leads us to the unknowable, and the logical conclusion implies a self-contradiction, we maintain that the world of our experience as apprehended and known by the mind is not an illusion, but real.

Three Additional Criticisms.

For three other reasons Shankara's position: "This entire apparent world, in which good and evil actions are done is a mere illusion" cannot be maintained.

1. It cannot consistently be fitted in with the theory of Creation given in the Upanishads. The most important theory of Creation is given in Chandogya Upanishads. VI. 2. 3. There if anywhere, the illusory character of the world should have been hinted at, but not a word to that effect is met with anywhere

2. Referring to his method of criticising the Sankhya system in his own Bhashya on Vedanta Sutrās. II. 1. 6., it may be remarked, that his whole refutation of that system is meaningless in view of his own position. Why should he take the trouble of answering the Sankhya objection that the non-intelligent world cannot spring from an intelligent principle,

by the remark that ' it is thus seen that non-intelligent things are produced from beings endowed with intelligence ; hairs and nails, for instance, spring from animals, and certain insects from dung.' Why should he insist on the fact of coming into being of the non-intelligent out of the intelligent when all is appearance, is illusion. From his point of view all this argumentation seems to be altogether irrelevant.

3. Again his statement implying Brahman to be not only the operative but the material cause as well, as given in Vedanta Sūtras 1. 4. 23-28 is quite out of place. For why should he take pains to establish at length the fact of the world having been brought into being by Brahman not only as its operative but material cause ? If all is an illusion, why present a lengthy argument to prove the existence of this illusion ? His method here is inconsistent with the spirit of his philosophy.

Conclusion.

If we bear in mind these various aspects of his system, it will not be altogether wrong to maintain that :

In general Shankara's philosophy may give an impression of the illusory character of the world ; and he did wish to impress such an idea on the mind of his readers. He has been to a great degree successful in his attempt, in spite of the interpretations of the sūtras by men like Ramanuja. The dominant view today in India is that which Shankara taught.

In particular (a) investigating the basis of his system as founded on scriptural authority in the light of philosophy showing the progressive development of words ;

(b) Critically examining his philosophical position ;

(c) Judging the nature of reality from the point of view of that which is given in human consciousness—the nature of reality as interpreted and understood by the mind as it comes in contact with the objective words ; and

(d) Comparing his own arguments as advanced against other systems, it will not be altogether wrong, I say, to maintain, that, in spite of his efforts to establish the illusory character of the world, it is not as conclusively established as it is commonly held.

Is Vedantism Mysticism?

BY

ASHUTOSH SHASTRI.

It is characteristic of Hindu Philosophy to recognise the values of authority and sometimes an excessive stress is laid upon it. Authority has a field of its own which cannot be covered by any other source, either perception or inference. That suggestibility opens an avenue of knowledge is accepted on all hands and especially in matters of finer knowledge and subtler perceptions, authority becomes the only source of knowledge, for the other sources are not easily accessible. Vedanta in accepting authority as a source of knowledge has shown the highest regard for truth conveyed unto humanity and in this has not limited the scope of knowledge to the ordinary sources. But in accepting the value of authority it has not committed itself to dogmatism inasmuch as it subjects authority to criticism before it can accept it. In this Vedanta has sustained the philosophic spirit and at the same time it has not gone to the other extreme of categorically throwing away the truths revealed unto humanity. Vedanta has, therefore, recognised all the possible sources of knowledge though it has not accepted anyone of them without sufficient reason and ground. Truth must satisfy the demands of all the faculties of knowledge. It must satisfy reason and logic, it must be in a line with revealed authority and above all it must be intuited. Any conflict between these sources of knowledge requires consideration and research. The claim of reason is no doubt high, but reason cannot give us immediate knowledge. When truth reveals, reason finds it self-consistent and not opposed to its own affirmation. Truth fills the whole being and satisfies all forms of demands of consciousness. Any partial presentation of truth may lack in this ideal and may be a strain upon thought.

Though Vedanta has duly recognised the respective importance of the different sources of knowledge mentioned above, still as a philosophic discipline Vedanta has to accentuate the critical reflection. Vedanta does not doubt the claim of intuition to truth, but when the affirmation of intuition is to be carried to others it seeks the aid of reason and logic, for an undisciplined understanding cannot grasp the philosophic implication and prepare for illuminated vision. "Samkara recognises the need of reason for testing scriptural views. Wherever he has an opportunity, he tries to confirm scriptural statements by rational arguments. Reasoning (tarka), which works as an auxiliary of intuition (anubhava), is commended by him. Reason with him is a critical weapon against untested assumptions and a creative principle which selects and emphasises the facts of truth. Even those destitute of the power of judgment do not attach themselves to particular traditions without any reason. Anubhava is the vital spirit of experience which can be communicated only through the language of imagination, and Sruti is the written code embodying it. Without the background of experience the statement of Sruti is mere sound without sense."

Vedanta as a theory of knowledge has recognised the services of intellect and intuition and has sought to seek confirmation of the one from the other. Logic and intuition have not been, therefore, contradictory. The highest intuitions are for the intellect the greatest truth and what is for the intellect a logical truth, is for intuition a spiritual reality. Mystic intuition is not a necessity opposed to reason though it flashes out light which intellect takes time to discover. Vedanta approaches truth through intellect as well as through intuition and does not find any conflict between the two, though what intuition presents in immediate consciousness, is seen by intellect in mediate consciousness. This is especially true of the theistic vedantism.

The final appeal to truth in all forms of Vedantism is direct intuition. Though the Vedantic teachers differ in the ultimate nature of intuition, still everyone has regarded intuition as the highest method of realising truth. Reason occupies the subordinate place inasmuch as it can give mediate knowledge and not immediate knowledge. In this the theistic teachers are at one with the transcendentalists. Vedanta claims the direct vision of truth and it is a system based upon it.

Vedantic teachers differ in their conception of the absolute and relative truth. The Advaita Vedantist thinks that the Absolute is beyond our relative consciousness and is revealed in intuition. The relative order is understood by reason and is true to reason. Reason cannot go beyond the relative order and the relative truth. Reason is confirmed to this order, as it works with categories of space, time and causality. "Intellect works with the categories of space, time, cause and force which involve us in deadlocks and antinomies. Either we must postulate a first cause, in which case, causality ceases to be a universal maxim or we have an endless regress. The puzzle cannot be solved by intellect, pure and simple. It must confess itself to be bankrupt when ultimate questions arise." The absolute therefore, for ever remains a wonder to the intellect and admiration for the heart. The theistic teachers, on the other hand, do not see this gap between the absolute and the relative order and are anxious to conceive the relative in the Absolute and to see the Absolute in the relative. Intuition reveals the Absolute as well as the relative and their synthesis. Reason sees the same truth logically. Reason does not conflict with intuition, but rather it upholds its affirmations. Logic and intuition with the theistic teachers support each other, and they thereby attempt to establish a harmony between the absolute and the relative. This unity of the Absolute and the relative is, therefore, as much a logical

affirmation as intuitive realisation. But this harmony of reason and intuition is a feature wanting in the Advaita Vedanta. Advaitism cannot establish by reason what intuition reveals, for the Advaita Vedantist thinks that reason is confined to relativity of knowledge and can never transcend it.

Reason and intuition are two different faculties having different scopes and the function of intuition can never be appropriated by reason, nor is reason competent to pronounce any judgment upon the affirmations of intuition. This naturally leads us to suppose that the intuition of the transcendentalists differs from that of the theistic teachers. Intuition in Ramanuja is not essentially distinct from a logical faculty whereas in Samkara it is superlogical. No intellectual category can approximately describe Samkara's intuition. None can approach it. In Ramanuja intuition never transcends the ordinary conditions of logical knowledge though it may be competent to give finer perception and subtler consciousness. In Ramanuja, therefore knowledge has uniform character in immanence as well as in transcendence. The character of knowledge thus nowhere differs, though its being and object may be limited and unlimited. Ramanuja never denies this logical character of intuition. Intuition is, in fact, assimilated to judgment. Samkara's intuition is essentially superlogical, for he denies all the conditions of relative thinking. Samkara has therefore, a greater affinity to Mysticism than Ramanuja. He like Spinoza refers to reason as a ratiocinative faculty not competent to realise transcendental truth. The intuitive cognition can only approach truth. The divergence of reason and intuition is a special feature of Samkara's metaphysics. Therefore, in his philosophy unaided reason has been instrumental to finding out contradictions in relative concepts and antinomies in its own character. Reason, in fact, is inherently incompetent to establish the final truth, for it moves in relational consciousness and cannot transcend the relative. Logical

faculty is, therefore, by its own nature precluded from knowing the non-relational being: Samkara has, therefore, finally to break away from the assertions of logic and see the way to intuition. Intuition and reason are not compatible. Logic moves in the sphere of the relative and is not competent to embrace truth where the conditions of realistic thinking disappear. This difference of intuition and intellect has brought to philosophy a momentous conclusion, viz., truth is to be directly felt and apprehended, it can never be thought about.

Vedanta like all revealed systems of religion accepts spiritual testimony as a source of knowledge and all the Vedantic teachers accept the authority of the Vedas as revealed texts. Supernatural revelation and spiritual illumination have been fascinating to the seekers after truth, for naturally in the infancy of humanity man has always sought guidance from above before he can rely upon his own consciousness. Humanity in its long history has established certain conventions and one of these is belief in scriptural authority. And it cannot be forgotten that man's consciousness has sometimes higher urges and revelations of higher truth which man naturally accepts as something coming to him from cosmic consciousness. Supernatural authority, has thus played an important part in Religion and Philosophy. All the revealed religions of the world claim inheritance of knowledge from indirectly inspired sayings of prophets and directly from cosmic consciousness. Such revelations are looked upon as sacred inasmuch as they convey unto humanity truths which are not supposed to be accessible in any other way. In this respect revealed religions do not differ from one another.

Vedanta in so far it is a systematisation of the revealed texts of the Vedas naturally respects the sacredness of these texts and its task has been mainly to interpret them logically and to find a consistent meaning out of them. No

Vedantic teacher has questioned the sacredness of the texts and even a rationalist and dialectician like Samkara has eloquently pleaded for the authority of the Vedas against all other forms of authority. Samkara has made a distinction between the sayings of the inspired saints and revealed texts, and he unhesitatingly has given the weight of his opinion in favour of the revealed texts against the inspired teachings, and naturally so, for inspired teachings may suffer from the touch of subjectivism which cannot affect the revelations that are eternally emanating from the Absolute. The Vedantic teachers believe in eternal emanation of knowledge from the divine source and to them, therefore, authority has a deeper meaning and a wider connotation. This has been specially the teachings of the Vaisanava teachers by whom authority has been given a higher place than reason and logic.

In fact the tendency of the Vaisnava teachers has been always to minimise reason against authority, and anything that reason conceives as rational and cogent, is thrown overboard, if it questions the affirmations of the Vedas. But such has not been the case happily with Samkara. Samkara as a mystic in a certain state of consciousness, accepts the free communion between the finite and the infinite mind and thus believes in the possibility of the divine authority. Still he does not completely sacrifice the value of intuition before authority. Samkara has put more credence in intuition than authority, for authority as compared to intuition is still an indirect source of knowledge. The great charm of Samkara's philosophy lies in allowing to man freedom from the fetters of authority, inasmuch as man has in his inner nature a transcendence where the implications of relative consciousness are denied. And authority is a source of knowledge in relative consciousness. Samkara perceives with his clear insight that the very essence of being is intuition and when man is freed from the divided consciousness, he enjoys the Absolute within

himself. Herein divergence arises between Samkara and theistic teachers. The greatest attraction of his philosophy lies in vouchsafing unto the seeker the infinite life and consciousness here and now. It is possible for Samkara to conceive this, for his Absolute being is immediate consciousness which is present in its fullness in all centres of existence. Samkara's mysticism is neither dogmatic nor theological. It is essentially philosophic. Though Samkara has begun theological mysticism, still he has been able to break away from the theological tradition and to assert the truth of intuitive conviction over all forms of truth. Intuition in Samkara is an ever-accomplished fact, before whose ineffable light all other forms of life are shadows. Samkara stands as a great champion of this self-evidence of immediate consciousness before which all other forms of consciousness pale into insignificance. In accepting the self-evidence of consciousness Samkara is not dogmatic, because it is so clear a fact that none can deny it and all knowledge presupposes it.

To the theistic teachers self-consciousness is also an immediate fact, and God-consciousness is an implication in self-consciousness. But since God-consciousness to them is distinct from self-consciousness it is not immediate in the sense in which the Absolute-consciousness of Samkara is. And this God-consciousness is a far off event which takes place not fully here but only when the soul is cut off from the body. Since the theistic teachers cannot have the direct realisation of God-consciousness in fulness they have to put more credence upon the authority of the Vedas, which they look upon as revelations of God to man. These revelations to them have more significance than immediate self-consciousness and the theistic attitude is more reverent towards the authority of the Vedas which they affirm is not denied when the highest illumination is reached. Self-conscious intuition then is reinforced by the authoritative

texts and when they conflict, the judgment is passed in favour of the Sruti, and this must be naturally the case with them since in self-consciousness they have not the highest source of knowledge. Intuition and authority in their case are not opposed nor divergent. The latter supplements the former.

Samkara's attitude is more philosophic since he has been bold enough to deny the authority of the Sruti in a certain state of consciousness. The theistic consciousness never oversteps the relative consciousness and as such it clings to its evidences and affirmations, whereas the transcendent consciousness of Samkara does overstep the limitation of relativistic consciousness and as such the sources of relative knowledge however high, accurate and telling they may be in a level of self-conscious life have no value when consciousness oversteps this limit and standard.

Change.

BY

J. N. CHUBB.

The problem of change which is the problem of experience itself is rightly considered as the most fundamental in philosophy. The whole of Kant's endeavour in the Critique of Pure Reason may be regarded as directed towards explaining the experience of change, by bringing change into relation with the unity of thought. Broadly speaking there are three main views concerning change which divide philosophers in the West, the Parmenidian, the Kantian, and the Heraclitian. Parmenides simply ingores change and does not explain it. Kant explains change in the first edition of the Critique by bringing forward the principle of the permanent substance enduring in the midst of change. In the second edition he dispenses with the notion of the permanent substance and thus passes over to the Heraclitean view by asserting that a '*perpetual change*' is all the permanence that we are aware of in time. I have here tried to bring out, in contrast, the Vedantic theory according to which the experience of change is self-contradictory and cannot be logically determined since it gives rise to an insoluble paradox.

I believe the Heraclitean view of the relation between change and permanence is true so far as it goes, that is, so far as it protests against the view that a concrete 'substance' or 'thing' is self-subsistent and can be referred to apart from the changes it is said to undergo, as a unit complete in itself and remaining unchanged in the midst of its changes. And in this Heraclitus has much in common with the Buddhists, the latter assert '*Sarvam anityam*', '*Sarvam anatman*' everything is impermanent and whatever is, is without a self; the Buddhists disbelieve in the soul or self regarded as a

permanent substance persisting through time. They talk of the 'heresy of individuality' and substitute for soul a group or aggregate of skandhas, (feeling, knowing etc.) a *soul-structure* instead of a soul-substance. The Vedanta claims, however, that the analysis of change and identity is not complete at this point. It accepts the Buddhistic conclusion as legitimate only as a recoil from the one-sided assertion of a thesis in an antinomy. The Buddhist view represents the antithesis, the second horn of a dilemma (the first being supplied by the Parmenidian notion of permanence) which is equally false if set up as final.

The philosophers of change reject the hypothesis of a permanent substance persisting in the midst of change. The physical object as they understand it is no self-identical substance underlying change ; it is simply a '*logical construction*' from the changing sense data. Heraclitus asserts that all is change and that *nothing* is permanent except the law of change. There is no substance which persists in the midst of change. The changes form a series and develop according to a certain law or inner purpose. It is this law immanent in the series and guiding its development that we refer to as something persisting in the midst of changes. It is really unmeaning to say that what persists is permanent. Persistence implies time and what is permanent is not in time. The phrase 'permanent in time' is a contradiction.

The above view, however, overlooks the paradoxical nature of change. Change is logically an impossible and self-contradictory concept, in that it necessarily implies permanence as its basis and yet cannot be reconciled with it. The question may be put thus : if change implies something which is permanent, in what sense can this permanent something be said to change ? Change is true of something which changes and if change is continuous it means that which changes

must remain identical in spite of the change. But if identical, how is it related to change ?

The philosophers of change cut the gordian knot by saying there is change yet nothing changes, i. e. there is no *thing* or *substance* which persists permanently in the midst of change. How can a permanent thing change ? Does it in its change become other than itself ? If it does it is not permanent, if it does not it has not changed. That there is the fact of change cannot be doubted. Change implies a process, it has several phases in succession. Yet somehow when we come to analyse it we find it hard to discover at any particular phase in the change *anything* that is actually changing. The 'thing' is a unity of all these successive phases. To consider an example. An object moves from A to B. It has to pass through several stages a, b, c, and so on. Now the object at each stage may be regarded as one phase of the whole object. The question is what changes ? It is clear that not one of the aspects of the object, far less the object as a whole is changing. The object thus has a changing aspect but neither it nor anything in it changes.

My contention is that the above view avoids the paradoxical conclusion that a permanent thing changes only by overlooking the fact that *only the permanent can change*, that if we experience change at all, we do not experience *bare change* or change by itself ; but change as belonging to and qualifying something which itself is felt to persist unchanged. The expression 'persisting unchanged' may be contradictory but it nevertheless expresses *a fact of experience*. Change may be analysed into its different phases but the different phases which are successively presented to us are not new or separately given but felt to belong to the same identical object. In our experience of change we experience the same thing re-appearing, as it were, in different forms. This reference to an identical object is indispensable in any

experience of change and therefore cannot be regarded as a 'logical construction' out of it. It has to be taken into account and cannot be brushed aside because it gives rise to a paradox.

The Heraclitean argument is an empiricism at the cost of logic. It exploits the dilemma into which change lands us, but does not show a way out.

Change is meaningless apart from *some thing* which changes. Change means growth and development. It implies a going out of one's self, a self-alienation. But unless there is formed this concrete personal centre that goes out of itself, change becomes a meaningless concept. Change is inherently self-contradictory. It is no doubt difficult to discover in change something that changes yet that does not warrant us in saying that in reality nothing changes. It would be more consistent in the case of a failure to find out something that changes, to declare that there is no change at all. Why should we stop half way in our analysis? But it is said change is a fact and cannot be denied. No less then are *changing things facts* and they too cannot be denied. That it is difficult to point out something that is changing is no argument, for it is still more difficult, nay impossible, to point out bare change i. e. change by itself. In the case of the moving object the question 'what moves' is as unanswerable as the question 'where is motion?'

It may be asked how can we say anything is 'permanent in time?' We cannot say 'how' but the expression refers to a fact of experience. If this is not admitted we may ask how can we talk of anything being *impermanent in time*. Whatever is in time has a history, and as such it cannot have a momentary existence. We are asked to distinguish between an event and a moment. An event is not momentary but has a finite length of duration. The present to which we

confine the event (And if the event is not to be permanent it must be so confined) is in other words the specious present. But if we admit that the specious present has a duration of a certain length, we must assert that the duration implies a *lapse of time*. On the above view experience is made up of different specious presents, but if these specious presents are themselves static or momentary they cannot give rise in us to an idea of *the flow of time*. Each specious present is itself a flow, a duration and thus occupies time. The event, therefore, which is permanent, i. e. remains itself, at least so far as the specious present is concerned (otherwise we cannot refer to it all) itself occupies the time which the specious present occupies. It is thus *permanent in time*.

I admit the expression 'permanent in time' is contradictory but what I insist on is that whatever is in time cannot be barely in time i. e. it is also permanent. Hence when we place events in time and regard them as permanent, we are asserting that permanent events are in time. The proposition 'permanent is in time' is equivalent to the proposition 'temporal events are non-temporal'. This may be a contradiction but it is an account of experience as it occurs.

This brings us to the main objection which can be raised against the Heraclitean view of change. According to this view experience would consist of a series of fleeting and temporary sense-data, each of which obtains at one moment and disappears at the next but this cannot give rise in us to the idea of change. At best it would make us aware of a rapid and temporal succession of changeless and non-temporal facts, if such a thing were possible. It would in other words make our experience discrete and discontinuous and then there would not be any idea of change and even of time as Kant so conclusively demonstrated against Hume. *Change implies causality*. I do not see any sense in which, on this view, causal connections can be made intelligible or shown to

be more than *bare succession*. *Causality implies identity*. To say that any thing has a cause is to assert that the thing in its present aspect does not explain itself, is not *self-subsistent*. In order to explain its appearance in the present we have to carry it back to the past and show that the present is intelligible in the light of its past existence i. e. is consistent with it. The present in explaining itself, transcends itself as the purely present and asserts that it has the roots of its being contained in the past. If we do not admit this then in what sense does the past explain the present? The shifting sense-data cannot explain each other because they have nothing in common. Any sense datum can be brought forward to 'explain' any other. What is truly explained is shown to be no new fact—what is wholly new does not admit of explanation. As Kant asserts, objective time determination is possible only through the concept of causality, and causality must mean *Sat Karya Vada*. Causality is introduced merely to give us the assurance that in the two successive perceptions that we have the object remains the same, that there has been change *in* the object rather than *of* the object. Nothing is not which once was and nothing was not which once is.

Briefly the Vedantic doctrine of causality is this. Effect is identical with the cause and yet somehow it distinguishes itself from the cause otherwise causation would have no meaning. As distinguished from the cause, however it is *anirvacaniya*. It is in a sense a new product and yet not new. In short the effect as such has an inexplicable existence, it escapes all logical determination. This is the peculiar standpoint which Vedanta holds in analysing experience. Experience presents us with contradictions and according to Vedanta contradictions are facts and exist in *rerum natura*. It believes in an objective contradiction (*anirvacaniya*) even as it believes in an objective falsehood (snake-rope). There

is only one such experience which makes us familiar with an 'objective inexplicability'—the experience of illusory objects. And hence the Vedanta asserts that ultimately, i. e. from the standpoint of Brahman, our vyavaharik experience is itself illusory and has not to be 'explained' but negated like the snake on the rope. When we experience an objective contradiction (experience of change) a doubt naturally arises that our experience is not true, that it does not present the reality as it is. The presence of contradictions in our world of experience, clearly recognized by Bradley in the first part of his *Appearance and Reality* and 'somehow' transformed and overcome in the second, justifies in my opinion, Sankara's hypothesis of Maya or cosmic nescience, since an analysis of illusory perception reveals that it is only Avidya that has the power of presenting contradictory appearances which being barely given but lacking all facthood or reality do not demand to be linked to or synthesized with the real.

We may say then that from the empirical standpoint (vyavahara) the effect may be regarded as the *parinama* of the cause, *parinama* the process of passing from the potential to the actual being itself logically unintelligible. From the absolute (parmarthik) standpoint the effect is not a process or a development, but an appearance (vivarta). Vedanta has gone beyond both realism and idealism by affirming the 'objective inexplicability' and hence falsehood of all experience.

Before concluding we must determine the true nature of permanence which is implied in change. We refer to the changing object as 'this' meaning by 'this' the content that is perceived. Now what does 'this' really refer to? As I have contended we can never refer to bare change, i. e. change without a background of identity. All knowledge refers to the permanent element in our changing experience. Does 'this' then refer to the permanent object in so far as it changes? It

cannot be because by 'this' we mean something self-subsistent and complete whereas the permanent object which changes is logically indeterminate. It is neither *there* nor yet *not there*. If it were there it would be complete and self-contained and then it would be difficult to predicate change of it, as change implies growth and development and hence lack of completeness. If it were not there then how could it enter into a process of change at all? The changing object thus is not a complete meaning and hence 'this' cannot really refer to it. Our reference seems to be a time-less object or permanence understood in the strict sense, something which is wholly out of time. Sankara distinguishes between two kinds of permanence; *parinamitya* and *kutasthanitya*, permanence through time and timeless permanence. In the latter we have the true permanence. The 'this' really refers to the *kutasthanitya* (timeless permanence). As I have said change in the sense of *parinama* may be predicated of the permanence through time but never of the timeless permanence. Compared with the timeless background, change is *vivarta*, an appearance like the snake on the rope. *Parinamitya* includes and embraces change and hence in its turn is embraced by contradiction. Not that time falls outside eternity, but like the illusory snake it does not demand to be located at all, or if under the pressure of the realistic demand we seek to find a place for it we must say that time falls within eternity not to qualify it but to be negated therein.

It may be said that 'this' cannot refer to the timeless permanence since what we experience is the changing object in time and not the changeless object outside time. It is true that the reference is not immediately to the timeless permanence, but, nevertheless, ultimately, such a reference is necessarily implied. 'This' refers directly to present changing object, but by implication to the reality which transcends the divisions of past, present and future, to eternity itself. How is

such a dual reference possible? The experience of illusion supplies us with an answer. When in illusion I assert, 'this is a snake' the 'this' immediately refers to the snake and not the rope. This is a snake means, this snake is here. But 'this' also refers to the rope. By 'this' I mean not merely something which I see but something which you can also see, something which exists there whether you or I see it or not. In this sense 'this' means this rope. We may say that 'this' refers to the snake, but snake itself refers to the rope because it has no existence apart from the rope. Similarly in all knowledge we ordinarily refer to a finite object, but the finite itself carries us beyond itself to the Infinite which is its essence and in which it is not taken up and transformed as Bradley suggests, but negated as a false appearance, even as the appearance of the snake is negated on the perception of the rope.

To conclude: So far as the 'permanent in time' is concerned it is a contradiction and we may characterize it in any way we like, either as a 'construction', 'a law of change' or as the 'structure' of the changing process. This, however, merely states the paradox of change but does not solve it. The only way to resolve the contradiction is by regarding the changing manifold as the vivarta of the false appearance of the timeless reality (paramarthik sat.) Buddhism in common with Vedanta rejects the Bradleyian synthesis. After all Sankara was not unjustly accused of being a 'prachchanna Baudha'. Sarvam anityam, sarvan anatman is not the last word of the Buddhists. It is the last word so far as this anirvacaniya jagat is concerned, but jagat, jiva and Ishwara are not the themes of the Vedanta nor of the Buddhists. The latter assert Nirvanam Santam. *Nirvana is the only calm.*

Aksara : A Forgotten Chapter in the History of Indian Philosophy.

BY

P. M. MODI

In the R̥gveda, the oldest literary monument of Aryan culture, we read already in those few hymns which herald the dawn of philosophy, that it is in reality but one being (*ekaṃ sat*) named differently which is addressed in the hymns to the various deities (I.164.46) ; and that, before the world was created, "with out air that One breathed by its own power ; for there was not beyond it anything whatever" (X. 129.2).

Later, the oldest prose Upaniṣads taught as their highest metaphysical principle either *akṣara* only, i. e., the (impersonal) Immutable or only *puruṣa*, the " Person " : it, or he, respectively, was declared to be " one only without a second " (*ekam eva a-dittiyam* ; Chā. Up. VI. 2.1).

After that, we find in Chapter I of Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad a first attempt at identifying the impersonal and the personal (*yenākṣaraṃ puruṣaṃ veda satyam* ; I. 2. 13) ; but the prevailing view at the age of these earlier metrical Upaniṣads is the one expressed in Mu. Up. II and III placing *puruṣa* above *akṣara* Mu. Up. II. 1. 3 ; Pra. Up. V. 5, 7 ; Ka. Up. III. 11). In Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad this is summarized as follows : Brahma in the one three-fold being (*trividhaṃ brahman*), viz., a triad (not three !) consisting of the individual soul, the Immutable, and the Person called here (I. 12), respectively, the Enjoyer, the Enjoyable, and the Inciter (or Lord ; I. 8), the Immutable (i.e., the " Highest Immutable " ; see IV. 8) being again two-fold (V. 1) in so far as it has unconscious matter (the Manifest, Mutable, *pradhāna*, *avidyā*) as its periodical manifestation and is yet persisting as the Unmanifest,

Immortal, Immutable, Light, Self, Knowledge (*avyakta*, *amṛta*, *akṣara*, *haras*, *ātman*, *vidyā*) (I. 8, 10 ; V. 1). Sve. Up., then, taught a triad foreshadowing a future tetrad.

The Bhagavadgītā taught the very same doctrine, only with some new names, speaking of two Unmanifest ones or Natures (VIII. 20 ; VII. 5), viz., a higher one (*akṣara*, *mahad brahman*) and a lower one (*kṣara*, *brahman*) (XV. 16 ; XIV. 3 ; VIII. 3-4 ; III. 15 ; V. 10) of which the latter periodically emerges from the former (IX. 7 ; III. 15) ; and we may suppose that its teaching the Lower Unmanifest to produce the manifest universe (VIII. 18-19) is also in agreement with Sve. Up., as is undoubtedly its regarding the personal (*puruṣa*) as higher than the impersonal (*akṣara*) and yet not a distinct entity from it : they are not two, though they are not one either ; i. e., they are, so to speak, an internal difference only (*svagata bheda*) of one and the same being.

This doctrine we find again practically unchanged with the Mahābhārata Aupanishads : they called the Lower Nature (1), *akṣara* (2), and *puruṣa* (3) the Twentyfourth, Twentyfifth, and Twentysixth respectively and said (MBh. XII. 217. 1) : " He who does not know the tetrad does not know the Supreme Brahman (*na sa veda param brahma yo na veda catuṣṭayam* ; XII. 217. 1), where the four are : (1) *vyakta* ; (2) *avyakta* or *amṛta pada* (XII. 217. 2), (3) *puruṣa* (XII. 217. 6), and (4) *dehīn*, the embodied soul (XII. 217. 12). But we see also another and, evidently, later School of the Mahābhārata Aupanishadas preparing already the ground for future developments by finding it necessary to explain—which was not really different, apart from its being expressly stated, from the view of both Sve. Up. and Bhag. Gītā—that the two Natures are one and *akṣara* and *puruṣa* are one in that in either case the one is the " place " of the other (*tatsthatvāt* ; XII. 318. 56, 78).

The Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas of the Mahabharata then actually did away with the theory of the two Natures, but in a different manner :

1. The Sāṃkhyas abolished the *akṣara* or Higher Nature by simply distributing its attributes among the lower, i. e., their only Nature, and the Twentysixth of the Aupaniṣadas whom they accepted as their Twentysixth. This was the origin of the dualism of Spirit and Matter which we find as an accomplished fact in Classical Sāṃkhya.

2. The Rudrite Yogas, while accepting the Sāṃkhya Twentyfourth (and rejecting the Higher Nature), could not admit the Sāṃkhya *puruṣa* who was both Jiva and Iśvara, for they (i. e. these Yogas) wanted a highest principle which was absolutely beyond bondage and liberation, i. e., has not even the semblance of being somehow (temporarily), viz., by creation etc., contaminated by *prakṛti*. Thus, they believed in two principles instead of the one *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhyas, viz., the Twentyfifth who was for them only a kind of world-soul, and the Twentysixth the *paramātmān* who was placed above the Twentyfifth and the Twentyfourth (*prakṛti*) and who was the absolutely transcendent, yet personal highest being. Thus, and not on the basis of an atheistic Sāṃkhya, has evolved the idea of a personal highest God in the Yoga System. This School, then, may be looked upon as having evolved from the (likewise Rudrite) Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. For its two *ātman*s are the two "friends" in Sve. Up. IV. 6-7. But in Sve. Up. the boundary between the two is still constantly obliterated ; it has still a conscious *prakṛti* ; and its " Lord " is still, though not *bhoktar*, yet *karter* as regards creation etc. (V. 3 ; VI. 3-4).

3. The Hiraṇyagarbha Yogas were at one with the Rudrite Yogas as regards their Twentyfourth and Twentyfifth, but went beyond them by positing an impersonal Twentysixth which they called *akṣara*. This *akṣara*, then, was like that

of the oldest prose Upaniṣads deprived of both its personality (cf. Br. Up. III. 8. 9) and materiality, the former being reserved for their Twentyfifth, and the latter for their Twenty-fourth. This is the acme of metaphysical abstraction reached in the Mahābhārata.

In all of these three Schools the Twentyfifth engaged (either really or apparently) in creation, etc., and transmigration, etc., had so far been only one, who either had (as in the case of the Yogas) or had not (as with the Sāṃkhyas) a higher principle above him, and the empirical plurality of individuals must have been for them but a phenomenon of Nature, if they cared at all to explain it. We can understand this attitude if we realise that it was an Herculean task for Indian thinkers to free themselves from the grip of the ancient Aupaniṣadic tradition with its one and only *ātman*. It is a great pity, therefore, that the Mahābhārata has not preserved for us one or two documents showing the rise of the theory of plurality of souls. We are merely confronted, in one of the latest chapters of the Śāntiparvan (350. 1ff) with the fact that both the Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas had meanwhile taken to it, i. e., to the doctrine of one real highest soul and many empirical individual ones. For the Sāṃkhyas now only one more step remained to be taken, viz., that of abolishing the *puruṣottama*, just as before they had abolished the Higher Nature, and establishing a real plurality of souls, but that is not heard of yet in the Mahābhārata; it came later, when Buddhism spread and atheism became fashionable.

Some time after the origin of these three Schools, came the Mahābhārata Pāñcarātras who rather developed the religion (*dharma*) of the Bhagavadgītā, their most venerable authority: they emphasised the oneness of *aksara* and *puruṣa* and did not allow either matter or soul to be a distinct entity from it, but looked upon the former as periodically created and withdrawn and upon the latter also as emerging from and

returning into their "source" the *Puruṣa*. In spite of this they did not renounce the *svagata-bheda* standpoint of the *Gītā*, but spoke of an innate power of the *Puruṣa* which they called his *viśyā* (and which was later identified with Viṣṇu's wife Lakṣmī) and also of the souls as somehow being parts of God and continuing as such even during the period of cosmic rest. This, then, is the strictest monism taught in the *Mahābhārata*.

And, finally, Bādarāyaṇa, the author (or reviser ?) of the *Brahmasūtras*, substitutes the *Mahābhārata* *Pāñcarātra* view of the oneness of *akṣara* and *puruṣa* by his teaching that the same Supreme Being called *para* "the Highest" is to be meditated upon as *akṣara* or *puruṣa*.

But, while in Bādarāyaṇa's *Sūtras* (and also in the systems of the Vaiṣṇavite *Ācāryas*) the abandoned ancient position (or *puruṣa* being higher than *akṣara*) is still to some extent recognizable, even the traces of the latter will be found to have disappeared when we turn to the works of his most renowned successor, *Saṅkarācārya*.

Thus it has happened that the history of *akṣara* has become what I have called it : a forgotten chapter.

Empirical Basis of Religion

BY

BAHADUR MAL.

Of all the concepts of human knowledge, that of religion, presents perhaps the greatest difficulty, in the way of clear and definite formulation. Aesthetics, Ethics, Logic, not to speak of the physical sciences, deal with subject-matters, which can be easily comprehended. We may differ in various ways, but as far as the subject-matter, in each of these sciences is concerned our minds are absolutely clear. We know, what we are talking about. It is, however not so in the case of religion. There is hardly any unanimity about its subject-matter or its meaning. If we survey, the various definitions, or descriptions, given from time to time, we shall have no difficulty in realizing, that we have to face an intellectual chaos of no mean order, in making an effort to understand, what religion really is.

It is enough for this purpose, to barely mention some of the attempts at definition, made by men like Mathew Arnold, who regards religion as, "morality tinged with emotion," or Max Muller, according to whom, "religion consists in the perception of the infinite under such manifestations, as are able to influence the moral character of man," or Taylor, who proposes "a belief in spiritual beings" as the minimum definition of religion, or lastly in modern times, we may take Otto, to whom religion appeals as an idea of the holy or the sacred present in the universe.

Yet the fact remains, that religion is one of the greatest concerns of mankind. It has swayed, and even now sways, the lives of millions of human beings. It has influenced for better or worse, the aspirations and activities of countless men and women, from the primitive down to our own civilized times. Such a phenomenon requires explanation, at least it

deserves a serious and earnest effort to be made, in order to understand it, in a spirit of fairmindedness and good will.

In modern times, it is a universally acknowledged dogma, that science has extended our knowledge of man and nature to a marvellous extent. It has led, in some cases to self-intoxication on the part of scientists, who have come to believe, that to talk of anything, beyond the knowledge, obtained by sense-perception and scientific elaboration is a mark of intellectual inferiority. Let us take them at their word, and yet, no one I believe, is prepared to contest the proposition that what we actually know, is almost nothing, as compared to what we do not know. Our knowledge is like an oasis in the illimitable desert of ignorance. Even that does not represent the truth, as it is. Our knowledge in fact does not touch reality in its essentials. The known, so to speak, has a central core of unknowability. We talk of matter, life, mind, etc. without really understanding what those categories mean. We can discuss the properties of material or living bodies, yet we have to confess our ignorance, as regards the real nature of matter or life, on the basis of which our entire reasoning proceeds. It is no exaggeration to say that the unknown surrounds the known on all sides, nay it interpenetrates it or is intertwined with it in a hopeless manner. Matters are possibly going to remain the same, howsoever much, our knowledge may extend its boundaries over hitherto unexplored regions. The unknown will always be there, to overwhelm us with a sense of awe and helplessness.

I want to lay a special emphasis on this idea of the unknown. To me it is one of the factors, that go to the formation of religious experience. The unknown is directly apprehended or intuited. It is not simply inferred. Moreover I do not regard it as a negative idea. Herbert Spencer regards the essence of reality as unknowable. Yet he does not hesitate to call it force, a decidedly positive conception.

It is no wonder, if the savage identifies the unknown with power or force. The same is the reaction of a civilised man, towards the unknown aspects of reality. They are not apprehended as simply unknown. They strike us as palpitating and dynamic with force or energy,—an inexhaustible reservoir, from which emanate all manifestations and events, that we know, with infinite potentialities for more to come. They also fill us with a mysterious sense of awe and dependence. It need not be said, that these emotions are universally present at all stages of human evolution.

It is one side of the picture only. Even a thorough-going naturalist, would have no objection to the positing of a force or power, as the source of all that exists—a power that is partially known, through its effects, but whose inexhaustible resources, it is absolutely beyond the capacity of man to envisage. Even a scientist cannot help feeling a thrill of awe, in contemplating the mysterious nature of the power, behind the universe. He however, conceives this power as simply material, and is interested only in its mechanical and quantitative aspects. It is very gratifying to find, therefore, eminent scientists, freely admitting the limitations of the scientific outlook. Thus to quote Sir Arthur Thompson, “science fishes in the sea of reality with particular kinds of nets called scientific methods—and there may be much in the unfathomed sea, which the meshes of the scientific net cannot catch. Thus the geologist, as geologist does not consider the beauty of the countryside though that is as real to us as its mineralogy.” A scientist exclusively occupied with the measurable aspects of reality, is inclined to forget, that the qualitative aspects are no less important and real. “The final meaning of the delight,” says Tagore, “which we find in the rose can never be in the roundness of its petals, just as the final meaning of the joy of music cannot be in a gramophone disc. Somehow, we feel, that through a rose, the language of love reached our heart.”

It goes without saying, that an individual not only perceives facts ; he also appreciates their meaning or value. Especially in observing his own activities, and those of other people like him, he finds that meaning or purpose is an important explanatory concept which he cannot do without. It is not at all possible, to give an adequate account of conscious being in physico-chemical terms alone.

In the case of man, the pursuit of ends and values is a normal feature of his life. He proceeds in his various activities on the tacit assumption, that value is as much a real feature of the world as materiality. In the words of Bosanquet, "he has a firm grasp of these values. He sees them at work cleansing organizing, ordering the world. They suffer or perish but in their own operation, the values never fail." The experience of order and harmony in the world further confirms the belief, that purpose is not only a human affair, but somehow, it pervades the universe as a whole.

It is not, that the purposive aspects of reality appears to the imagination of average human beings only. Even scientists of great note, may come to achieve an insight similar to it, as a result of their profound investigations. Sir James Jeans, the author of the well-known book 'the mysterious universe', comes to the strange conclusion, that "the universe can be best pictured, though still very imperfectly and inadequately as consisting of pure thought, the thought of what we must describe as a mathematical thinker." It is difficult to think of a teleological interpretation of reality more definite and far-reaching than that of Sir James Jeans as mentioned above.

It has already been indicated that we directly and intuitively apprehend a power (or in the case of savages) powers, behind the universe, and as these values are a part of the universe, and are included in its various manifestations, we naturally and at the sametime; intuitively apprehend that power, as the source of the values also. If the sensuously perceived objects and

phenomena, are experienced as dependent on some power, values such as beauty, love, delight etc. are also ascribed to the same power. In this way, the emotion of reverence and loyalty to the source of these values, comes to be amalgamated to the emotion of awe and wonder, mentioned previously.

I would like to make it clear, that religious apprehension is not the same thing as philosophical reflection. What generally goes by the name of religion, is mostly a veiled contribution, made by philosophy. For instance the various theories about God or immortality or evil, are simply philosophical speculations. Religion is based on direct experience or vision of an infinite power as well as of values, the two experiences coming at the same time and so intuitively regarded as identical. To characterise this power as personal or absolute is the result of further philosophical elaboration. Along with insight we have also to take note of the accompanying emotions of awe and veneration as well as the desire to readjust the entire life in accordance with the religious insight. Beyond this, pure religion claims nothing. A religious man may not be able to explain the origin of evil, or what happens after death, or whether the good will ultimately prevail, and similar other pressing problems. But he has an intense consciousness of the spiritual significance of the universe and is prepared to take every thing for it. It is enough for him that the values exist and that the universe permits him to completely identify himself with them and to make every kind of sacrifice for them.

To my mind, the validity of the basis of religious experience—namely belief in the existence of an infinite power and the reality of values—will remain unshaken and is not likely to lose in importance with the further advance of human knowledge. Our philosophical views may change, but whether we shall ever cease to believe in the requisites of religion as mentioned above seems to me, to be a remote and practically unrealizable possibility. If it ever happen, religion will naturally collapse. But

it will be only, when our knowledge will have embraced everything in the universe and our spiritual perfection reached the utmost limit of realization.

The view of religion, as here presented, explains why in certain religions, such as Buddhism belief in God is not essential. As already indicated the concept of God is arrived at interentially while the apprehension of divinity in the form of values is direct and immediate. It is the latter, which is the central core of religion. Buddhism looks to its founder as an expression in human form of the essential quality of the divine. The same idea underlies the theory of incarnation amongst the Hindoos. The incarnated individual is the ideal man who has caught and crystallized in his own person, the divinity which is present in the universe. What counts therefore for religion, is a vivid realization of the divine or spiritual aspect of reality, and to live according to that realisation.

We cannot minimize the importance of the practical aspect of religion. It is not simply an insight or apprehension. It simultaneously entails an entire transformation of life—a re-valuation of values as it were—in the light of that experience. The religious man feels himself at home in the universe, fear is completely banished, difficulties and hardships are borne cheerfully and do not disturb the established harmony and perennial joy of life. Narrow sectarian attachments are repudiated, and the whole world is claimed as one's own. The saintliness and beauty of the lives of religious men have perhaps brought more converts to religion than mere theoretical discourses on spirituality.

We are here taking religion at its best, but the same influences can be traced, in various degrees, at all levels of human development. A religious man whether civilized or savage, embodies in his person the highest values recognized and claimed at the particular stage of cultural evolution, with which he happens to be associated.

Thus, it appears that religion is not a thing or a body of doctrines. It is a special attitude, a way of life based upon insight and direct experience, which gradually transforms and moulds the entire life in the direction of saintliness and purity. The transformation does not ordinarily come all of a sudden. If religious life possesses any charm or attractiveness worth striving for it presupposes a stage of discipline and single-minded devotion. In India, the training of yoga has always claimed a very important place in the career of an aspirant for religious perfection. Religion is thus an achievement—a way of life perfected through continual effort and moral purification.

Moral Deliberation

BY

T. V. SUBBAYYA, M.A.,

The task undertaken in this paper will be a summary account of the conditions which give rise to moral deliberation, the alternative ways of behaviour in the face of a moral situation and an estimate of their moral value. Some situations we call beautiful; some ugly; some true and yet others false. But we do not call them moral. The question, 'therefore now is,—what are the characteristic features that compel us to call some particular situations moral. In answer to this question, Dewey and Tuft point out that the moral factor is introduced only, when there is a conflict which gives rise to a judgment of value. They argue that, if an end is accepted as good or valuable by itself without its being reconsidered and adopted after a conflict with some other end, then there is no moral issue. There may arise a conflict as to what is more prudent and more profitable method of achieving the desired end but such a conflict is not moral. Suppose a man has accepted committing murder as a desirable end, the conflict for him is about the more successful means of getting at the end, say, by either shooting or strangling. Here the pause is not over the value of the end itself, whether it is really worth-while to commit murder but only over the means. Therefore Dewey and Tuft conclude that moral situation arises only when there is a conflict of *ends* themselves, when the value of one proposed end is in conflict with an equally attractive end.

We cannot launch upon a detailed criticism of this view in such a short paper as this. Suffice it to say for our purpose on hand that this view of a mere conflict of ends as engendering moral reflection is in one sense superfluous and in another insufficient.

Is a conflict of *ends* so indispensable a condition for moral deliberation? Is it not possible for a moral agent to pass judgment upon a particular proposed course of conduct even when there is no other end to oppose it and throw doubt upon its value? I do admit that conflict to a certain extent is necessary; that in some way the valuableness of the proposed mode of conduct must be doubted as to whether it is intrinsically good. The suspicion and reconsideration of the value of an act already accepted as good can be brought about without the necessity of its being opposed by an equally attractive course of action. The doubt about its value may arise even as a result of its incompatibility with a time-honoured standard of moral laws. Here we have the moral issue without a conflict of *ends*. In this sense Dewey and Tuft's demand that a conflict of ends is the minimum requisite of moral deliberation is superfluous.

In a sense also the conflict of ends is insufficient to provoke moral deliberation. The outcome of moral deliberation is not what act we choose but what kind of personality we value. The choice of the act is merely an expression of the worth of the personality itself. Mere conflict of ends does not lead to any judgment about the value of the personality itself. The agent may choose an end quite arbitrarily. In this sense Dewey and Tuft's account is insufficient to create a moral situation. Therefore we have to conclude that moral issue arises when there is a conflict between a valued mode of conduct and a time-honoured standard. Even here the moral agent may arbitrarily reject the conflicting standard if he had no habit of loyalty for it. Only when the act appeals to him directly as valuable and at the same time rebels against a standard of moral behaviour whose authority was unquestioningly obeyed for a long time, we have a situation created for the moral agent to deliberate as to which of them is intrinsically valuable.

Having now ascertained the conditions which engender moral reflection, the next problem will be an account of the alternative ways of behaviour in the face of a moral situation and an estimate of their moral value. The least reflective and almost mechanical way of getting out of this conflict is merely to bring the action whose valuableness is questioned under the standard and reject it as highly immoral if it runs counter to the standard. Here the conflict does not result in a desire on the part of the agent to critically and impartially examine which of them is really good. He simply rejects it merely for its formal inconsistency with the standard. That is the procedure of men who are unreflective in their judgments.

Another way of reacting to the situation is to begin to question the value of the act accepted as good having decided about the valuableness of the standard. The agent provisionally adopts a plan of conduct and finds it disapproved by the moral code which he has respected for a long time. He begins to reconsider his action and tries to refashion it in such a way that it may be approved by the standard. In this case the readjustment of the act and the final decision about its moral value take place only after some amount of deliberation. This is the method adopted by the people whose judgment is guided by considerations for customary morality. Another way of reaction is also possible though such a procedure is not morally valuable. The moral agent may be decided about the action in view not for its moral value but from extraneous considerations. But at the same time he may seek to find out some moral justification for his act when it comes into conflict with an accepted moral code. He tries to pervert the meaning of the standard in such a way as to find out a harmony between the action which he has decided as good independently and the conflicting standard. This is the method of the casuist. Instead of judging the individual act in the light of an

approved standard he is interested in twisting the standard so as to adjust it to his own end in view. For illustration let us take the moral injunction 'Thou shalt not shed blood'. The man who cannot refrain from slaughtering animals wants at the same time a moral justification for his act. He desires to get over the conflict without giving up his desired action. Being inspired by this pernicious motive, he emphasises some aspect of the injunction, in this instance, prohibition of shedding blood and believes that his conduct has not violated the injunction 'Thou shalt not shed blood' when he smothers the duck in a tub of boiling water, without shedding blood for decorating his dinner table. By this perverting the meaning of the standard, the casuist gets over the conflict.

But the highly moral way of reacting upon a situation when there is a discord between an individual act and a long accepted standard is when the moral agent is not interested in finding a justification for his conduct but when he is sincerely determined to find out what is really more valuable. In such a case the agent's attention goes from the act to the standard and from the standard to the act. He is not predisposed either towards the act or towards the standard. When his conduct comes into conflict with the moral code he launches upon finding out another mode of behaviour which may be in harmony with the standard. But whatever alternate mode of conduct he suggests, though it has the approval of the standard has not, for him, as much value as the original conduct itself. Then he begins to reflect over the value of the standard itself whether it is really good. The individual act is not only so powerful as to appeal to the moral agent in spite of its incompatibility with a moral code but is also instrumental in casting doubt upon, and for a critical examination of a standard of moral behaviour whose validity was unquestioningly accepted for a long time.

How is the standard itself to be validated? If it is to be subsumed under a higher standard, how again is that standard to be tested? Therefore the method of validating a standard whose value is under question by the process of subsumption will end nowhere. If doubt is cast upon the valuableness of the standard, we can find its real value by only going backwards to its origin. This is the only rational method of examining a general rule or standard of conduct. For the general rule is merely an abstraction from unique individual concrete moral situations. In so far as it is a general rule it has not in it the wealth of details of concrete facts. It stands only for some outstanding features common to all the situations that give rise to it. As Earnest Mach remarks (quoted by J. Ward in "The Realm of Ends") "In reality the law always contains less than the fact itself, because it does not reproduce the fact as a whole, but only that aspect of it which is important to us, the rest being either intentionally or from necessity omitted." Therefore if the value of the standard is doubted and if it is to be reconsidered, can there be a more reasonable procedure than to judge it in the light of the concrete facts which it pretends to represent,—whether it truly and fully embodies the essential factors that gave rise to it? Before formulating the standards themselves which were intended to give objective validity to individual acts, certain situations had been directly and immediately valued as good and abstracting from them the prominent features, the moralist cast them into rigid abstract laws. Thus the standard itself is of later growth.

The conflict between the proposed mode of conduct and the so-called objective standard has been reduced to a conflict between two concrete modes of conduct—one, the conduct under question and the other the conduct represented by the standard. In the highest stage of moral deliberation, the moral agent is faced with two competing courses of action neither of

which has any objective validity in itself. In such a stage, the moral agent cannot find any ready made objective principle which can sit in judgment over individual acts. As Stuart describes, " the fully deliberate ethical valuation is not a process of *ascertaining* the value of particular courses of conduct but on the contrary it is a process of *determining* or *assigning* value. The moral experience is not essentially and in its typical emergencies a *recognition* of values with a view to shaping one's course of conduct accordingly, but rather a *determination* or *fixation* of values which shall serve for the time being, but be subject at all times to reappraisement. "

It may appear that after all we have arrived at a moral subjectivism when we say that ultimately there is no objective principle and the moral agent is free to choose the act which appeals to him most. In what way is this essentially different from casuistry which we denounced in the earlier pages ? If morality is thus ultimately based upon the free choice of an individual what is the surety that the act chosen is intrinsically good ? If there is no objective control over the choice of ends then deliberation will not be a rational process. What is the nature of the objective control ? We have seen that any extraneous control in the shape of a moral code loosens its grip when its validity is being questioned. Then the control must be internal and individual. Then we will have to answer the question if it is internal and individual how can it be at the same time objective. Here the idealistic criterion of truth does not mean correspondence with any external existence but only means the internal constraint under which reason has to think if it is to be consistent with itself. In a similar way we can say with regard to the choice of conduct that what is desirable is what is intrinsically or objectively good and what is objectively good is not what is in agreement with an external standard but what I am ' obliged ' to value as good if I am to be consistent with my own rational nature. Thus the

obligation is purely internal and yet objective. Just as truth means only rationality in thinking morality means only rationality in conduct. Thus we have answered the charge of moral subjectivism. Therefore in complete moral deliberation the conflict is got over by a mode of conduct which is purely individual but none the less objective in so far as it is influenced and dictated by considerations which are rational and over-individual.

The Nature of Sabdapramana in Vatsyayana's Nyayabhasya

BY

SAILESWAR SEN.

In Vatsyayana's *Bhasya* on N. S. I. i. I. there occurs the following passage regarding the nature and function of *nyaya*.¹

*Kah punar ayam nyayah? Pramanair arthapariksanam nyayah. Pratyaksagamavritam anumanam, saanviksa, pratyaksagamabhyam iksitasyanviksanam anviksa. Taya pravartata ityanviksiki nyayaavidya nyayasastram.*²

" But what is this *nyaya*? *Nyaya* is knowing an object thoroughly with the aid of all the *pramanas*. It is reasoning. Reasoning is the servant of perception and scriptural testimony. It is post-sepection. Post-sepection is reviewing

1. For an explanation of how all the *pramanas* converge in a reasoning or proof, vide *Bhasya* on N. S. I. i. 39.

2. This passage when read with the one occurring at a later point in the *Bhasya* on the same *Sutra*, where the *pramanyavakya* is called the *paramanyaya*, indicates that *nyaya* is distinguished by the *Bhasyakara* into proof for one's own certainty and proof for the certainty of an opponent. The former consists in reasoning out in one's own mind the truth of an object that has been known from perception, verbal testimony, or, though the *Bhasyakara* does not mention it, *anumana* (understanding the term in the sense of a mode of discovery). The latter consists in expressing the reasoning in the prescribed five-membered sentence and is called the *paramanyaya*, because, by being so expressed, proof attains its perfection which consists in convincing a *vipratipannam purusa*: vide *Nyayavarttika*, Bib. Ind., p. 18, ll. 10-12. It should also be noted that this is one of the few instances in the *Bhasya* where *anumana* is used in the sense of proof as distinguished from that of discovery in which it is invariably used in N. S. For a detailed discussion of this topic, vide S. Sen's paper on "The Historical Origin of the Distinction between Svārthanumana and Parārthanumana" in the *Journal of Indian History*: Vol. X, Parts I & II.

what has been viewed from perception and scriptural testimony. This Science is called *anviksiki*, *nyayavidya* or *nyayasastra*, because it functions with that (i. e. with *anviksa*, *anumana* or *nyaya*).

From the above passage it follows that knowing an object merely from perception or from scriptural testimony is not knowing it thoroughly from the point of view of the *nyaya-sastra* or logic which demands that what is known from perception or from scriptural testimony must be *anumita* or *anviksita*, i. e., proved by reasoning. It also follows that *sabda*,—we leave *pratyaksa* out of consideration,—is a *pramana* in the sense that it is a source, not of knowledge, but of judgments³ that are capable of becoming knowledge by being proved to be true.

Sabda, as will be evident from the sequel, may be either scriptural or non-scriptural. In the above passage mention is made only of *agama*, because *nyaya* which is meant to be used for the attainment of the *summum bonum* in preference to other ends, is primarily concerned with the demonstration of scriptural truths. Nevertheless, non-scriptural *vakyas* are not unworthy of being used by *nyaya*, provided the objects about which they convey information are not imaginary objects. The question is discussed in the *Tatparyatika* from which the following passage may be quoted.

Atmadiprameyapratipadanoddeseana hi sastram etat pravrttam. Tannantariyakataya nyayam vyutpadayat. Tam eva vyutpalayed yas catmadeh prameyasya saksanniscayakas, tatpratipadakaqamapramanyaniscayaka va..... Tasmad yadyapi na nyayamatravartini pratijnagamah, tathapi prakrtanyayabhiprayena drastavyam. Tatha

3. By judgment is meant the mind's awakening to the meaning of a presentation. We are said to possess knowledge when our judgments are proved to be true or false : vide Watts-Cunningham's *Problems of Philosophy*, p. 132.

cagamanusandhanena pratijnayah kalpitavisayatvam api nirakrtam veditavyam.

“ This sastra functions for the purpose of establishing the Atman and kindred *prameyas*. It treats of *nyaya*, because it is indispensable for that purpose. It should treat of only that which directly establishes the Atman and kindred *prameyas*, or that which establishes the trustworthiness of scriptural testimony which again establishes those *prameyas*.....Hence though the proposition in every *nyaya* is not a scriptural testimony, nevertheless the *Bhasyakara*'s statement that the proposition is scriptural testimony is to be regarded as true from the point of view of a genuine *nyaya*. And also, it is to be understood that by reference to scriptural testimony, the possibility of a proposition being about an imaginary object is excluded”.

To the question whether all *sablas* are sources of judgments that are capable of being proved to be true, the following answer is given in the *Bhasya* on N. S. I. i. 7 : *Aptopadesah sabdah* :—

Aptah khalu saksatkrtadharma⁴ yathadrstarthasya ciksapayisaya prayukta upadesta. Saksatkaranam arthasyaptis, taya pravarttata ityaptah. Rsyaryamlecchanam samanam laksanam. Evam ebhik pramanair devamanusya-tirascam vyavaharah prakalpante, nato' nyatheti.

“ An *apta* is, indeed, one who has seen an object with his own eyes and who, actuated by the desire to convey information about the object as he has seen it with his own eyes, conveys such information. See ng an object with one's own eyes is

4. The expression *saksatkrtadharma* is interpreted in the *Tatparyatika* thus : *Sudrdhupramanenaavadhritah saksatkrtah dharmah padarthat.....yena*. That is, an *apta* may derive his knowledge about the object from perception or from any other *pramanas*, but in all cases his knowledge must be *drdhikrtu*, or proved to be true before being communicated to others.

called its *apti*. The *apta* is so-called, because he acts with that (i. e. with the *apti* or direct apprehension of an object). The same definition holds good of all *aptas* whether *rsis*, *aryas*, or *mlecchas*. In this manner with the aid of these *pramanas* runs the ordinary course of action of gods, men and the lower animals, and in no other manner than this."

Not all *sabdas* can therefore serve as sources of judgments that are capable of being proved to be true, but only those *sabdas* which are voluntarily uttered,—as compulsion may lead to suppression or distortion,—by persons who have directly apprehended the objects described by the *sabdas*.

In reference to the last sentence of the above passage it may be noted that the mention of the lower animals along with gods and men as those who make use of the *pramanas* for purposes of their ordinary behaviour implies that the ordinary behaviour of gods and men is more or less of the same nature as that of the lower animals, so that judgments that are directly aroused by the *pramanas* appeal more to the animal or instinctive attitude than to the logical.⁵ This does not, however,

5. It may be possible for a lower animal to awaken to the meaning of a visible sign, e g., the approach of its master with a basket in his hands (*anumana*), or to the meaning of its masters words (*sabda*); but it is difficult to believe that such an animal can make use of the *upamana-pramana* which, as we learn from the *Bhasya* on N. S. I. i. 6., is a statement expressive of comparison, e.g. *yatha gaur evagavayah*, on the strength of which the listener is enabled to connect the name *gavaya* with such an animal when he perceives it on a subsequent occasion. The question therefore arises: Did the *Bhasyakara* mean that all the *pramanas* (including *upamana*) could be made use of even by the lower animals, when he said: *Evam ebhiknato' nyatheti*. Neither Uddyotakara nor Vacaspati help us in arriving at a definite answer. The term *upamana* is however used in different senses in different places of the *Bhasya*, for a detailed discussion of which vide S. Sen's paper on "Upamana in Ancient Nyaya" read at Fifth Indian Philosophical Congress.

commit us to the assertion that judgments of our ordinary behaviour contain *in posse* no truth-value for the logical attitude. Some of them, on the contrary, are capable of satisfying the logical mind by being proved to be true, and these are said to be derived from the *pramanas*. In other words, what we directly derive from the *pramanas* is not true knowledge, but judgments that render such knowledge possible. In this connection we would refer to the following passage from the *Vartika* on the *Sutra* under consideration, which contains a dispute with a *purvapaksin* who is identified as Dignaga in the *Tatparyatika*.

Aptopadesa iti kim aptanam avisamvaditvam va pratipadyate ahosvid arthasya tathabhava iti. Yadyaptanam avisamvaditvam prapadyate talanumanat. Atharthasya tathabhavah so'pi pratyaksena. Yata hyayam artham pratyaksenopalabhate tata tathabhavam arthasya pratipadyata iti. Tunna. Sutrarthaparijñanat. Nayam sutrarthah. Aptopadesah sabda iti. Api tvindriyasambaddhasambaddhesvarthe'va sabdollekkena pratipattih sagamarthah. Tasmad asambaddho' yam vikalpah.

(*Purvapaksin*): Does the expression *aptopadesa* mean that *aptas* are trustworthy, or that the object about which information is conveyed by them is trustworthy. If it means that *aptas* are trustworthy, that can be ascertained from inference. Now, if it means that the object is trustworthy, that, too, can be ascertained from perception, because when a particular object is apprehended through perception, then that object's trustworthiness is ascertained. (*Uttarapaksin*): This objection is not relevant, because the meaning of the *Sutra* has not been understood by you. The meaning of the *Sutra* is not such as you have understood. The *Sutra* says: *Aptopadesah sabdah*. The function of scriptural testimony is to produce such knowledge in respect of objects having or not

having contact with the senses, as is derived from verbal description. Therefore this objection is irrelevant."

Uddyotakara's reply thus lends support to the view that verbal testimony is one of the various means of awakening truth-value.

With regard to the types of judgments aroused by verbal testimony we would briefly refer to the fourfold classification of judgments in modern logic, viz., (1) perceptual, e. g., This room is warm ; (2) empirical, e.g., All noise is compound of tones ; (3) symbolic, e.g., Rome was occupied by Caesar (where the evidence is a text-book account) ; and (4) transcendent, e. g., God is a substance of infinite attributes. Judgments 1 and 2 both appeal to actual experience, but 2 is more complex and ideational than 1 in that the appeal to past experiences is greater in 2 than in 1. Judgment 3 differs from both 1 and 2 in that it appeals, not to actual, but to possible experience, so that the ideational activity it involves is more of the nature of production than of reproduction. It is called symbolic, it exhibits only the skeleton of experience without its flesh and blood. Judgment 4 differs from the others in that it attempts to transcend not only the actual, but also the possible experience of ordinary mortals, so that the ideational activity it involves is almost completely 'loosed from experiential moorings'. In the light of this analysis we would now consider the Bhasya on N. S. I. i. 8 : *Sa dvidvidho dr̥stadr̥starthatvat.*

Yasyeha dr̥syate'rthah sa dr̥startho, yasyamutra pratiyate so'dr̥starthah. Evam rsilaukyakavyanam vibhaga iti. Kim arthah punar idam ucyate ? Sa na manyata dr̥startha evaptopadesah pramanam arthasyavadharanad iti. Adr̥startho'pi pramanam arthsayanumanad iti.

"A *dr̥startha* word is one of which the object is experienced in this world. An *adr̥startha* word is one of which the object

is experienced in the next world. The worlds of *rsis* and ordinary mortals admit of classification in this manner. (*Purvapaksin*): But for what purpose is this said? (*Uttarapaksin*): Lest he should think: The *aptopadesa* which has for its object only what is experienced in this world is a *pramana*, because of the ascertainment of the trustworthiness of the object by perception. The *aptopadesa* which has for its object what is not experienced in this world is also a *pramana*, because of the inference of the object".

Thus if the verbal testimony be a *drstārtha*, the judgment produced thereby would be of the nature of a symbolic judgment i.e. judgment about an object of possible experience, which again may be either of the following species:—

(1) Judgment about an object which, though not actually experienced in the past, can possibly be experienced in the future or could possibly be experienced in the past, e.g. the judgment about the existence of fire on the mountain (when derived only from second hand information), or the judgment (derived from the scriptural testimony: *Putrakamo yajet*) about the birth of a son to a person who performs the *putresthi* sacrifice.

(2) Judgment which can not possibly be experienced in the future, but could possibly be experienced in the past, e.g. the judgment (derived from the opening line of the Kathaka Upanisad: *Usan ha vai Vajasrasvasah sarvavedasan darlau*) about Vajasravasa having given away all his possessions at a sacrifice.

If the verbal testimony be an *adrstārtha*, the judgment produced thereby would be of the nature of a transcendent judgment, e.g., the judgment (derived from the scriptural testimony: *Agnihotram juhuyat svargakamah*) about the attainment of heaven by a person who performs the *agnihotra* sacrifice.

It is not clear from the *Bhasya* whether the verbal testimony of persons other than *rsis* can be both *drstārtha* and *adrstārtha*. If so, then Vacaspati's interpretation of *saksat-kṛtadharmā* must be accepted as correct. That scriptural testimony can be *drstārtha* is evident from the examples mentioned above.

The Nature of Pramā.

BY

J. N. SINHA

Indian epistemology deals with four questions, viz., what is the nature of pramāna (instrument of valid knowledge), what is the nature of pramā (valid knowledge), what is the nature of pramāta (subject of valid knowledge), and what is the nature of prameya (object of valid knowledge). Here we shall deal with the nature of pramā. Pramā means valid knowledge. What is the real nature of pramā? Opinions differ on this question. There are different types of realism, idealism, and pragmatism in Indian epistemology. These different types of thought define the nature of pramā in different ways. It is beyond the scope of this short paper to attempt an elaborate treatment of this vast subject. Here we shall simply refer to the different views in Indian epistemology as regards the nature of pramā.

I. The Nyaya view.

The Nyāya advocates uncritical realism. It advocates the correspondence theory of truth. We know external objects with their qualities, actions, generalities etc., by sense-perception. That knowledge is valid, which represents the real nature of its object. There is a correspondence between knowledge and its object. When there is disagreement between the two the knowledge is invalid. The truth of this statement will be borne out by certain Naiyāyika definitions of pramā.

Vātsyayana defines valid knowledge as the cognition of an object in something in which it is, that is, the cognition of an object as it really is.¹ Udayana defines pramā as the

1 यत् तस्मिंस्तदिति तदव्यभिचारि । Nyaya Bhasya, 1.1.4.

true ascertainment of an object ? Others define it as the true apprehension of an object.³

These realistic definitions of pramā are based upon dualistic metaphysics. They presuppose the existence of the knowing self and the known object, and recognise the correspondence between valid knowledge and its object. The Nyāya realism does not define the exact nature of the correspondence between the two. But how can the agreement or disagreement between knowledge and its object be known ? Here the Nyāya realism offers a pragmatic test. According to Nyāya, the agreement or disagreement of knowledge with its object can be known only by its pragmatic value. When a knowledge leads to fruitful activity it is valid. When it leads to fruitless activity it is invalid. The validity of a cognition is determined by its pravṛttisāmarthya, and pravṛttisāmarthya means the cognition of activity ending in fruition or fruitful activity.⁴ Thus the Nyāya realism affiliates itself to pragmatism. It advocates realistic pragmatism.

II. The Jaina view.

The Jaina agrees with the Naiyāyika in his theory of pramā. He also advocates realistic pragmatism. Pramā or valid knowledge, according to him, is the determinate cognition of itself and its object, and invalid knowledge is the determinate cognition of an object in something in which it is not, that is, the determinate cognition of an object as different from what it really is. (Pramāṇanayatatvālokaṅkāra, sūtra 2). And pramā or valid knowledge is capable of

2 सम्यक् परिच्छिन्तिः प्रमा । 3 यथार्थानुभूतिः प्रमा ।

तत्त्वानुभूतिः प्रमा ।

4 अर्थक्रियास्वरूपफलज्ञानमेव प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यम् । Nyāya-
manjari, p. 172

practical efficiency in the form of selection of good and the avoidance of evil.⁵ (Parīkhāmukhasūtra 2; Pramāṇanaya-tattvālokālankāra, sūtra 3).

The validity of a cognition consists in its agreement with the object cognised, and the invalidity of a cognition consists in its disagreement with the object cognised. And both the validity and the invalidity of knowledge arise from extraneous circumstances, viz., the special virtues (guṇa) and the defects and imperfections (doṣa) respectively in their originating causes. So far the Jaina substantially agrees with the Naiyāyika. But he draws a distinction between initial cognitions and habitual cognitions, and holds that validity and invalidity of habitual cognitions are self-evident, while those of initial cognitions are determined by extraneous circumstances viz., the knowledge of harmony or disharmony, and the presence or absence of contradicting experience. (Pramāṇanayatattvālokālankāra, sūtras 18-20).

III. The Mimamsaka view.

The Prābhākara identifies pramāṇa with pramā. He means by pramāṇa valid cognition, and not the means of valid cognition. He defines valid knowledge as direct and immediate apprehension (anubhūti), which is different from recollection (smṛti). Recollection is invalid because it lacks novelty; it is the mere reproduction of past experience. All cognitions *per se* are valid. The invalidity is due to their disagreement with the real nature of their objects, so that wrongness does not belong to the cognitions themselves but to the objects cognised. Prabhākara puts it thus:—"It is strange indeed how a cognition can be said to *apprehend* an object, and yet be invalid." (Bṛhatī quoted by Dr. Ganganath Jha in his

Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā). This inherent validity of a cognition is disproved only when it is found to be not in agreement with the real nature of its objects.

Kumārila also accepts the view of Prabhākara as to the nature of valid knowledge. According to him, the validity of a cognition must consist in its being an *apprehension*; this validity can be set aside only by such discrepancies as the disagreement of the cognition with the real nature of its object and so forth. (Slokavārtika sūtra 2, Sloka 53) Pārthasārathi-misra, however, though a follower of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, puts forward the following definition of valid knowledge. 'A valid cognition is the cognition of an object which has not already been apprehended, which is free from contradiction, and which arises from causes free from defects or imperfections'. **कारणदोष वाधक ज्ञानरहितमगृहीतयाहिज्ञान प्रमाणम् ।** (Śāstradīpikā, P.45. N.S.P. Briefer edition). 'A valid cognition is the cognition of an object which has not already been apprehended, truly representing the real nature of the object.' (Ibid P. 45.) Thus according to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, knowledge, in order to be valid must truly represent the real nature of its object, and it must be characterised by novelty or freshness, and it must be generated by causes which are untainted by defects and imperfections. The Mīmāṃsaka theory of pramā too is realistic.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka differs from the Naiyāyika in two respects. In the first place, according to the former, the validity of knowledge is self-evident, and the invalidity of knowledge is inferred from the knowledge of defects and imperfections in its causes, and the knowledge of its disagreement with its object, while, according to the latter, both validity and invalidity of knowledge are inferred from fruitful and fruitless activity respectively. In the second place, the former does not appeal to the pragmatic test, while the latter

applies the pragmatic criterion to knowledge. The former advocates realism, pure and simple, while the latter advocates realistic pragmatism. According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, truth is its own criterion,—it is self-evident or self-validating ; it does not require any extraneous or adventitious evidence for its validity ; but invalidity or falsity of knowledge cannot be known by itself ; it can be known through the knowledge of the disagreement or discrepancy of the knowledge with its object, and the knowledge of defects in its originating causes e. g.: sense-organs etc. According to the Naiyāyika, on the other hand, both truth and error can be proved only by fulfilled and unfulfilled activity respectively ; both validity and invalidity of knowledge are not inherent characteristics of knowledge ; they are the accidental or adventitious marks of knowledge borrowed from extraneous circumstances. (Śāstra-dīpikā, P. 50).

IV. The Sankara-Vedantist view:—

According to Sankara, Brahman alone is the ontological reality, and the other objects (e. g. cloth, jar, etc) are superimposed on the eternal consciousness by nescience, and have only an empirical existence (Vyāvahārikasattā) as distinguished from ontological existence (pāramārthikasattā). So, the Sankara-Vedantist distinguishes between empirical validity and ontological validity. The knowledge of one undifferentiated consciousness or Brahman has ontological validity, and the knowledge of empirical objects or the world of appearance (prapañcha) has empirical validity. A knowledge is empirically valid if it represents the nature of its object, and is not contradicted by any other valid cognition. The Vedantist does not necessarily exclude recollection (smṛiti) from valid knowledge. The above definition of valid knowledge is common to both apprehension (anubhūti) and recollection (smṛiti). A valid apprehension (anubhūti) is the knowledge of

an object, which has not already been apprehended by a previous cognition, and which is not contradicted by a subsequent valid knowledge. (Advaitachintākaustubha, P. 129). (Vedantaparibhāṣā p.p. 19-20).

The Vedantist agrees with the Mīmāṃsaka in holding that the validity of knowledge is its innerent character, and the invalidity of knowledge is an adventitious mark of knowledge due to extraneous circumstances. The validity of knowledge arises from itself, and is known by itself. The invalidity of knowledge arises from extraneous circumstances, and is known through them. The Vedantist, however, differs from the Mīmāṃsaka in the fact that he also appeals to the pragmatic test. He defines validity of knowledge as the character of a cognition of an object as it really is, which is conducive to fruitful activity.* (Vedantaparibhāṣa, p. 333.)

Thus the Sankara-Vedantist advocates the doctrine of empirical realism (as opposed to the Nyāya doctrine of ontological realism) of a pragmatic type ; it may be termed pragmatic empirical realism or empirical realism or empirical realistic pragmatism. And this doctrine is affiliated to the main Vedantist doctrine of Absolute Idealism, according to which, the Brahman, the Absolute, or the one eternal consciousness alone is ultimately real.

V. The Sankhya view :—

According to the Sankhya, both validity and invalidity of knowledge are the inherent characteristics of knowledge ; and they can be known by themselves. A cognition is either in-

6 स्मृत्यनुभवसाधारणं संवादप्रवृत्त्यनुकूलं तद्वति तत्प्रकारकज्ञानत्वं प्रामाण्यम् ।

trinsically valid or intrinsically invalid. Its validity or invalidity is not due to extraneous circumstances. The Sankhya theory of knowledge too is realistic. It is based on metaphysical dualism. The validity of knowledge consists in the correspondence of knowledge-forms with the object-forms. But how can knowledge copy or represent the reality? The Sankhya holds that the transparent unintelligent intellect (buddhi) in which the intelligence-stuff (satva) is the predominant factor and the matter-stuff (tamas) is in the minimum, is transformed into the form of an object which is conveyed to it through the medium of external sense-organs, the central sensory (manas), and the empirical ego (ahamkāra), and is intelligised by the transcendental Self which comes to have a knowledge of the object owing to the reflection of the intelligised function of the intellect (buddhi) on itself.

The Sense-materials are supplied by outer senses in intercourse with extra-mental objects; and the forms of time, space and causality are supplied by the buddhi, which organises the discrete sense impressions into concrete objects of knowledge; these organised impressions are appropriated to the empirical ego by its synthetic unity of apperception, and intelligised and experienced by the transcendental Self. Thus the Sankhya is an advocate of transcendental realism.

VI. The Buddhist view :—

According to the Buddhist realist, a valid knowledge is a cognition which is in harmony with its object, and this harmony between a cognition and its object, is known by fruitful activity or the actual attainment of the object. Thus the Buddhist realism advocates realistic pragmatism. But the Buddhist differs from the Naiyāyika in that only the validity of knowledge, according to him, is due to, and known by, fruitful activity, but the invalidity of knowledge is inherent

in itself; it is not due to extraneous circumstances. (Nyāyabindutikā, p. 3).

According to the Buddhist idealist also, the validity of knowledge consists in the harmony of experience. Dr. Seal puts it thus:—"The ultimate truth of Truth is found, not in mere cognitive representation, but in the correspondence between the cognitive and the practical activity of the Self, which together are supposed to form the circuit of consciousness. That knowledge is valid which prompts an activity ending in fruition... Truth is not self-evidence, not the agreement between ideas, nor the agreement of the idea with the reality beyond, if any, for this cannot be attained direct, but the harmony of experience, which is implied when the volitional reaction, that is prompted by a cognition and that completes the circuit of consciousness, meets with fruition, i.e. realises its immediate 'end.' (The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, PP. 244-245). This doctrine of pramā may be termed subjectivistic or idealistic pragmatism as distinguished from realistic pragmatism.

Thus the Nyāya, the Mīmāṃsaka, the Jaina, the Vaibhāsika, the Sautrāntika, and the Sāṅkhya-Pātañjali are realists, though they differ from one another in many respects. The Yogācāra is a subjective idealist. The Śāṅkara-Vedāntist is an absolute idealist. The Nyāya realism and the Jaina realism are affiliated to pragmatism, so that they may be called realistic pragmatism. The Sautrāntika and Vaibhāsika realism and Yogācāra idealism both are of a pragmatic type, so that one may be called realistic pragmatism, and the other, subjectivistic or idealistic pragmatism. The Śāṅkarite absolute idealism also is affiliated to empirical realism and pragmatism.

7. अविसंवादकं ज्ञानं सम्यग् ज्ञानम् ।..... अर्थाभिमतैरेव
प्रमाणफलम् ।

The Doctrine of words as the Doctrine of Ideas.

BY

The ideal theory has had a long and honourable career in the speculative history of mankind both in the East and in the West. But while Plato's theory of Ideas and Aristotle's doctrine of forms and Hegel's Notion have become justly famous, the Hindu theory of Idea has not been properly emphasised in modern thought. What I wish to attempt in this paper is to set forth, not indeed the idealistic systems of metaphysics in Indian philosophy, but the epistemological doctrine of Ideas as taught in some of the systems, notably in the Purva-Mimamsa and in the Vedanta Sūtras and indicate its philosophical importance.

The Hindu theory of Ideas is generally connected with the question of the eternity and the personally-non-derived character (*apaurusheyatva*) of the Vedas which entitles it in the eyes of the orthodox, to lay down absolute codes of duty (*dharma*). The gist of the argument of "*apaurusheyatva*) is that the vedas are a collection of words (*Sabdās*) used in all concerns of daily life, and as those words are impersonal and eternal, the vedas must necessarily be so, especially as they form the basis of all kinds of knowledge and embody the first significant utterances of the human race—in this forming, as it has been finely said, "the Bible of Humanity". But in what sense are the *words* themselves eternal which bestow this character of eternality and impersonality upon the Vedas? This question is the only relevant question to be discussed in this connection, for the Mimamsaka is prepared to admit that the Vedas may have been first pronounced or uttered by

Brahma or "seen" by the early rishis (drashtarah) and still maintains that they had no personal author, because words themselves are eternal in character notwithstanding that some person at some definite time in world-history first uttered them.

What, then are words? Not mere letters or mere sounds or combinations of sounds (though the Mimamsaka argues for the eternity of sounds themselves). Sounds as such, however combined, cannot constitute true words unless they 'denoted' or referred to certain objects, i. e., conveyed the thought or conception of the objects to the mind. Here therefore we have to distinguish between the psychical or physical existence of the sounds as such and their reference to reality. It is this latter aspect of sounds which constitutes their objectivity or meaning. The word 'cow' e. g., is a *word*, not in respect of the letters c, o and w constituting it or even their combination but on account of its ability to refer to a distinct object of experience, viz., an animal of the bovine kind. The conception, then, is the life or soul of the word; the letters or sounds are merely the outward sensuous forms in which it is clothed. But what is this conception itself, what does it refer to? Evidently it refers to the *species* and not to the individuals of the object denoted—to the *jati* or *Akriti* and not to the *vyakti*. Hence as Sankara puts it, "it is with the species that the words are connected, not with the individuals, which, as being infinite in number, are not capable of entering into that connection". Any individual object, then, that we may perceive is merely a particular embodiment of this its species or *Akriti* which we may, following Thibaut, best translate by the term 'idea'. While the idea (cowness, horseness) is a rational, universal, permanent form, the individual (particular horses and cows) is a sensuous particular perishing existence and only affords the sensuous conditions of the appearance of the idea.

It is these permanent universal, rational forms or meanings then that are implied by the sounds—they form the *words* proper, *śabda*. So far all schools of philosophy which accept *Śabda* as one of the *pramāṇas* are agreed. But now there arises a controversy in regard to the way in which the *śabda* or word i.e., the reference to reality becomes apprehended on the pronounciation of the letters composing it. Jaimini as well as Pāṇini the grammarian, hold that over and above the letters there exists a supersensuous entity—, called the *sphota*, which is immediately manifested to the *buddhi* by the letters, and which thereupon in its turn, itself manifests the sense of the word. The apprehension of the meaning of a word is according to them a meditate process made possible through the *sphota* alone. The Bhatta School maintains on the other hand that no such third entity is necessary to meditate between the letters and the meaning and that the letters of which a word consists, having through traditional use, entered into a connection with a definite sense reveal unerringly this sense to the *buddhi* directly as soon as pronounced.

Śaṅkara, following the lead of 'reverend Upavarsha' maintains that the letters only are the word and enters into an elaborate defence of this view in his commentary on the Sāṅkhya Sūtras. But while his arguments in detail seem reasonable enough, we somehow miss in them on the whole that deeper philosophical insight which characterises Śaṅkara's writings in other connections. For what Pāṇini, Bhartrihari, and others who uphold the *sphota-siddhanta* seem to intend really by it is that the *Sphota* is ultimately identical with the conception or the idea itself. No doubt the *Sphota* is called *vācaka* and is represented as that which *causes* the conception of the sense of a word (*arthādhīhetu*). But this can be explained by distinguishing between meaning as a subjective process of apprehension and meaning as an objective significance, as a self-revealed, self-consistent portion of reality

itself, as a *notion* (to use Hegel's terminology), in which case it will be seen that while the *sphota* remains in itself a conception, an idea, a notion, it can still be said to produce its own meaning to the mind which apprehends it on the utterance of the letters of a word. At any rate Mādhavāchārya, the talented author of *Sarvadarsana Sangraha*, himself a follower of Sankara but on his own terms, for in this case at least he vigorously defends sphota-vāda against Saṃkara, inclines to the view that the *sphota* is the idea, the conception itself, and proceeds to develop a system of idealistic philosophy on this basis. It is to this development of thought that we shall now turn, and it is this metaphysical development which we find missing in Saṃkara's treatment of *śabda* in his commentary on sūtra 28, 3rd pada of 1 Adhyaya of the *Vedānta Sūtras* which states that "the world originates from the word, as is shown by perception and inference."

Saṃkara hammers out at wearisome length that the word is nothing but the letters in their aggregate capacity which when comprehended by the *buddhi* as an aggregate, unerringly intimates to it their definite sense; hence there is no need, according to him, to assume a *sphota* over above the letters. This, it would appear is the plain common sense of the matter. But if this were the whole truth, how are we to interpret the sūtra statement that the world originates from the word—a statement borne out, as Saṃkara himself points out, by various passages in the Śruti and the Smṛiti? Do these various passages simply mean that *letters* created the world? It is hardly possible that the school of reverend Upavarsha should be right in this matter. According to Mādhavāchārya, on the other hand, "The eternal word, called *Sphota*, without parts and the cause of the world, is verily 'Brahman' and he straightaway quotes a passage from Bhartrihari which declares that 'Brahman', without beginning or end; the indes-

tractible essence of speech, which is developed in the form of things and whence springs the creation of the world."

Here in a nutshell we have the idealistic philosophy of the Vedānta that the world and its various things exist as eternal ideas in Brahman—ideas from which proceed the actual concrete phenomena. If *śabda* is to be of creative potency, it must not only be eternal, it must be an eternal idea, a conception, a form, an *Akṛiti*—representing a species or *jāti*—and only as an *Akṛiti* can it give rise to a *vyakti*, and it is this *Akṛiti* which is the *śphota* in its philosophical signification. It is little wonder then that having such a firm grasp of the metaphysical significance of the idea, Mādhavāchārya should come to the conclusion that "the meaning of all words is ultimately that *summum genus*, i.e., that existence whose characteristic is perfect knowledge of the supreme reality (Brahman)". "And just as the colourless crystal is affected by different objects which colour it as blue, red, yellow etc., so since the *summum genus*, Brahman, is variously cognised through its connection with different things as severally identified with each, we thus account for the use of the various conventional words which arise from the different species, as cow etc., these being existence (the *summum genus*) as found in the individual cow etc." "Existence is that great *summum genus* which is found in cows, horses, etc., differentiated by the various subjects in which it resides, and the inferior species, 'cow' 'horse' etc, are not really different from it, for the species "cow" and "horse" (*gotva* and *asvatva*) are not really new subjects, but each is "existence" as residing in the subject "cow" and "horse". Therefore all words, as expressing definite meanings ultimately rest on that *summum genus*, existence, which is differentiated by the various subjects, cows etc., in which it resides, and hence "existence" is the meaning of the stemword (*prāti-padika*)."

In a similar strain Mādhava writes further. But his thought has already become clear. Words as meanings denote species or forms (Akriti) and these various forms are different forms of that *summum genus* "Existence" which is identified by Mādhava (and by Vedantic thought in general) with Brahman. Brahman or Existence, being divided, when found in cows etc., by reason of its connection with different subjects is called this or that species and on it all words depend; i.e., all words depending ultimately on Brahman or Existence, denote only the different forms of this existence (ideas). Stripping this language of its popular or empirical garb, we find embedded in it the idealistic thought that the so-called 'forms' or *Akritis* are all 'ideas' sustained in the Divine Mind, Brahman, which, through them, gives rise to the world of name and form. For unless we thus interpret Existence or Brahman as an Infinite Mind and the forms which are said to be parts of it as its eternal ideas, we can neither maintain the eternity of the word, and consequently of the Veda, nor understand how the world originates from the word. We find that in perceiving a horse or any object for that matter, we do not perceive mere sensations, which are particular, perishing, changing, spatial and temporal, but we perceive them in relation to a mind which is also perceived to be universal, permanent, unchanging, infinite in character—for it is only in relation to such a mind that sensations with their characters can be known at all. All objects and qualities and relations, and relations, again, which such a mind apprehends, while on one side particular, perishing existences, are on the other side persisting unities, conceptions, meanings, powers, functions, categories, ideas, standing for species as well as for individual objects—of such an infinite or absolute mind. Hence Madhava's contention that all names—all words—are truly the names of God naturally follows, as well as the thesis that the Veda—the sum of all knowledge is eternal and uncreated for it con-

sists of words, and words, as ideas or conceptions of the Divine Mind, are themselves eternal and uncreated.

What now more particularly, is the relation, according to the above system, between the idea or form and the individual object which is said to be a reproduction of it? The Vedānta Sūtras, as we have seen, speak of the world of objects as having originated from the word, as is shown by perception and inference. Quoting various passages from Sruti and Smṛiti (which according to him are what is meant by perception and inference) Sāṅkara explains them all by saying: "We therefore conclude that before the creation, the Vedic words became manifest in the mind of Prajapati the Creator, and that after that he created the things corresponding to those words". The most familiar Western counterpart to this theory which recurs to one's mind in this connection is, of course, the ideal theory of Plato, but Plato's theory has been subjected to such various interpretations that it is really hard to determine how far it resembles its eastern counterpart. It is neither possible nor necessary here to enter into a discussion of these various interpretations; but the problem, common to both Plato and Indian thought may be taken, I think, as the more general problem of the relation of universals to particulars. Thus viewed, the problem receives, I think, its proper answer from Sāṅkara's interpretation of the Sūtra above referred to. Earlier in the passage quoted above, he writes: "The origination of the world from the 'word' is not to be understood in the sense that the 'word' constitutes the material cause of the world, as Brahman does, but while there exists the *everlasting words whose essence is the power of denotation in connection with their eternal sense*, the accomplishment of such individual things as are capable of having those words applied to them, is called an origination from those words". That is, universals in themselves have no actual existence independently of the particulars, constituting a class by themselves and serving as

'patterns' for the particulars, as Plato's theory has sometimes been interpreted. They are only logically prior to particulars, or they possess an ontological status of independent and objective *subsistence*. Universals, therefore are possible subsistent objects—eternal and logically independent. But they have the power of *denotation* which results in the creation of particular objects. Sankara it seems to me, has embodied here a most significant truth regarding the problem of Universals and particulars. For he makes it clear thereby that 'denotation' is what gives *existence* or concrete objectivity to objects. According to W. P. Montague for instance, the denotation of the object is constituted by the relational properties—what he calls the *extrinsic* properties—of that object taken collectively. "This object is the favourite possession of John Smith." Here I am ascribing to 'this object' a property which would be meaningless unless there were another object, John Smith in whom the property also 'inherited' ¹ while the intrinsic properties—*connotation*—of a thing give the thing's essence which other objects might also have and still be different, the extrinsic properties give it denotation i.e., a place or position with respect to other objects, a place or position which other things cannot have. Hence denotation is closer to the being or reality of a thing than connotation, and this truth, according to Montague, is conclusively proved by the fact that the verb 'is' meaning "to exist" is also the word for the copula ². To proceed. Denotation, therefore, which confers existence on objects, implies that objects are members of a *series, order* or *system*. But what determines then, the precipitation of universals which subsist into objects which come to exist?

1. 'Ways of Knowing' P. 79—81.

2. How closely Montague approaches Madhava's conception that all words ultimately express 'existence' because existence is the meaning of all roots or stem-words otherwise called 'bhava' which also mean 'existence' :

Obviously the answer of vedānta as well as of modern epistemology, is space and time. According to vedānta, space and time form the net-work which catches the Absolute mind with all its ideas and crystallises them in the form of a world of objects. It is position in space and time that differentiates the particular from the universal and whatever thus secures position in space and time possess the capacity for interaction and change. In other words, as Montague puts it 'existence is not a new quality which, when added to the other qualities of a possible object, makes it actual. It is rather a thing's *relation* of interaction or spatio-temporal connection with the totality of other things'.³ Hence a particular is nothing but a "complexus of universal—only it is a complex of universals which has somehow found a position in space and time and thus acquired the capacity of interaction with other such complexes—which has in short acquired *denotation* or relational properties. A universal like blackness is "in" or runs through particulars like cloth, table etc., just as a line or spatial dimension runs through the points of which it is a co-ordinate, "just as all time is in each spatial point, or all space is in each temporal instant."⁴ In short we may conceive the things actually existing in the spatio-temporal nexus as related to the totality of possible things or universals just as a cluster of oases are related to the vast sandy desert from out of which they have sprung.

Such, it seems to me, are the metaphysical and epistemological implications of the innocent-locking doctrine of words in Indian thought. Small wonder then that the Hindus have not only believed in the eternity and uncreatedness of the Veda but also have held as in the Maitri Upanishad (vi. 22) that "He who is well-versed in the Sabda-Brahman attains to the Supreme Brahman," which Madhava whole-heartedly endorses by saying that the science of "the exposition of words is the means to final bliss."

3. *Ibid.* pp. 110—11.

4. *Ibid.* pp. 83.

Sridhara's Presentation of the Vaiśeṣika Theistic Argument.

BY

SUSIL KUMAR MAITRA

The present paper will deal with the Vaiśeṣika Theistic Argument as set forth by Śrīdhara in the *Nyāyakandalīkā*.¹ The argument together with antitheistic objections and theistic rejoinders will be expounded in the order in which they appear in the text, with such slight deviations as may be necessary in the interests of clearness and easy comprehension.

The Vaiśeṣikas, it should be noted, are not concerned to prove a creator in the customary Christian meaning of the term. The Lord, as the Vaiśeṣikas conceive Him, is only the World-Orderer who arranges a cosmos out of pre-existing materials. *The Lord is thus responsible for the order and arrangement of the Universe and not for the matter or stuff out of which it is made.† He is the great world-architect who builds an ordered universe out of the *Paramāṇus* or Atoms as the potter makes his jar out of the lump of clay or the weaver weaves the cloth out of the threads of yarn. In Aristotelian phraseology, the Lord is the efficient, formal and final cause of the world, but not its material cause.

The Theistic Argument by which the Vaiśeṣikas endeavour to prove the existence of such a Lord of the Universe is an

1. The reference is to the Vizianagram edition pp. 54—58.

every case be an intelligent cause and that no effect can arise except as the product of an intelligent cause, is the paradox which the Vaiśeṣika theist never tires of urging against his sceptical opponents. Hence, according to the Vaiśeṣikas as also according to Martineau in the West, the cosmological Argument alone suffices to prove both a First Cause of the world and an Intelligent Cause thereof.

The Vaiśeṣikas enunciate their Theistic Argument in the form of an *Anumāna* or Inference. The Inference is as follows :—

The universe consisting of the earth and the rest must have an intelligent Cause,

Because it is an effect,

(Whatever is an effect, is the effect of an intelligent Cause).

Just as is the jar.

The ground or *hetu* of the argument, it will be seen, is *kāryatva* or the nature of being an effect. From the fact that the universe possesses this nature of being an effect, the Vaiśeṣika infers an intelligent Cause of the Universe. It is therefore against this part of the inference that the antitheists launch their attacks. They point out that the argument, considered as a piece of inferential reasoning, is open to the fallacy of an unestablished ground (*hetvasiddhi*). For what is the real ground of the inference? The real ground is not *Kāryatva* considered by itself, but the invariable relation* between *Kāryatva* "being an effect", and *Sakartakatva*, "being the effect of an intelligent cause". Provided that whatever is an effect, is also the effect of an intelligent cause, and provided

further that the world is, in fact, an effect, the inference holds good, i.e., it is a materially true conclusion. The theistic conclusion thus follows jointly from the material truth of two propositions, viz., (1) the world is an effect, and (2) every effect is the product of an intelligent cause. But the material truth of these propositions is simply taken for granted and not actually proved. For what evidence is there to prove that the world is an effect? As nobody was present at the time of creation, nobody can say for certain that the world is an effect. Hence the presence of the *hetu* in the *pakṣa*, i.e., the character of an effect which is attributed to the subject of the inference, viz., the world, is a dogmatic assumption that cannot be verified. Thus the *hetu* i.e., the nature of an effect, being unestablished in regard to the *pakṣa* or subject of the inference, we have here the fallacy of an unestablished *h-tu* or ground (the fallacy of *Svarūpāsiddhi* according to the Naiyāyikas, and of *sambandhāsiddhi* according to the Mimāṃsakas).

In reply to this objection the Vaiśeṣikas point that it is not necessary to be present at the time of creation in order to be assured of the nature of the world as an effect. One may arrive at the same conclusion from an examination of the structure of the universe. If we look carefully into the internal structure of the world we find that it is a contingent whole made of parts. That the world is made of parts is itself conclusive evidence of the fact that the world is an effect. For look at the familiar instance of the jar. It is a whole made of the combination of parts and it is also a temporal effect being the handiwork of the potter. It follows that whatever is a result of the combination of parts is an effect in time, and it follows therefore that the world which is made of parts is also a temporal effect. The composition of the world itself establishes its character as an effect, even though its actual creation may not be a matter of observation.

But the antitheist points out that there are other forms of an unestablished ground (*asiddha hetu*) besides the one above-mentioned and the theistic inference is not free from these other fallacies, even though it may not involve the fallacy of *svatūpāsiddhi*. For consider what is asserted to be the real *hetu* or ground of the inference. The real *hetu* or ground is not *kāryatva* as such but the *vyāpti* or invariable relation between *kāryatva* or "being an effect" and *upalabdhi-mat-pūrvakatva*, "being the effect of an intelligent cause". Hence the ground of the inference is the universal proposition "whatever is an effect, is the effect of an intelligent cause". It follows therefore that this universal proposition must be materially true, if the inference which is based on it is to lead to a materially true conclusion. If the material truth of the universal proposition is open to doubt, we have the fallacy of *vyāpyatvasiddhi*, i.e., the fallacy of an unestablished ground in another form. But the material truth of this universal proposition is not quite apparent. No doubt we have the case of the jar as illustrating the asserted invariable relation between "an effect" and "intelligent authorship". But we have also many instances in experience to the contrary, i.e., many exceptions to the so-called universal proposition. Take, for instance, the sprouting of the seed. It is something that happens without the supervision of any intelligent agent. We can also cite other instances of spontaneous generation which run counter to the theist's generalisation. And thus there being so many negative instances, the invariable relation on which the theist rests his case remains at best a doubtful proposition. Nor can it be said that these so-called exceptions being only doubtful cases of intelligent authorship may be comprised within the *pakṣa* or subject of the inference in respect of which a similar doubt exists and which doubt it will be the task of the inference to resolve and finally lay to rest. For such reasoning will ruin inference as a logical process and

will render it useless as a source of knowledge. In fact, without a clear specification at the outset of what is to constitute the subject of the inference, what the hetu or ground, and what the *sādhya* or *probandum*, no inference can proceed a single step. If the subject or *pakṣa* remains unspecified or only indefinitely specified, then every contrary instance may be easily disposed of by being merged into the indefinitely stated *pakṣa* or subject, and the evidently fallacious inference will thus fare quite as well as a valid reasoning.

In reply to this objection the Vaiśeṣikas point out that the Mimāṃsaka atheist should be the last person to raise an objection like this to the Vaiśeṣika theistic inference. For what does the objection resolve into? It is simply this that every inference must be based on an invariable relation or *vyāpti* and that the *vyāpti* on which an inference is based must be established beyond all doubt by the satisfactory disposal of all apparent exceptions to it. Till such contrary instances are fully explained away, the invariable relation or *vyāpti* cannot be said to be finally and conclusively established and the inference which is based on such imperfect inductions cannot be said to yield logically valid conclusions, and yet the Mimāṃsaka who holds this view does not hesitate to use the *sāmānyatohdr̥ṣṭa* form of inference to prove the "Sun's movement" from the observed fact of the 'the Sun's change of place'. And how does the Mimāṃsaka arrive at this conclusion in regard to the sun's movement? He starts from the observed correlation between Devadatta's "change of place" and Devadatta's "movement", and he extends this generalisation to the case of the sun even though he has observed it only in the case of beings who inhabit this earth and has never observed it in the case of the distant stars and other like objects. It is no doubt open to the Mimāṃsaka to argue that distance being a bar to sense-perception in the case of the stars and the like, the non-observation of movement in these

cases cannot overthrow an induction based on repeated observation of an unconditional invariable relation between "movement" and "change of place" in innumerable other instances. But in this case the theist also may argue in a similar way in respect of the so-called negative instances of the sprouting of the seed and the like. He may reason with equal force that sprouting, etc., are no exceptions to his rule, that they are examples of intelligent authorship quite as much as the jar is; only the author in these cases is not visible to our observation on account of the absence of a body.

But the antitheist now points out that even this does not establish the case for an intelligent author of the universe. For what does the theistic inference really establish? It establishes at best the case for the universal or generic essence, intelligent authorship of the universe. In other words, it proves only a generic essence and not a concrete individual. And yet a generic essence is not what is really intended. The theist is not concerned to prove an abstract universal, but a particular intelligent agent—an agent who will be equal to the task of creating the world. An agent of any kind e.g., an agent of limited intelligence like ourselves is not what he intends to prove. And yet the illustration of the jar and the potter points to an agent like ourselves. If we have to go by this illustration, we shall have to admit only a finite agent like ourselves and such an agent is neither intended by the theist nor can possibly be the Creator of the Universe.

In reply to this objection the Vaiśeṣikas point out that the question of a concrete individual agent does not concern us at the outset. On the strength of the invariable relation we first of all prove the intelligent authorship as a universal. But since the universal cannot go wandering (*nirviśeṣasāmānyasya asiddhatvāt*), we argue from the universal to the particular in which the universal must embody itself. In other words, we first prove the generic essence, "intelligent authorship"

(*kartrtvasāmānya*), and thence we argue to a concrete individual author of the universe. From the universal to the particular—this is a necessary epistemological step in every reasoning.

But the antitheist points out that there is no such epistemological step involved in inferential reasoning. As a matter of fact, no inference proves a mere universal, for only in so far as it establishes the universal as particularised, it involves a real march of thought. Otherwise inference would be a process of *grhitagruhaṇa*, of unprofitable repetition of thought. Every inference, in fact, consists of two essential factors. One of these is *vyāpti* or an invariable relation between a certain mark and some other character or generic essence with which the said mark is associated. The other is *pakṣadharma*, the presence of the mark in the *pakṣa* or subject of the inference. Through the former the inference makes known the universal or generic essence which is associated with the mark or sign. Through the latter again the said universal is shown as particularised by the *pakṣa* or subject of the inference.

The Vaiśeṣikas in reply observe that this does not affect the theistic inference. Even if we admit the force of the above reasoning, the theistic conclusion is not overthrown thereby. For through the *vyāpti* we get the universal, "intelligent authorship", and through the *pakṣadharma*, we get this universal particularised as an individual competent to create the universe.

The antitheist however points out that he objects not to an intelligent author as such, but to the particular intelligent author that is required for creating a world. From the universal to the particular may be a necessary step, but a particular that is *pramāṇaviruddha*, i.e., a particular that contradicts the organised body of experience, is not logically admissible. In inferring fire on the sides of the mountain from the perception of smoke at the same place, I am not running

counter to the accumulated testimony of knowledge. The particularisation of a generic essence like "fire" by localisation in space and time is a common experience of everyday life. It is otherwise however with the particular intelligent agent which is intended to be proved by the theistic inference. For the intelligent agent of the theistic argument is not one or other of two contradictory alternatives and is thus *aprāmāṇika* and imaginary like the hare's horn. For this agent cannot be either an embodied agent like ourselves nor a disembodied spirit free from the limitations of the body. It cannot be an embodied agent because as such it will be subject to the limitations of the sensibilities and will thus lack the omniscience necessary for creating the world. It cannot also be disembodied because as lacking the bodily apparatus it will be incapable of the function of acting and therefore of carrying out its task of creating a world. The theistic argument thus establishes an agent X which is neither A nor not-A and this is absurd on the face of it. It will not do to say that the body is not a necessary condition of action. Every intelligent action involves (1) firstly, a grasp of the materials and tools, (2) secondly, desire to accomplish something with the help of these materials and tools, (3) thirdly, the will to carry out the desire into overt action, (4) fourthly the putting forth of bodily effort, (5) fifthly manipulating the tools and materials by means of the body, (6) sixthly, achieving the object by effecting the necessary changes in the environment. And just as all these processes are involved in the carrying out of an intelligent action, so also when one or other of these processes is wanting there is no intelligent action. And thus it is proved by agreement in presence and agreement in absence that the body is as much necessary for intelligent action as is the exercise of intelligence. Hence if the theist will dispense with the body as a condition of Divine Action, one may, with equal logic, dispense with the Divine Intelligence as a condition of creation. But how, it

may be asked, is it possible to create without prior knowledge of the materials and tools? In the same way, it may be retorted, as it is possible to create without a body. The body, in fact, is the *avyavahita* or immediate antecedent of action, while intelligence, desire and choice are remote antecedents. Therefore if any of the conditions of action may be omitted, it is the intelligence as a remote antecedent and not the body which is the immediate antecedent. And thus the theistic argument leads us nowhere. The argument proves an agent which yet cannot be either an embodied or a disembodied agent. And as there is no escape from this dilemma, the theist must confess that this great world-architect of his is an imaginary being no more real than the hare's horn. But what, it may be asked, is the fallacy in the argument? The fallacy, the antitheist replies, consists in the use of any incongruous *hetu* or ground. The *hetu* is *kāryatva*, i.e., the nature of being an effect, and it is incongruous with the *sādhya*, i. e., that which is to be established by it. The *sādhya*, the object to be proved by the inference, is not the universal or generic essence, intelligent authorship. It is a concrete individual, a concrete particular person who is competent to create the world. Now this person must be a disembodied being if He is to be equal to the task of creating the world. Hence the *sādhya*, that which is to be proved, is a disembodied intelligent author of the universe. But the *hetu* which is to prove this disembodied author is competent to prove only an embodied agent like ourselves. For the *hetu* is "the nature of being an effect," and this *hetu* is the invariable concomitant of "an embodied agent" as the illustration of the jar and the potter shows. Thus the *hetu* is compatible only with an embodied intelligent agent like ourselves and is incongruous with a disembodied agent, i.e., with that particular kind of agent which is sought to be proved by the theistic argument. The incongruity (*virodha*) here being not between the *hetu* and

the *sādhya* in its generic character but between the *hetu* and that particular variety of the *sādhya* which answers to the theist's requirements, the particular logical fallacy involved is the fallacy of a Viśeṣa Viṃuddha *hetu*.

The Vaiśeṣika in reply to all this points out that the antitheist is overestimating the body as a condition of intelligent action. For what does the antitheist mean by saying that the body is an indispensable condition of intelligent action? Does he mean that "acting intelligently" and "possessing a body" are the same thing? Or does he mean that "intelligent acting" is manipulating tools and materials with prior knowledge of their efficacy to produce definite results? That the antitheist does not mean the former of these alternatives is obvious enough. The sleeper, when asleep, is not separated from his body, and yet the fact of his possessing a body does not amount to his acting intelligently during his sleep and quiescence. So also the *udāsīna*, the passive, non-acting being, may possess a body, but such possession does not mean his being active or his intelligently exerting himself. It follows therefore that "intelligent acting" is not the same thing as "possessing a body". Hence "Intelligent acting" must mean actively manipulating materials and tools with knowledge of their capacity to yield specific results. And this being the real meaning of intelligent action there is no reason why a disembodied agent should be incapable of acting intelligently despite the absence of a body. For how does the self act in moving the body to which it is attached? Obviously it does not require the outside assistance of a second body in moving its own body. No doubt, the self in moving the body requires the body as the object on which to act. But the body is necessary as the object to be moved (*preyya*) and not as being itself the moving force (*preraka*.) If it be argued that the body at all events must be there and cannot be dispensed with, the theist's reply is, the

Lord also is provided with a body in this sense in the *paramānus* or *atoms* which are the objects of His creative activity. The Lord, in other words, moves the *paramānus* as the self moves its body, and just as the latter does not require any other body for this purpose so also the Lord does not require any in acting on the *paramānus* and arranging them into the form of a cosmos.

But it may be said : the body is moved only through desire and effort, and as desire and effort require a body, the moving of the body must also require the body through the desire and the effort presupposed by it. In reply to this the Vaiśeṣikas point out that the body is necessary for evoking desire and effort but not for its own moving. Hence when the desire and the effort are already there, the body is not necessary for its own moving, i.e. not necessary except as the object to be moved. Now we must distinguish between desire and effort as adventitious (*āgantuka*) generated events, and desire and effort as non generated and essential states or attributes. The body is a condition of desire and effort only when these are generated states, but it is not a condition of desire and effort as essential and eternal attributes of objects. There may be effort in the Lord as Creator, but as it is an essential and eternal attribute of His Personality it does not presuppose a body. That qualities like desire and conative effort may be eternal as well as adventitious is no more paradoxical than that qualities like colour etc., may be eternal as well as non-eternal according to the differences of their substrates.

But it may be said : why assume a Lord as the mover of the Atoms ? Why not attribute this task to the individual self ? The Vaiśeṣikas point out in reply : the individual self is not competent to discharge this function for obvious reasons. The individual self is limited by its own body and the sensibili-

ties. Hence its intelligence is limited by its sensibilities. The individual thus lacks the omniscience necessary for creating the universe.

But why, it may be asked, should the individual self be lacking in omniscience? Is not the self's intelligence both innate (*sāhaja*) and all-pervading? How in these circumstances can the intelligence of the self be said to be limited?

The Vaisesikas in reply point out: there is no reason to suppose that the self's intelligence is innate. If it had been so then inasmuch as this intelligence is also all-pervading and object-revealing by very nature, there should be an uninterrupted knowledge of all things at all times. And thus there would be no room for that sense of novelty (*apūrva-avabhāsa*) that is a common feature of our experiences in this life. It will not do to say that this innate intelligence centres in the self itself at death and is withdrawn from the objects, and this accounts for the sense of novelty at a later birth. For how are we to speak of the intelligence being withdrawn from objects seeing that it is the very function of the intelligence to reveal, and therefore to be connected with objects? Nor can we speak of this intelligence being arrested in its function, for if the intelligence becomes defunct through any cause (e.g. death), the self will cease to have any knowledge thereafter. Nor can we say that the intelligence is arrested in certain circumstances (e.g. at death) and functions normally again in certain other circumstances (e.g. after birth). For why should the intelligence behave differently under different circumstances? It does not improve matters to say that these differences are due to differences in respect of the relations in which the intelligence stands to the sensibilities in the two different circumstances. For this is to admit that the individual intelligence depends on the sensibilities in revealing the objects and that objects are not revealed by the intelligence through the sheer fact of their

proximity to the intelligence. And thus the individual intelligence being admitted to depend on the sensibilities in the matter of revealing objects, it follows that the individual self cannot possess the omniscience necessary for creating the universe. And so we conclude, there must be a superintending intelligence or Overlord other than the individual self, one who is Omniscient and full of innate intelligence and possesses the qualities of a Creator of the Universe. All this, we claim, is a necessary hypothesis (*kalpanā*), as we never see any non-intelligent thing accomplish anything without the guidance of a presiding intelligence.

Having proved the existence of a Superintending Intelligence as a necessary hypothesis, we next proceed to discuss the question whether it is one or many. Our own view is that it is one and that a plurality of such intelligences is a superfluous assumption. For consider the matter carefully. If there be a plurality of these intelligences, then the question is: Are they all non-omniscient like ourselves, or are they all Omniscient and unlike ourselves. If they are all non-omniscient, then they are all alike incapable and powerless like ourselves, and therefore cannot possibly create the world. And if they are all omniscient, then inasmuch as one such Omniscient intelligence suffices to account for the creation of the world, the assumption of the other intelligences involves an unnecessary multiplication of hypotheses and leaves nothing for these other intelligences to accomplish. Nor is unanimity of purpose (*aikamītya*) a common enough thing among equals of coordinate rank, and unanimity being not likely in such circumstances a plurality of equals will spoil and mar instead of furthering the task of creation. And if the many submit to the authority of one amongst themselves, then that one is the real Master and Overlord and the rest are subordinate to his authority. We observe the same thing in the management of temples where

there is one real Master, a first among equals, to whose authority the others submit without question.

Since this Superintending Intelligence possesses—

- (1) Omniscience (*sarvajñatva*) therefore*
- (2) it cannot be wanting in the knowledge of the special nature of anything (*na-
kutracidvastuni viśeṣānupalambhah*),
and therefore
- (3) cannot have erroneous knowledge arising therefrom (*na tannibandhana mithya-
jñānam*), and therefore
- (4) any attachment and aversion spring therefrom (*tanmulakrāgadveṣan*), and
therefore
- (5) any action under the influence of attach-
ment and aversion (*tatpurvika prav-
ritti*) and therefore
- (6) any merit or demerit resulting from such
action (*tatsadhyān dharmadhurman*),
and therefore
- (7) any pleasure or pain born of merit or
demerit (*tajīayorapi sukhaduḥkṛdayah*)
- (8) And lastly, it follows, its Intelligence
being an "eternal now", i.e., an eternal
intuitive vision of all things, it cannot
have anything like a reproductive
indirect cognition (*smṛti*) or faint
impression (*sanskāra*)

According to another view, its Intelligence itself constituting its irresistible will-power (*āvyāhataḥ kriyāśakti*) it does not possess any other form of desire and will.

As this Superintending Intelligence is not subject to the miseries (kleśādi), known technically as the bonds that bind, it cannot be said to be a spirit in bondage. It cannot also be said to be a liberated spirit as liberation presupposes a prior stage of bondage. We may therefore say that it is eternally free (nityamukta), or, as Patanjali says, one who is for ever untouched by the miseries, by karma and by the fruits of karma.

Summary of the Vaiśeṣika Theistic argument as set forth in Sridhara's Nyayakandalitika.

The Vaiśeṣika Theistic Argument is a blend of the cosmological and teleological arguments and bears a certain resemblance to Martineau's presentation of the Theistic Argument in the West.

The Vaiśeṣikas admit a Creator only in the sense of the Formal, Final and Efficient Cause of the world, the material cause of it being, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, the Paramānus or Atoms. The Lord arranges the original chaos of the atoms into the form of a cosmos and in this sense is the World-Creator.

The Theistic Argument which the Vaiśeṣikas offer in proof of such a Creator is an Anumāna or Inference which is based on the nature of the world as an effect. The Inference is as follows :—

The Universe must be the creation of an Intelligent Agent.
Because it is an effect,
just as is the jar.

The argument thus reasons from the world as an effect not merely to an uncaused First Cause of the world, but an intelligent First Cause thereof.

The following are the antitheistic objections to the argument :—

(1) There is no proof that the universe is an effect, nobody being actually present at the time of creation.

(2) There is no proof also of the *vyāpti*, i.e., the invariable relation, between *kāryatva* "being an effect", and *buddhimat-purvakatva* "being the effect of an intelligent cause". Experience abounds in instances of spontaneous generation.

(3) The illustration of the jar and the potter warrants this inference of a finite agent like ourselves, and such an agent is not equal to the task of creating the world.

(4) Besides, the agent which is sought to be proved by the argument cannot be an agent in general, but a determinate particular agent that is capable of creating the world. But no such agent is really proved by the argument. For this agent, if there be any such, must be either an embodied agent or a disembodied spirit. But an embodied agent would not be equal to the task of creation, while a disembodied spirit would not be an agent at all as lacking the bodily apparatus through which to act. Thus the agent sought to be inferred is an imaginary entity like the hare's horn.

The Theist replies to these objections as follows :—

(1) The universe being made of parts, must be an effect, *sāvayavatva* of the world proves its *kāryatva*.

(2) The so called instances of spontaneous generation are in reality cases of intelligent authorship, but the author is not actually observed as lacking a physical body.

(3) The inference proves only an agent in general, but as the universal must clothe itself in a concrete instance we reason to a particular concrete agent as the creator of the universe (*nirviśeṣa sāmānyasya asiddhatvāt*) as an epistemological implication of the conclusion of the inference.

(4) The objection that a disembodied agent cannot be an agent at all is untenable. The self in moving the body does not require the body except as the object to be moved. And

the Lord in creating the world does not also require any except the atoms as the objects of His creative activity. Even if the moving of the body be not possible except through desire and conation, it cannot be said that such desire and conation always require a body. A body is required only in the case of adventitious desire and will, but not when these are essential and non-adventitious as in the case of the Lord.

(5) That there cannot be more than one such creative Intelligence is proved by the fact that a plurality of Creative Intelligences, if non-omniscient, would be all alike incapable of creating the universe, and, if omniscient, would be without occupation, one omniscient intelligence being sufficient for the task of creation. Besides *aikamātya*, unanimity being not always possible among equals, there must be one supreme authority to which the rest must submit and this supervising authority thus will be the real master or Lord.

Since this Overlord must be *sarvajña* or omniscient, it follows that—

(1) it cannot have any *viśeṣānupalambhah*, non-apprehension of the special characteristics of things, and therefore

(2) any *mithyājñāna*, error or illusion, resulting therefrom, and therefore,

(3) any *rāgaḍvesan*, any attachment or aversion due to *mithyājñāna*, and therefore

(4) any *pravṛtti*, will or choice determined by *rāgaḍveśa*, and therefore

(5) any *dharmādharmān*, merit or demerit resulting from such willing, and therefore

(6) any pleasure or pain as the consequence of merit or demerit, and lastly

(7) it cannot have either *smṛti* i.e., reproductive experiences, or *saṁskāra*, mere impressions of past experiences, it

being *sarvada anubhavasvalhāva* i.e., of the nature of an eternal, presentative experience.

According to another view—its intelligence constitutes its irresistible will power (*avyāhatā kriyāśakti*) and therefore it does not require any other form of desire and effort, so that altogether its attributes are six in number.

As freedom presupposes prior bondage, it cannot be said to be *mukta* or free, and it also cannot be in bondage, the bonds of the miseries, etc., being impossible in its case. And thus we may say that it is *nityamukta*, eternally free.

A Gestalt approach to the concept of the Unconscious

BY

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In a singularly expressive phrase William James characterised the psychology of the unconscious as 'tumbling ground for whimsies'. The characterisation does not appear to be wholly unjust, for the amount of loose thinking and confusion that prevail have made it one of the most notoriously baffling subjects in modern psychology. No very successful attempts seem to have been made toward the clarification of the concept of the unconscious. There is no unanimity about its connotation, as the term continues to be employed by different writers to signify widely different conceptions. Some of the followers of Freud, for instance, look upon it as the dwelling-place of all kinds of repressed desires and unfulfilled ambitions that are declared taboo. In this sense the unconscious is a lumber-room or a prison where the condemned ideas and 'rebellious tendencies' are kept when they are not wanted. To Jung it is the inexhaustible reservoir of archaic thought and feeling. It is a huge mass of the collective experiences of humanity with which the individual is endowed at birth. It is a realm of 'shadows, dim lights and confusion'. Others regard the unconscious as a material or immaterial entity (or personality) which exists independently of consciousness and which thinks plans, struggles and achieves. It is co-conscious with the conscious activity of the subject ; and goes on concurrently as a subsidiary stream of mental activity. This is the famous hypothesis of Morton Prince. There are others, however, who look upon the unconscious with superstitious awe and reverence and would invoke it whenever there is a failure of scientific explanation. Still others like Schopenhauer and Hartmann have complicated the problem

of introducing general metaphysical considerations i.e., by ascribing ultimate reality to the unconscious as a principle of cosmic evolution. Still more recently Samuel Butler and Hering follow the same line of thought though they identify the unconscious with Matter. On the other hand there are those who have suggested that it is nothing but a hypothetical entity necessary for certain purposes of explanation and description. And some (like Münsterberg) have even doubted if it is necessary to postulate this at all

The common characteristic of the above views is the tendency to *spatialise* and *individualise* the unconscious : to regard it as a structure or stratum. Now to prejudice our inquiry at the outset by accepting implicitly what we might call the 'stratal' view of the unconscious would be quite unwarranted. *Prima facie* there is no reason why the unconscious should be looked upon as an independent structure or a mechanism made up of diverse elements of thought and feeling. And yet we find that a majority of writers have adopted some such point of view as the basis of their theory. We shall, therefore, avoid both the stratal and the 'personalistic' descriptions of the unconscious as being too mystical or metaphysical for scientific psychology.

It must not, however, be overlooked that the stratal point of view, as for instance, that implied by Freud, has considerable practical utility and methodological convenience. In the analysis and understanding of concrete neurotic phenomena it is always useful to demarcate the normal from the pathological with the utmost sharpness. Thus alone can insight be obtained into the nature of such pathogenic phenomena, as, for example, appear when two or more rival tendencies or systems of ideas develop in a single personality. Psychopathology must, therefore, like the natural sciences, isolate its phenomena with a view to their scientific treatment. But as

in the sciences, so too here, we must not forget the more or less hypothetical and abstract nature of the entities that are dealt with by the psycho-analysist or the pathologist.

Freud has, it must be admitted given due regard to this fact. He does not take the three divisions of conscious, fore-conscious and unconscious as ultimately separate or independent levels at all. On the contrary his fundamental position is that each of these strata determines and is determined by the others. More particularly, the unconscious which, according to him, constitutes eight-ninths of our mental make-up inevitably determines our conscious actions and general behaviour. He proceeds to interpret conscious phenomena in terms of the unconscious ; and for purposes of analysis and description this method turns out to be eminently useful. But it is not of much avail for a systematic exposition of mental phenomena which we must attempt in general psychology. Here analysis and description are not an end in themselves ; they constitute but a framework for ultimate theoretic construction. This has not been sufficiently realised by Freud and others, or at any rate, such general theoretic considerations stand in the back-ground and supply but a feeble motive in their investigations. What they do not appear to have particularly considered are, for instance, (1) the general *arrangement* of the states and contents and the specific relations obtaining between the various strata and (2) the physiological implications of these : problems which are of such considerable interest and importance to general psychology. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate these two problems.

Now, there are two ways in which the problem of the relation of psychic contents has been discussed; viz. (1) the Associationist hypothesis and (2) the Hormic theory. According to the association theory all consciousness is a conglomeration of ideas exhibiting a certain kind of uniformity and order

determined either by the principle of apperception or by certain well-known mechanical laws (like contiguity, resemblance, etc.). Ideas as discrete psychic elements may be associated into any combination and may likewise be dissociated. The hormic theory, on the other hand, looks upon the relation of contents of consciousness after Herbartian fashion as one of struggle and conflict. Each content is said to possess a hormic urge, an energy whereby it rises into consciousness or dives underground into the unconscious. Consciousness is the battle-ground of these diverse psychic forces. Freud's theory appears to be an admixture of both these points of view. Neither of these views, however, seems to be satisfactory, for conscious states may not be interpreted in terms of either or both. The associationist doctrine misses the most fundamental characteristic of mental processes viz., that they are *processes* and transitions and not *states* or entities. The hormic theory takes the analogy of forces a little too literally. Thus, while the former hypothesis erects entities out of fluid states, the latter vainly aims at constructing a dynamics of mind with its individual forces and tendencies, and the one is as unsatisfactory as the other. Thus, Herbart's attempt ought to serve as a warning against all such attempts.

Now, as the same laws appear to operate throughout mental life, we may expect to have an idea of the arrangement of conscious states as also of the contents of the unconscious from the facts of conscious life. The most important characteristic of a conscious state is that it is a whole or a configuration and not a combination of elements. That is; while it may lend itself with considerable difficulty to analysis and discrimination, strictly speaking in reality it is a phenomenological unity. This can be better understood if we approach the matter from the view-point of fusion theory.

Stumpf who is the author of this theory formulated this hypothesis as a result of experimental findings on tonal sensations. Nevertheless he was inclined to extend it to other sensations and facts of conscious life¹. "We term fusion", says he, "that relation of two contents in which they form not a mere sum but a *whole*". "Fusion signifies here not a process but a present relation". It is not to be viewed as originating a third (tonal) quality in addition to or instead of the other two." It represents a relation of interpenetration, and an interpenetration of a higher and lower degree. If two tones the number of whose vibrations are related as 1 : 2 are simultaneously produced they can be very imperfectly discriminated, indeed if at all". "The octave tones," for instance, "cannot be kept distinct even by the most delicate and practised ear, in the same degree as those of the seventh, or the unmusical relation 40 : 77"².

What occurs in tonal fusion appears to characterise mental processes and conscious states in general. Every perception, for instance, is a fusion of what by an introspective abstraction we call sensations and images. My perception of the moon, for instance, is a fusion of the various sensations, memories and images and meanings which rise into my mind as soon as I perceive it. I may try to discriminate and distinguish between these various contents but it is impossible to effect any disjunction between them. They constitute one dynamic configuration, a fusion-whole, like the two notes of an octave. Every motor-whole is dynamic because as a total configuration it leads psychologically to motor transitions and physiologically to motor discharges. Thus an emotion e.g. is a fusion in so far as it represents a unique conscious state. To look upon it as mere sum of organic and visceral sensation is to miss

1. Rand---Classical Psychologist p. 631

2. Rand---Classical Psychologist p.p. 619, 20, 21.

all that is fundamentally characteristic of it. Psychologically it is felt as a dynamic experience and physiologically observed as the starting point for movements.

Ideas in this sense would be fusion-wholes of images and their associates for each idea is experienced as a unitary meaning and serves to guide motor discharges. The meaning of an idea is definite when the motor guidance is specific, it is indefinite when the motor guidance involves a number of alternatives. Conflict between ideas and their appearance in consciousness would then ultimately depend upon the nature of the motor discharge that they dictate. Idea, then, like any other mental process is a configuration, a whole which represents a fusion-relation and inherent dynamic character in the sense we have already indicated. A fusion, however, is not a 'psychical resultant' in the Wundtian sense. It does not possess any properties other than those of its constituents and yet it is not a mere assemblage of parts or elements, for the fusion-whole functions as a unitary fact of consciousness and its constituents do not function independently of the whole. That is, the fusion-whole alone determines the course of the motor discharge and the constituent by itself does not initiate any specific activity.

The fusion-whole, then, is given as a unitary psychic configuration in phenomenological observation and represents an integrated and specific response of the organism. It would follow that when the fusion is not complete a constituent would be experienced more or less separately from the whole and would also initiate a movement out of keeping with it.

The arrangement of contents may be understood in another way and so we pass on to another line of thought, though eventually it may lead to the same conclusion. We have in mind particularly the important experiments conducted by Head and

Rivers on cutaneous sensibility. By aesthetising a particular area on the skin they discovered that though superficially insensible the skin still responded to extremes of stimulation, and that there remained a definitely localised *deep* sensibility. Again, when a divided nerve was re-united the process of the return of sensibility was marked by two distinct stages. The first kind of sensibility to return was characterised by its relative crudeness, irradiating quality and indefinite localisation. It could be aroused by intense stimulation and had a prominently effective tone—particularly unpleasant. This is the protopathic sensibility. The other sensibility which came later was distinguished by discrimination, easy localisation and low stimulation and was termed epicritic. Because of its fineness and discrimination the epicritic sensibility allies itself to intelligence, while the relative crudeness and indefiniteness place the protopathic sensibility on the side of the reflex and instinctive mechanism of an organism.

While thus the three systems appear to be more or less distinct levels it is important to remember that they exist side by side in mutual interdependence. The one merely supervenes on the other without abolishing the individual characteristics of the latter. Altogether they constitute a fusion-whole. As in a fusion the contents may be distinct but their simultaneous existence gives rise to a whole of unique quality so here the three kinds of sensibility occasion a peculiar feeling-pattern which embodying in some ways their individual qualities is characteristic. Their interdependence is further brought out by the fact that when one system fails—for whatever reason—the other takes its place. When the epicritic touch has been impaired, the protopathic must come in its place, and when this has been damaged the responsibility of adjustment and adaptation devolves upon the deep-lying sensibility. If this were not so, the organism would fail in its adaptation.

The arrangement of the conscious and unconscious as also their particular set of contents appear to be in a similar fusion. At any particular moment a set of conscious, fore-conscious and unconscious elements (to adopt the Freudian scheme) would be in a state of fusion. In the higher degrees such as characterise the normal consciousness the various contents so arrange themselves that there is harmony and concord. The diverse sensations, ideas and tendencies are so adjusted and are in such relation of interdependence and interperetration that they give rise to a unitary experience, and behaviour is coherent and orderly. When, however, the fusion is imperfect (for some reason or other) it may result in all manner of conflicts. The individual torn by rival tendencies and impulses would be a house divided against itself. Thought would be incoherent and action generally ill-adapted, and in extreme cases self-destructive. For each of them, as we have seen above, would initiate independent motor impulses.

Fusion would be complete only when the various contents constituting a blend at a particular level (fore-conscious or unconscious) are in unison with the blend of the other strata. That is, when besides a horizontal blending there is also a vertical blending so that the whole constitutes one fusion-relation. This becomes obvious when we see that a particular system of ideas may be in itself a coherent-whole but somehow it may not harmonise with another system or other systems. Thus a consistent plan of life often conflicts with desires and impulses vaguely felt and with the tendencies of the organism with which heredity and training have invested it and which are not felt at all. Fusion here would be very incomplete indeed, as the recalcitrant idea-system would resort to all kinds of devious ways, such as symbolisation and sublimation rationalisation etc., to blend itself with the whole. All of these processes may be easily interpreted as fusion-products. Even in the lowest types of fusion such as are met with in.

what are called dissociations there would be some blending albeit a very imperfect one such as Stumpf signalises by the unmusical relation 40 : 77. The difference between the various levels then would be only a difference of *degrees of fusion*.

But the difference may be characterised in another way. We find in normal consciousness what James has called substantive and transitive states. The substantives are eg., ideas and perception, memory and imagination, the transitive states are those that lead from one of these substantives to the other. They are represented in consciousness by what have been called feelings of relation. These feelings filiate themselves with attitudes, dispositions and motor tendencies with respect to their experienced character. In conscious experience then there are contents and the transitions between them. We may be conscious of both and may introspect and verbalise some of them. In the fore-conscious, the contents or substantives have lapsed and there is the consciousness of vague attitudes, tensions, incomprehensible fears and anxieties which are represented by the transitives of waking consciousness. And it is due to the loss of their association with substantives that the individual is unable to relate these to any of his conscious experiences and feels an embarrassment and oppression which he is unable to understand. The tension may, however, resolve itself into some kind of behaviour which the subject does not comprehend and for which he would give elaborate rationalisations. At the unconscious level both the content and transitions have lapsed so far as to make verbalisation and introspection impossible. It is only under certain conditions and by means of special processes that any part of these may be revealed. Nevertheless, the unconscious as much as any afferent stimulation must find its outlet in some manner. When the usual channels are blocked it may diffuse itself throughout or appear in all kinds of indirect and tortuous ways and disguises. Behaviour would consequently seem very

incoherent and peculiar but in its own way it would be the best that is possible at the level to which the individual has regressed. It would have some kind of adaptive value even though in extreme cases this may be very doubtful (as in suicidal mania.)

This leads us to the consideration of certain well-known biological and physiological facts. It is common knowledge that in the course of evolution an organism undergoes very important and far-reaching changes. In certain animals particularly the insects, fishes and amphibia complete metamorphoses and vast transformations mark the various stages of development. Apart from anatomical and physiological changes, the memories and experiences of an earlier stage are superseded by those of the later. This supersession appears to be in the best interests of the individual for it possesses adaptive and survival value. In mammals and particularly in man, however, the changes are not so radical and hence the supersession never so complete. But even here the experiences of the infant do not go unmodified to the adult, for if they did, they would have a disturbing effect. Hence these experiences continue in some modified form to color and determine adult life. The reflex and instinctive mechanism, for instance, which dominates the life of an infant is not suppressed but is merely superseded by and assimilated into higher conscious patterns. Normally it plays its role unobtrusively but once the 'brainy life of relations' is disturbed, we find the responsibility of adjustment and adaptation devolve upon it. Thus, in any behaviour the organism as a whole is concerned. All the different parts contribute towards a consolidated, unitary re-action. It is only when the balance of the organism is disturbed,—for whatever causes,—that these begin to function fractionally rather than as an integrated whole.

It is now well-established that brain also works in integrations. In any activity the brain as a whole is concerned although certain neurone-patterns or neurograms, as Prince has called them, may be more dominantly active than others. The nervous energy irradiates throughout the wide-spreading patterns, exciting some into pronounced activity while feebly stimulating the others. Why one pattern is activated more than others is determined by the character of the situation, and the history and training of the organism. When a neurone-pattern is not activated it lies in a state of dormancy. But once an appropriate stimulus has touched it off, it leaps into the centre, as it were, and assumes the major role. There does not, therefore, seem to be any justification for assuming, as Knight Dunlop has done, 'that a few million nerve cells might be able to combine into two systems instead of one' and that 'both of these systems may be conscious at the same time.'¹ However convenient the hypothesis, the latest researches in neurology do not appear to countenance it.² These have shown that even in cases of localisation 'we must allow a certain flexibility to cortical patterns'.³ Thus, any afferent stimulation not only arouses its appropriate sensation—it also spreads and irradiates throughout. This is particularly evident in cases where it cannot find an adequate motor outlet. "If the centrifugal discharge is inhibited", says Münsterberg, "the channel closed, then the sensory process goes on as before, but the impression is faint, unperceived, while it may become vivid later as soon as the hindrance to the discharge disappears."⁴ 'The inhibition of ideas', for instance, 'would then mean that a special path of discharge is closed, and thus the

1. *Problem of Personality* in honor of Prince : p. 248.

2. S. I. Franz, Lashley, Herrick and Cameron.

3. Woodworth—*Psychology*, p. 535.

4. Münsterberg—*Psychology and Life* p. 96.

idea which needs that discharge for its vividness cannot come into existence.⁵ But as it must find some channel it may express itself in most extraordinary ways. This is so because, as the principle of dynamogenesis has shown, every sensory stimulation has a tendency to pass into a motor discharge. 'All consciousness is motor', 'There is no central sensory process which is not the beginning of an action too'. So that when the special path of discharge which the irradiating centripetal stimulation seeks is closed and it cannot ensue into a usual normal motor behaviour, it diffuses itself throughout the organism and may make itself felt as vague attitudes, and tens on, or it may exploit the ever ready reflex and instinctive or habit mechanism for its manifestation. Thus 'the channels may be closed in one direction but open in others; the actually resulting discharge must be the product of the situation in the whole centrifugal system, with its millions of ramifications, and the same sensory stimulus may thus under a thousand different conditions produce a thousand different centrifugal waves, all, perhaps with the same intensity. The vividness would then be always the same, and yet the difference of the locality in the discharge must give new features to the psychical element.'⁶ Physiologically, then the fore-conscious and the unconscious would correspond to the diffusion of the impulse in the ramifications of the system, with the resulting tension, and the passage of the centrifugal discharge into unusual channels with the consequent extraordinary behaviour respectively. Why the impulse follows this rather than that particular channel, is, as has been already pointed out, determined by the nature of the situation and character of the organism. These reasons are obvious and well-known and do not form part of our enquiry, so we need not investigate them here.

5. Munsterberg--Psychology & Life, p. 95.

6. Munsterberg---Psychology and Life---p. 96.

The relations between the different levels of consciousness, then, as our survey indicates, is like that between the elements in a fusion-whole. The conscious, fore-consciousness and the unconscious may form a unified pattern and may lead to a unified reaction as is the ideal of normal life. But it frequently happens that the fusion is not of the highest degree so that either a system of experience as a whole or any portion of it may fall asunder from the main fusion-whole which for the time-being guides and controls the motor responses of the organism. In such instances the relatively discriminable unit initiates behaviour specific to itself and thus sows the seed of discord. We have its analogy in the field of tonal fusion when the discriminable tonal unit draws attention to itself and thus tends to initiate reactions, for whatever is specifically attended to would have a specific motor implication.

The relation between the conscious and the various orders of sub-conscious experience, again, is analogous to that between the system of contaneous sensations as it brought home by the experiments of Head and Rivers. The factors that are more readily discriminable serve better for adaptation inasmuch as they can envisage for the organism a wider range of the facts of the environment. Hence they tend to supersede others which are less discriminable, or possess a higher threshold value of stimulation. It is for this reason that the epicritic sensibility figures in the field of attention while the other systems which are no less elements of experience recede in the margin. We can conceive the different so-called layers of consciousness as similarly arranged and for the same reasons. This point becomes further evident when we consider the contents of the conscious and sub-conscious experiences. The conscious life consists of substantive and transitive experiences. Its principal characteristics are that it can be introspected and verbalised, i.e., while all orders of experience

initiate motor responses the finely graded and organised system of reactions represented by verbal responses is peculiar only to the waking consciousness. As a consequence it has the peculiarity of leading to graded reaction, whereas the other systems are said to be capable of 'all or none reaction'. The transitive experience which we find in consciousness are seldom separated from their substantives. When on rare occasions they are loosened from their moorings we call them attitudes and tendencies which from their very nature do not lead to specific consequences either on the psychological or on the motor plan. It is these transitions with indefinite motor directions that constitute what Freud has called the fore-conscious. They are neither capable of offering specific motor guidance nor specific verbalisation. We may further conceive of a state where the contents and the transitions are so far out of the focus of attention that they cannot be discovered by any effort of introspection. This is the level of the unconscious. It is a plane which expresses itself either through the mediation of waking consciousness or through the ready-made mechanism of reflexes, for every experience must sooner or later culminate in some kind of muscular or other bodily changes. Both of these latter modes of response are less satisfactory from the point of adaptation than the consciously guided responses, although they can be relied upon when conscious guidance fails, just in the same way as general attitudes and tendencies help us out of situations when no well-defined conscious state mediates orientation. Arrangement of the conscious and sub-conscious systems seems to depend on their relative efficacy in the matter of adaptation. And the same principle of reaction also explains how the experienced contents sink below the level of waking consciousness.

Münsterberg's action theory, read in the context of the principle of dynamogenesis, leads us to hold that whatever

experience commands an open channel or motor response figures vividly in consciousness or is the object of attention. Conversely, an experience to the extent to which it is unable to secure a motor pathway recedes from the focus of attention. In the same way where several experiences find a common path they would blend. This principle would also explain how ideas are inhibited when for one reason or another they cannot ensure for themselves an unblocked motor-passage. In such cases the afferent impulses would diffuse themselves in various motor directions and would make themselves felt as tendencies, yearnings, etc. On the other hand if these translations do not help them to secure a motor expression they would tend to recede farther from the field of attention and manifest themselves through the mechanism of automatic behaviour or they might seek a common path with a conscious state and thus blend with it indiscernibly although changing its significance for the organism. It is in this way that the openness and closeness of the motor channel determines not only the function but also the expression of the sub-conscious experiences.

The Problem of Evil in Indian Philosophy.

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कास्ताः दृशो यासु न सन्ति दोषाः

कास्ताः दिशो यासु न दुःखदाहः ।

कास्ताः प्रजा यासु न मङ्गु रत्नम्

कास्ताः क्रिया यासु न नाम माया ॥१॥

“Is there any view which is free from *error* ; is there any place where there is no agony of *suffering* ; is there any creation which is not *transitory* ; and is there any transaction which is free from *deception* ?” It is a serious question which was put to Vasiṣṭha by Ramachandra. It is sure to occur in the mind of every human being at some time or other. The answer we get from our experience is in no way optimistic. Buddha, the Enlightened one, with his searching and penetrating eyes, discovered that pain and transitoriness are the characteristics of all beings. “Birth”, says he, “is painful, decay is painful, death is painful, union with the unpleasant is painful, painful is the separation from the pleasant, and any craving that is unsatisfied, that too is painful. In brief, the five aggregates (body, feeling, perception, conation and cognition), which spring from attachment are painful”. And “There are three things, O King, which you cannot find in the world. That which, whether conscious or unconscious, is not subject to decay and death, that you will not find. The quality of anything which is not impermanent, that you will not find. And in the highest sense there is no such thing as being possessed of being”. Kant asks : “Would any man of sound understanding who has lived long enough and has meditated

on the worth of human existence care to go again through the life's poor play, I do not say on the same conditions, but on any condition whatsoever?". Schopenhauer comes to a similar conclusion: "The nature of life throughout presents itself to us as intended and calculated to awaken the conviction that nothing at all is worth our striving, our efforts and struggles; that all good things are vanity; the world in all its ends bankrupt; and life a business which does not cover expenses". In the *Yogavāsistha* we are told by Vasiṣṭha that there cannot be any abiding satisfaction realised in sense-enjoyments for "they please only at the commencement" (V.22.30). "All pleasures terminate in pain, as all bright flames terminate in the darkness of smoke" (V. 49.6-7). "On the head of all beings dances non-being; within all beauty is hid ugliness; and all pleasures terminate in pain. To which shall we then resort?" (V.9.41). "We are disgusted, because we have realised that all beautiful things turn ugly; all stability is unstable; and all our truths are false" (VI b.93.91). "All prosperity brings added misery; all pleasures bring their consequent pains; and life is only for death" (VIb. 93.73). "The entire activity of life will be found asara (without any positive gain) on reflection" (VIa.78.8). It is this dark and disappointing aspect of life, which, however undesirable it may be, is a fact to which eyes cannot be shut for all times, that is called *evil* in religion and philosophy of the West. It is designated as *duḥkha* in India. All religion and philosophy have their birth in the consciousness of evil or *duḥkha* and the desire to get rid of it. "Duḥkha trayā-abhighātāt jijñāsā tadabhighātake hetau." (*Sāṅkhyakārikā*).

In modern philosophy of the West there are two main conceptions of evil; that of the Absolutists and that of the Humanists. The first group of thinkers holds that the consciousness of evil is only a partial vision, that evil is merely an appearance, and that in the Reality as a Whole it is "over-ruled

and subserved". Evil according to them is not grounded in the Reality as a Whole, but is experienced only in the parts of the Reality. How any partial appearance, such as evil, error, and finitude etc. arise in the Perfect Absolute Whole is not answered satisfactorily by them. They think, that it is beyond our comprehension. "Why there are appearances, and why appearances of such various kinds, are questions not to be answered", says Bradley in his *Appearance and Reality*, (p. 511.) The Pragmatists and Humanists naturally revolt against such a view. According to them evil is as real as the individual. They denounce the Absolutistic metaphysics downright, because they think that in the Absolutistic philosophy the centre of interest is the Absolute and not the individual for whom the evil is ingrained in reality. Evil, they say, is real. The Pragmatists discard the conception of a perfect, omnipotent and good God, who has hitherto been believed to be the creator of the world, for, if God is the author of the world, he must have also been the author of the dreadful evils of the world like war, pestilence, accidents, earthquakes and floods etc., and of suffering, old age and death etc., of the living creatures. They recognise evil as a real principle active in the world side by side with the forces that are operative to conquer it. A finite God struggling against the forces of Satan, and to a great extent aided by the growing wisdom and power of man, is what satisfies them. If God and man co-operate and put their best efforts in changing the present nature of the world, evil may be finally vanquished and subdued to the service of man. It is clear that even by the Pragmatists no further explanation of evil is given than that it is a *fact*, an actuality that cannot be denied. Their main concern is 'Not why evil should exist at all, but how we can lessen the actual amount of it'. (James : *Pluralistic Universe*, p. viii). Prof. Radhakrishnan, therefore, while defending the Absolutistic philosophy against the attacks of

James, rightly remarks: "But if Absolutism fails to account for evils and error, (which are "Mystery" according to Bradley and "insoluble puzzle" according to Joachim), pluralism does not fare better" (*The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 259).

In India, however, it was long ago clearly realised that the world as such can never be free from evil and *duḥkha*. The *samsāra* will always be what it is, however we may try to rectify it. Swami Vivekananda gives expression to this idea ingrained in the Indian Mind when he writes: "Objective society will always be a mixture of good and evil—objective life will always be followed by its shadow, death, and the longer the life, the longer will be the shadow. ...Every improvement is coupled with an equal degradation.....If good is increasing so is evil...The progress of the world means more enjoyment and more misery too...To have good and no evil is a childish nonsense" (*Complete Works* VI, p. 341). "Two ways," he further writes, "are left open—one by giving up all hope to take up the world as it is and bear the pangs and pains in the hope of a crumb of happiness now and then. The other, to give up the search for pleasure (in the world), knowing it to be pain in another form and seek for Truth...present in themselves." (*Ibd*, p. 341). The world as such, Indian philosophers have thought cannot be freed from evil. But it is, they think, possible for every individual to perfect himself and to save himself from evil and suffering. They have distinguished two states of the existence of the Self of all beings, one, the *actual*, which is full of imperfections, suffering, and other sorts of evils, and the other, the *ideal* state in which it is possible for the individual to exist as free from all evils, imperfections and disturbances. The former is designated the state of *Bandha* (bondage to evil) and the latter that of *Mokṣa* (freedom from evil). Here we propose to have a bird's eye view of what the prominent schools of Indian philosophy have

thought on the cause and remedy of bondage of the individual to the world of evils.

According to the Cārvākas, the Indian materialists, enjoyment of life without any consideration of the future existence and destiny of the individual is the ideal living. Bondage, if there is any, is the bondage to the authority of religion and morality. These considerations make a coward of man and keep him away from the enjoyments of life. Let us take the life as it is, and let us not postpone the present enjoyments for the sake of some non-existent, but wrongly supposed to be existent, state of heavenly or liberated bliss. We end with death. There is no problem of *mokṣa* beyond the present life. This view, it is evident, cannot satisfy man, although there is a grain of truth in it. It is an antithesis to the too much religious obsession which makes a man neglect the comforts the body legitimately requires.

According to the Jaina thinkers, the limitations of life and the consequent misery and suffering are due to the intermixture of the soul with the forces of matter ; both of which have been existing intermixed from time immemorial, without any beginning in time. Yet it is possible through moral and ascetic practices to separate the soul from the kārmiic particles of matter entirely. When the soul is thus freed from matter, it will go high up, beyond the mundane existence. This view, it is evident from the beginninglessness of the intermixture of the soul with the matter, does not make the sufferer from the evil responsible for his suffering. The evil is ingrained in the reality from time immemorial and is sufficiently deeply intermixed with the soul. This view does not also attribute any meaning and purpose to evil in life. And the method suggested to get rid of the mundane existence is very ascetic and puritanic, full of hardships and difficulties at every step.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, evil consists in the soul (which in its essential nature is a pure substance free

from all attributes of knowledge, emotion and activity, which it acquires during the mundane existence) assuming a body with the senses and uniting with a mind, as a consequence of its previous karmas (actions), and thereby suffering from the misery of life and death. The *samsāra* (cycle of births and deaths) continues as long as the soul is not freed from attachment to the body and mind and from binding actions through the knowledge of the real nature of the soul and other things. When this is effected, the soul becomes liberated and continues to exist in its pure form which is free from all pains and pleasures, and from all attributes that were acquired during the embodied existence, including consciousness. It is not explained in this philosophy how and why such an originally pure soul was implicated in the clutches of karma and bondage for the first time, it being considered a sufficient reply that our bondage is beginningless. This idea of freedom from bondage in a state of liberation which will be free from not only pain but also from every kind of happiness even, free from even consciousness of every kind, is not an idea that can appeal to man. It is an attempt to acquire a state of complete anaesthesia, as it were, and to reduce oneself to a stone-like state of unconscious existence.

According to the early *Mīmāṃsakas*, Jaimini and Śabara, the evil is due to the performance of bad and prohibited actions which are bound to bring suffering to the performers. Freedom from evil would be a state of happy existence in a heaven brought about by the performance of the duties enjoined upon us by the Scripture, the Vedas. This view suffers from the fault pointed by the author of the *Sāmkhyakārika* that the stay in heaven cannot be a state perfectly free from pain, on account of there being grades in the happiness of the residents of heaven, and that this remedy of escaping from the evils of life does not bring about the final escape, an escape once for ever, for, the consequences of "good" actions even must last for

some definite period of time, and not for ever. So, these philosophers have suggested neither the ultimate origin of evil nor the final remedy of it.

The evil of bondage, according to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga philosophers, is due to the want of discriminative knowledge (aviveka) between the spirit-Subject and the psycho-physical matter-Object (the Puruṣa and Prakṛti). Of the two, the former is, by its very nature, unchanging, inactive and pure consciousness, which is essentially free from all pleasures, pains and delusions. In the present state, however, it feels its identity with the objective psycho-physical reality, the Prakṛti, in the forms of intellect, ego, mind, body and the senses. On account of forgetfulness by the Puruṣa of its own nature and of the attention directed by the puruṣa towards it, the prakṛti begins to dance into the many forms of things, senses, mind, ego and intellect etc., which are all amenable to pleasure, pain or dullness; to change into all kinds of miserable or happy states in heaven or hell. The Puruṣa feels its identity with every changing state or form of Prakṛti, and is never at rest in its pristine purity. It is really wrong for the subject to attribute to itself the conditions of objects, both of the psychical and physical order. Nevertheless it is actually done for want of discrimination. Discrimination between the two as absolutely separate entities and the consequent aloofness of the subject in its own state of self-effulgent consciousness is the ideal of these two systems of Indian philosophy. No satisfactory answer, however, is given as to how this false identity between the two, this non-discrimination, originates at all. If the two were essentially distinct entities, when and how did they come to be so united that the one is identified with the other? To say that this non-discrimination is beginningless is to evade the question of the origin and not to answer it. According to these thinkers, no other character than that of being pure consciousness, unattached to anything, aloof and

distinct from all other things, although infinite in extension, is present in the liberated soul. This state is realised, as it were, by abstracting it from all the contents of consciousness, or by stripping off all concreteness from conscious experience. It is, apparently a way of not conquering the evil, but of running away from it.

According to Buddhism, in general, life as such is misery and pain. There is no joy in it. Everything is in perpetual flux. The soul, postulated by other systems of philosophy, in which a resort is sought to escape from the evils of life, is itself, when analysed, found by the Buddhists to be no exception to the universal law of change and is of a composite nature. To be something, to will to be something, or to desire to have something, is itself the root of all suffering. This *trāṇā* or desire to be is due to *ignorance*, *avidyā*. Freedom from all kinds of desires for objects and negation of the will to live through moral conduct prepare the way, for arriving at a state, in which the individual personality, which is changing and composite in its nature, is finally extinguished. This state is called *Nirvāṇa* or extinction of evils and passions with that of the personality. How the individual originated, why there is ignorance on account of which he goes on weaving the web of prolonged existence here and hereafter, are questions to which no answer can be found in the philosophy of the Buddha. The ignorance is said to be beginningless. The remedy, it will appear, suggested for the evils of life is a medicine that would effectively remove the disease of suffering, but would also do away with the patient to insure freedom from possible relapse. The idea of the Buddhist *Nirvāṇa* is more or less a negative, one of freedom from all the dark aspects of life. But man does not only want an escape from the miserable state of existence, but also desires to be in some such state of existence where he may enjoy unconditional and undecaying bliss. This positive aspect is to a great extent absent in Buddhist philosophy.

which lays much emphasis on negation, although signs are not wanting in the later Buddhism of the influence of the Upanishadic idea of the Self as Ānanda—bliss.

According to the Upanishads, to speak in a general way, the cause and root of all evil is our ignorance of the ever-existing fact that we are one with the Absolute Brahman, the Ultimate Reality which is self-effulgent Bliss. When we come to know this fact we partake in the Joy Absolute. "When the Brahman is known all fetters fall away"; "The knower of the Brahman becomes Brahman", say the Upanishads. Śaṅkarācārya, therefore, thinks that the evil consists in the *ignorance* of the true nature of the self, which is Brahman. When, through the study of the Upanishads, understanding their doctrines, contemplating over their truth, we come to realise that we are the Brahman, our finitude and vision of the world of plurality and change, which are essentially false and evil, vanish from our experience, and we are left, not in a negative state of emptiness (Shūnya), but in a state of Perfect Existence, which is not destitute of Consciousness and Bliss, and which is fuller than the full one can imagine. But why, how and when Ignorance crept into our Being to make us finite is a question which not only is not answered by the Vedantists satisfactorily but is also denounced as an illegitimate question (atipraśnam). A similar remark is made by Suzuki with regard to the Mahayana Metaphysics, the doctrines of which very much resemble those of the Advaita Vedānta, when he says "As to the question how and why this negative principle of ignorance came to assert itself in the body of Suchness (the name of the Ultimate Reality for Aśvaghosa), we are at a loss where to find an authoritative and definite answer to it" (Suzuki; *Outline of Mahayana Buddhism*, p. 116).

Thus, no philosophical system of the East or West so far considered has given a satisfactory answer to the question of the origin of evil. No one seems to agree on the point.

that we suffer because we are ignorant of the true nature of things around us, of the true nature of ourselves, and of the true relation that exists between us and the objects around us. They all seem to hold that it is more important to know how ignorance is to be removed, that is, how the evil is to be overcome and destroyed, than how why and when it originated. The Buddha said so, William James says so. In the *Yoga-vasistha*, Vasistha tells Rama : "Do not, O Rāma, waste your time in thinking on how the ignorance arose. Think how you can get rid of it. It is only when this Ignorance is completely removed that you will know the secret why and how it arose" (Sthiti Prakaranam. IV.41.32-34).

But man cannot rest satisfied with this agnosticism as to the ultimate reason why ignorance or evil is there at all. The main difficulty in the acceptance of evil as an ultimate fact ingrained in reality, is that the admission of it as an independent power, a Cosmic Principle like the Satan, takes away all hope of victory over it, and also all possibility of its ever being effaced out of existence with regard to the individual as well as to the world. The difficulty of the Monistic systems of philosophy on the other hand is to understand why the One Perfect and Infinite Blissful God or Brahman could become the finite and suffering Many ; or, if the many are eternally rooted in the all-comprehending and all-embracing One, how could the forgetfulness of this fact occur at all ? Moreover, unless we can conceive why and how evil is there we cannot understand how to overcome it. To say that the evil is beginningless is to admit an actual reality of it.

The *Yogavāsistha* presents one of the boldest attempts to account for the mystery of evil from the Monistic standpoint. Bondage or evil, according to Vasistha, is another name for finite existence, the mind or individual itself. Ignorance is another name for it. It is also *Maya*. To be an *avidya*

dual is to be limited, is to hedge a wall of neglect or non-recognition of the Whole round the centre of interest in a particular portion or aspect of the Absolute Whole. To attend to a particular point is, in fact, to neglect the rest. And we *are* only that, for the time being, to which we give our full attention. Nobody else forces us to attend to a part of the whole. It is a voluntary game which we may play or not. It has a beginning and an end. As every concave has its convex side, so the limitation of our interest to here and now has the other side involved in the very act of limitation, namely, the passing away of the rest of the Reality, ever present in the total experience, into the subconscious.

A centre of interest, a point of consciring activity, is *spontaneously* (swabhāvataḥ) and without any ulterior motive, fixed in the ever Perfect and Infinite Absolute like the springing up of a whirl in an ocean. From the point of view of this centre the total Experience appears split up into two aspects, one in which the individual (centre) is interested, and so, real to it, and the other in which the individual is not interested, and so unreal to the individual. But there cannot be an actual separation between the two aspects of the Entire Experience except for the individual. As the centre of interest of the individual continues shifting his experience goes on changing. Imagining ever new forms in the objective world is the changing of the centre of interest. And we cannot but imagine new forms in our objective experience, because the entire Infinite Experience is immanent in the individual and on account of this fact there is a revolt in the individual against being satisfied with a particular form of experience and a demand to have other forms of experience in the field of consciousness. This is the reason why there is no final satisfaction of desire in having got this or that object. As long as we shall continue to desire particular objects, our desires will bring us no rest or final peace, for objects will be infinite in number and kind and there is a

craving in us for the Infinite. This is why in spite of our possessions, achievements and enjoyments we always feel poor.

We do not wait to enjoy what we have ourselves attracted towards us. This is why there is discord, disharmony and misery in this world. This state of affairs will continue to be experienced so long as there is interest in particular objects and desire to be this or that, and attachment to this or that, for, there will be a perpetual revolt from within against satisfaction with the particular part when the Whole is ours. Want of happiness is the sign of this revolt. There is a need also of this revolt, otherwise perfection would never be aspired for. This evil is necessary, otherwise the glory of the Absolute which is our very Self, the deep Ocean behind the bubble of our being, would remain hidden from the view of those who are interested in partial and poor aspects of it. The vision of the Whole, the Infinite, will shine above the threshold of consciousness only when we give up our limited interests and become interested in the Whole and constantly imagine ourselves to be nothing less than the Whole.

The Self in relation to knowledge (A Symposium)

BY

S. S. SURYANARAYANA SHASTRI.

Modern European Philosophy started with the indubitable certainty of the self, which was left over, it was said, even when everything else was rejected as uncertain and deceptive. Such a starting-point, it has been repeatedly remarked, inevitably led to difficulties in linking up the subject with the object of knowledge, and to the fallacies of Representationism. Given subject and object, each standing outside the other, knowledge, as a relation between them, explains nothing ; for, no relation is, in the end, intelligible. It is either adjectival to the relata, in which case the relata are modified in the very process of being related, or it falls outside of them, in which case they are not related at all. Knowledge, as a relation, either modifies the facts in the very act of knowing or it does not know facts at all. The difficulty is fundamental and cannot be got over by any attempt to treat knowing as a relation *sui generis*, as a special kind of viṣayitā-sambandha, as the Neo-Realists and the Naiyāyikas seek to do. The self as a knowing subject is an abstraction from knowledge, and such an abstraction is by its very nature phenomenal.

It is also true, however, that the self in another sense is real, its reality being more certain to us than anything else. Descartes' method may have been faulty, but he did not err in his conclusion that indubitable certainty belongs to the self. This self cannot obviously be the abstraction called the knowing subject. And, if knowledge, as that from which subject and object are both abstracted, is more real than these, the self which is said to be indubitable must be at least as real as knowledge. This self, again, cannot be in relation to

knowledge or the object known. For, relation, as we have said, is phenomenal, and if the self and knowledge were related, we should have to look for a higher reality of which both are appearances. The indubitably real self cannot be in relation to knowledge, for, the self is knowledge ; satyam jñānam anantam brahma.

This way of looking at the problem reduces reality to a unity, that unity being the self, not as opposed to a not-self, but as transcending all distinctions of self and not-self. The diversity and plurality experienced by us will have to be explained (up to a stage) as due to superimposition. There is no point in asking for the cause of this superimposition, since the causal concept itself belongs to the world of phenomena and diversity and obviously cannot be applied to the coming into existence of that world. The phenomenal world, as the advaitin says, is beginningless. Unsatisfactory as this explanation is, it is at least more intelligible than any other theory which seems condemned to leave subject and object standing over, one against the other. The advaitin makes an attempt to see them both as appearances of a basic unity, which avoids the *impasse* presented by the concept of relation, since it is supra-relational. This supra-relational unity is the self. Only as superimposed thereon is the knowledge of the objective world intelligible.¹

The objection that on such a view knowledge too becomes supra-relational and hence unintelligible, there being no knowledge except of objects known (i. e., in relation to objects), is puerile. Luminosity is of the essential nature of knowledge, not relation to objects. The sun's rays would not lose their

1. Cp. Maṇḍana Miśra : *ekatva 'avā 'yam draṣṭṛ-dṛśya-bhāve 'vakalpate, draṣṭur eva cidātmanah tathā tathā vipariṣmād vivartanād vā ; nānātre tu vivikta-svabhāvayor asamsrṣṭa-parampara-svarūpayor asambaddhayoh kidrśo draṣṭṛ-dṛśya-bhāvah ? (Brahmasiddhi, p. 2).*

character of brightness, even if there were no objects to be illumined by them. It is true that we in our imagined finitude divide the world into subjects and objects, and conceive of knowledge as a relation between them. But intelligence does not cease to be intelligence, merely because it transcends the superimposed distinctions; for, even in our limited experience, knowledge would not be intelligible if the wall between subject and object were not conceived as somehow pulled down or got over; we know, not because there is an object over against us, but because being imagined to be against us, it ceases to be so. ²

It may be thought that, whatever may be said of things, in the case of other selves at least, the validity of the knowledge of them as independent and distinct should be conceded; for, to deny that is to deny the existence of other selves and to sap the foundations of the moral life. One answer is that morality is phenomenal and that the phenomenal reality of other selves is never sought to be denied. Another answer consists in asking how we know the reality of other selves. All that is available to our ordinary means of knowledge consists of the bodies etc. of those whom we call other persons. These are parts of the not-self, and the explanation of our knowledge of them does not necessitate the postulation of other selves. ³ Anything like personality or purpose we are

2. Cf. Sāṅkara: *na hi śāstram idantayā viśaya-bhūtam brahma pratipādayiṣati kim tarhi? pratyag-ātmavhenā 'viśayatayā pratipādayan avidyā-kalpitam vedyā-veditr-vedanadi-bhedam apanayati* (Sārīraka-bhāṣya, I, i, 4).

3. Nevertheless, our earliest knowledge of the world is as a world of other persons than ourselves. This is possibly due to a projection of our own personalities. Hence the personification common to the child and the savage. And the sophisticated mind, in thought and speech, is more ready to identify itself with material things than with other personalities.

not aware of directly, anywhere outside our own selves. The inference of their existence, though frequently made, has no really sound basis. The only realisation of other purposes and personalities would appear to come through sympathetic rapport. ⁴ This rapport consists in our selves flowing out, breaking out of their narrow domestic walls, and becoming one with the other selves. So that, in the case of other selves too, our knowledge means becoming one with what is known. The becoming one is more possible and more worth while in the case of selves, for, they too are fundamentally the intelligent self, only diversified, not distorted into the semblance of inertness.

It has been said that persons of the greatest sympathy are those whose characters are most unique ; and that sympathetic rapport proves the uniqueness of selves rather than the unity of the self. But uniqueness, it should be remembered, is not repellent. Indeed, the one self is unique ; but it is unique, not as one of many, but as the one of which the many are appearances. The great sage is he who appears unique to outsiders, in the sense of one who seems to be a being apart. But his own vision sees no diversity. He identifies himself with the all. He feels unique, because there is nothing else by him with which he can be compared. His sympathy has overflowed the universe and made it one with himself. He knows the Real, and in knowing it, is the Real.

Philosophically one cannot stop short of the identification of knowledge with the self. Any attempt to stop midway ends in making both of these meaningless and contentless. Knowledge is essentially of the self ; a self that is outside of know-

Hence it is that Saṅkara in the *adhyāsa-bhāṣya* treats the not-self as the sphere of the concept "thou" (*yusmat-pratyaya-gocarāḥ*). See the *Bhāmati*, Srirangam edition, p. 12.

4. Cf. C. C. J. Webb, *Our Knowledge of One Another*.

ledge and has to be related to it, can never know, and is no better than the not-self. Nor is the position made easier by taking knowledge to be an attribute of the self, for, the adjectival relation, like all relations, is unintelligible. It is either identical with the relata or fails to relate. The problem therefore, as presented for the symposium, is a misnomer.

The Self in relation to knowledge II

BY

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The subject of the title appears to me to have a distinctly epistemological bias, and as such I have attempted to approach it from the logical and epistemological points of view, leaving the metaphysical issue as not definitely pertaining to our enquiry.

It is, therefore, necessary for me at the outset to define our problem with the utmost care and precision. We may at once say that we are not here concerned with an investigation of the nature and ultimate reality of the self. We do not inquire whether the self is simple or complex, permanent and eternal or transitory and phenomenal, whether it is a principle of unity or a ground of multiplicity, or whether it has a substantial reality or not. We leave metaphysics to enquire into the character, being and reality of the self. Ours is a more modest inquiry: we ask what relation does the self (whatever, ultimately, it may turn out to be) bear to the processes of experience and knowledge? We assume that there is a process of experience and further that the self is in one way or other involved and implicated in knowledge. These two assumptions serve to define the scope of our inquiry and it appears that it is not possible to get under way without these. Our problem, then, is to bring out the implications of the self in knowledge and experience. But when we thus speak of the self as implicated in the processes of knowledge and experience we are mainly speaking of it as a logical relation and not as a metaphysical entity--this, as we have already indicated, does not form part of our inquiry.

Our problem will become more evident when we examine some of the important attempts that have been made to en-

visage the subject of the discussion. Leaving aside the crude hylozoistic conceptions of the early thinkers we find certain philosophers speaking of the self as a soul-substance or a spiritual substratum. It constitutes the stuff of reality and all experience is inevitably dependent upon it. Individual self, in this hypothesis, is but a mode or fragment of reality. And, according as it is a mode or a fragment, a 'broken light', there would be one substance or many. In the one case it would represent the 'pulseless identity of a Spinozistic substance', with no possibility of independent individuality, in the other it would correspond with one amongst an infinite number of apertureless worlds and independent centres of experience with which Leibnitz peopled his universe. From either point of view knowledge of the individual self would be wholly illusory or valueless. For it would know nothing but itself and its own states whether as substance or mode. Where the self is ultimately considered identical with the Absolute substance or reality the knowledge relation is annulled, and the problem loses its meaning. Such is the line taken, for instance, by Mr. Sastri, for whom 'there is no such thing as the self in relation to knowledge, for knowledge *is* the self'. There is an attractive simplicity in this conception but I must confess that it misses the point of the problem and side-tracks the main issue. We are not here concerned with the problem of the being of the self but its cognitive relations. It may be that the one question involves the other but it will be readily granted that they can be separated, at least for purposes of methodological convenience.

There is another difficulty in the substance conception. It introduces a transcendent entity which is supposed to be necessary for the explanation and possibility of knowledge and existence. But this is only seeking to explain the known in terms of the unknown. A substratum may not be necessary for sustaining the cognitive processes for these may be indepen-

dent and self-explanatory as Hume pointed out long ago. Further, the elements in a cognitive relation are not entities and as such they do not require something different from them to bind them together in an orderly whole. Substance even as a logical postulate appears to be entirely unnecessary.

Another variant of this doctrine has been proposed which suggests that the self is not a substance but a subject of cognitive processes. It is sometimes held that the analysis of cognition shows directly and conclusively that there must be a knower over and above acts of knowledge. The motive which inspires this thought is the same as in the first case viz., to save knowledge from hanging in the air or disintegrating into loose and purposeless elements. We may take Lotze's statement as typical of this point of view. 'The self,' he says, 'cannot be simply the result of the confluence of a number of components destitute of any centre' ¹. 'Our whole inner world of thoughts,' says Lotze, 'is built up not as a mere collection of manifold ideas existing with or after one another, but as a world in which these individual members are held together and arranged by the relating activity of this single pervading principle'. 'This then', he goes on, 'is what we mean by the unity of consciousness, and it is this that we regard as the sufficient ground for assuming an indivisible soul' ². And from the unity and indivisibility of the self follows, according to Lotze, its substantiality. 'The fact of the unity of consciousness', he concludes, 'is *co ipso* at once the fact of the existence of a substance' ³. But this does not follow. It is true that in a sense the self is distinct from the acts of cognitions, but from the fact of distinction the unity and substantiality of self do not by any means follow. 'The self is distinct from its objects not because it is a unity, but because the object of knowledge

1. Laird : *Problems of self* p. 201.

2. *Metaphysic Eng. Tr.* Vol. II pp. 170, 171.

3. *Metaphysic Eng. Tr.* Vol. II pp. 170, 171.

is never the same as the knowledge.' ⁴ Again, Lotze says that apart from the absolutely indivisible unity which is presupposed in any comparison of two ideas, 'the various acts of comparing ideas and referring them to one another are themselves in turn reciprocally related, and this relation brings a new activity of comparison to consciousness.' ⁵ Here a fresh difficulty seems to have been introduced. 'If the unity of ideas compared implies a self distinct from these ideas, then, surely the comparison of the unities thus obtained will require a new and distinctive unity of self to compare them.' ⁶ Thus we should be led from one unity to another in a plurality and hierarchy of selves until we reach the arch-self or may proceed even further into an infinite regress. Of course, Lotze would reply that it is the same unity which compares objects and constructs the whole world but the statement above seems to suggest that acts of comparison may themselves be compared and as such imply a unity at every step.

Now, throughout the argument of Lotze it was considered necessary that the self must have a unity, indivisibility and substantiality in order that cognitive experience be possible. But the net result appears to be that none of these concepts follows logically from the nature of knowledge relations.

Let us now examine another closely allied thought viz, that the self is a cause—efficient or final, whatever—of knowledge. But there is a fundamental difficulty in the application of the principle of causality as it is ordinarily understood, to the realm of mind. First, causality is a conception that is bound up with the nature of interdependent substances, and secondly it is understood in terms of quantitative equivalence (e. g., of cause and effect). But the self as we have tried to ~~show~~ need

4. Laird : *Problems of self* p. 204.

5. *Metaphysics* Tr. p. 170. 171. Vol. II.

6. Laird : *Problems of self* p. 206.

not be looked upon as a substance and hence the knowledge-relation not as a cause and effect relation. Then even to say that the self is the cause of knowledge does not throw any light upon the cognitive relation, for the *raison d'être* of this phenomenon remains inexplicable.

But it may be said that while the self need not be a cause there is nothing to prevent it from being a 'referrent'. We must have an independent centre to which all relation including the cognitive relation must be referred. It is not, however, clear what part this referrent plays in relation to that which is referred to it. Is it to be considered as a mere spectator—a *sākṣi* of the fleeting procession of ideas or does it organise it into a unity? If the latter, then it is not different from the subject we considered above, if not it would be a postulate or an hypothesis of the nature of substance. In any case we may not pause longer to consider it.

Now, from the above survey it is evident that self has been variously conceived as a substance, a cause, a subject or a referrent in relation to epistemic processes. The validity of any of these conceptions would naturally depend on the logical status of the conception of self.

In order to envisage the problem of relation, we may begin with facts which are not in dispute. In ordinary experience we discover a certain fact we may call the datum of the self-experience, and since it is known through introspection we might call it introspectum. We find that various experiences arrange themselves in a certain manner. The self accompanies all these arrangements of cognitive data: not indeed separate from them, and yet it would not be a product of these. Every experience implies as Russell has put it, 'self-acquaintance with sense-datum'. My acquaintance with the world could not be understood unless we were also acquainted with what we call a self or I. The same experience when called the experience of 'myself' or every sense-

datum seems to belong in some sense to an experient. Thus this feeling of myness and the feeling of the 'I' in the sense in which Russell uses it are given as much as the sense-datum. In a like manner others have said that any sense-experience has an objective pole represented e.g. color, form etc. and a subjective pole which is marked by a feeling of privacy. Now these experiences represented by the pronoun I, by 'myness' or by privacy are all given immediately in consciousness like the sense-data. Just as the color and form arrange themselves as percepts according to some principles inherent in them so the other types of feelings represented by I or myness arrange themselves into what is called self. Thus, just as the percepts into which the sense-data arrange themselves are 'constructs', the self, too which represents an arrangement of certain other phases of experience, is a construct. The process of construction in particular system has been given different names. For Hegel it is dialectical in character; Fichte has developed it through the conflict of opposites, and James, influenced as he was by evolutionism, has called it development'. In all these instances the immediate experiences arrange themselves in some order and lead to the concepts which are logically posterior. The self is a construct in this sense of the term, and since it is construct it has its root in immediate experience.

A construct is very often confused with the materials out of which it is formed. I shall call this confusion the fallacy of identification. It is a fallacy which plays its part in so many spheres of mental life. We very often confuse a cue which leads to an idea with the idea itself. In the same way the self as a construct is treated as immediately given through this fallacy of identification. But this is not all. It serves further to invest the self with properties which it does not possess.

The construct self since it arises in the course of experience is employed in most of the systems of thought.

Experience, as we have seen above, involves two phases (1) objective, such as perception of color and form and (2) the subjective, such as one represented by 'I', 'myself' etc. Let us call them A & B. We may say that the two phases are integral to each other in as much as A cannot be experienced without B nor B without A. But it is out of the A phases that the construct self arises. We postulate then that just as B is not possible without A, so it is not possible without the construct self. In other words, the assertion that B is not possible without A, which is a statement of a fact of experience, is translated into a postulate when we transpose A with the construct self and henceforward not only is there a construct self but it comes to possess a special function in the sphere of experience and hence knowledge. It is thus that we come to the postulate that experience and knowledge involve self-feeling. Here again is an illustration of the fallacy of identification. What is true of a phase of immediate awareness is held to be true also of the construct built out of that awareness. But we have to proceed another step. As soon as we reach the position that knowledge and experience are not possible without self we proceed to adduce reasons for it. The properties that are found in knowledge and experience are sought to be explained in terms of self. Thus knowledge and experience are found to be rational. Hence it is the self which must have instituted relation. Knowledge and experience are found to be continuous ; hence the self is a principle of continuity. Knowledge and experience again are an object of enjoyment, it is self then which must be regarded as purposive. Knowledge is unitary, so that all the aspects contribute to one meaning ; it is the self then which possesses the unifying properties. In this way the construct self which has been treated as a postulate of knowledge, or experience is

further invested with a number of hypothetical properties. Self as a postulate then is also treated as a functional unit. The functional self is identified with postulated self, with the construct self and ultimately with the immediate subjective data. We have, here, again, a further illustration of the fallacy of identification.

I must make one point clear. I do not object to the postulating of the self. A postulate serves to define a system when thus we say that there is no knowledge without self we are interesting ourselves in a particular type of knowledge, viz. in a privately owned knowledge, a knowledge attached to a definite and particular individual. We are not asserting any metaphysical truth either about the individual or about the nature of knowledge. But if we treat the postulate as a principle or a law true in the metaphysical sense we are going against the very principle of postulation. In the same way it is perfectly legitimate to posit hypothesis for particular explanatory purposes, but when we treat the hypothesis as true beyond the sphere for which it is assumed or as ultimately valid we shall be led into an illicit conclusion. Hence while the self may be postulated for defining particular systems or may be set up as an explanatory hypothesis for particular purposes it would be illegitimate to identify the postulated and the hypothetical self with what may (or may not be !) be the real self.

The result of our analysis, then, is that the concept of self as we find employed in the sphere of epistemology usually represents either the self as a hypothesis or the self as a postulate and we make it the real self only by receding a step further and by committing the fallacy of identification. Experience, like life, flows on, develops and arranges and rearranges its phases and qualities by its own immanent nature. The immediate subjective feelings like those of privacy etc., are one with the stuff of experience itself. The construct self

arises in the flow or dialectic development of experience. But constructs (in Russell's sense of the term⁸) are doomed in the hands of philosophers to assume one of two rôles. In the first place they are regarded as revealed as a whole immediately in consciousness and secondly in consequence of this they are conceived of as metaphysically ultimate. We are familiar with this fate which overtakes such constructs as percepts. On the one hand we think of things as given immediately in intuitions and on the other hand we are busy assigning to them an ultimate metaphysical status. The self which is a construct is likewise supposed to be given as an Ego or the individual in immediate experience and thereupon it is invested with a status and a role in the ultimate scheme of reality. It must not, however, be understood that the construct is a fiction as Laird apprehends. In a certain sense it is an experienced reality although the whole of it is never given in any particular moment of experience. It appears in knowledge spread over in the series of time. It is grounded in feelings or as Laird would have it as *æstheta*, which gather themselves together through their inherent nature and thus attains a state of relative stability. The construct self, then, is an actuality of knowledge. In itself it is not a mere hypothesis or a postulate of scientific methodology. It is however employed as postulate and adopted as a hypothesis and the difficulties that we have to face arise from the identification of the hypothesis with the postulate and the postulate with the construct and the construct with immediate data, in short from the fallacy of identification.

8. cf. Contemporary British Philosophy p. 336. Vol. I.

The Aham-Pratiti in Advaita.

By

M. LAKSHMI NARASIMAH

Originators of philosophical systems, in the East as well as in the West, have always started with certain basic assumptions on which they have reared the edifices of their doctrines. The fundamental assumption of Śāṅkara is *Avidyā*. But an assumption will have to be justified before it can be utilised. Hence he gives us the *lakṣaṇa*, *sambhāvanā* and *pramāṇa* of *Avidyā*. His most convincing proof is Perception, embodied in statements like *aham sthūlaḥ*. Even like Bradley who begins his monumental work with the statement, "the fact of illusion and error is forced very early upon the human mind," Śāṅkara starts by saying, *Satyāṅṛte mithunīkṛtya ahamidam mamedamiti naisargiko'yaṁ lokavyavahāraḥ* (Śāṅkara Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣyam, Nirṇaya Sagar Edition, P. 16). Our worldly transactions proceed with a confounding of the real with the unreal. Even activities like the performance of sacrifices or the seeking for *mukti* which derive their authority from the Śāstras do not escape this condemnation (Ibid, P. 40.)

The most cursory glance through the Śārīraka Mīmāṃsā Bhāṣya of Śāṅkara cannot fail to impress the reader with the frequency of his references to the *Ahampratiti*. Even at the threshold of his Bhāṣya he mentions it by name and whenever he is forced to defend himself against the possible attacks of an opponent the Ācārya falls back upon it. An opponent urges that since *Ātman* cannot serve as a *viśaya* he cannot be taken as the *Āśraya* of *alīkṣā*. The reply of the Bhāṣyakāra is : The *Ātman* does not entirely cease to be a *viśaya* for we admit his cognition in the *aśmat-prāyaya* or the *aham-pratiti* (Ibid, P. 38.)

The fourth *varṇaka* of the Bhāṣya begins with a *pūrva-pakṣa* which tries to establish the futility of this Śāstra by referring to *Brahma-prasiddhi* and *Brahmāprasiddhi*. If Brahman is *prasiddha*, then it is already known and this attempt is useless. If Brahman is *aprasiddha*, then it cannot be known and thus the present attempt is a waste. The Bhāṣyakāra steers clear of this dilemma by admitting *prasiddhi* for Brahman and by pointing out that *sāmānya-jñāna* or general awareness does not preclude an attempt to know Brahman in detail.

In the *ārambhanādhikaraṇa* an opponent questions the *siddhāntin* as to how the *ātmaikatva* taught by the *mokṣa-śāstra* which is itself *anṛta* can be true. The *siddhāntin* overcomes this objection by admitting reality for the *Mokṣa-Śāstra* till the *carama-sākṣatkāra* or final realisation arises, on the analogy of dream experience.

Again, in the *samudāyādhikaraṇa* (II. ii. 18.) Śankara points out how the Buddhistic conception of *Kṣanikatva* or momentariness is inapplicable to the *Upalabdhy* or the perceiver. Remembrance is possible only if there is an identity between the rememberer and the original perceiver. (Ibid. P. 535).

It would not be hard to draw attention to other passages in the Bhāṣya referring to the *Aham-pratiti* to illustrate the truth that Śankara uses it profusely, sometimes to vindicate his own position, at other times to refute the position of an antagonist.

Though, as we noticed, Śankara and Bradley started almost from the same point, they soon parted. Bradley selected conceptions like primary and secondary qualities relating to the outside world, to illustrate the illusory character of the world, while Śankara indented upon the *Aham-pratiti* which is very close to our inner selves. Not that Bradley has left

this problem uninvestigated, because in the Chapters on "The Meanings of Self" and "The Reality of Self" he has viewed it in all its aspects. He even goes to the length of admitting that he has no objection to begin his book with the chapters on "Self." (Appearance and Reality, P. 553).

Nor has Sankara failed to take note of outward objects. Perhaps he chose the *aham-pratyaya* as his illustration because he wanted to establish the unreal character of bondage lest he should be placed on a par with the *kākadantaparīkṣaka*, thus laying bare the essentially pragmatic character of his system. (cf. Ratnaprabhā II. 1. 14—P. 33, Benares Ed.)

This early reference to the *aham-pratīti* suggests to us a similarity between Sankara and the French philosopher Descartes. Feeling that the barrenness in philosophy was due to the weakness of the starting point and being overcome with a bias for the mathematical sciences which, in his opinion, yielded better results, Descartes went in pursuit of an unshakable basis for philosophy, comparable to that of the mathematical sciences. "Les mathematiques sont des principaux fondements sur lesquels j'appuie tous mes raisonnements" With Descartes philosophy became intoxicated with mathematics. The quest consisted in mercilessly repudiating the theories of the Churchmen with an inveterate scepticism and landed him ultimately on the oasis of *Cogito Ergo Sum*. Self-consciousness was the sovereign key to unlock the secrets of the universe. Thus Descartes obtained self-consciousness as a product of the method of doubt in philosophy, But Sankara never exerted himself to this extent. It first presented itself to Descartes as the solution of a problem; to Sankara it was a self-evident datum.

Perhaps because he had been wearied out in the quest after an indubitable bedrock of certainty.

Descartes did not scan the features more keenly to test the genuineness of the datum which he adopted. It is this want of scrutiny on the part of Descartes that paved the way, as pointed out by Caird, for the phenomenalism that was formulated by Kant in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. (The Critical Philosophy of Kant—Vol I, p. 67).

But though he was conscious of its short-comings even from the beginning (Cf. the word *mithyā* in the first sentence of the Śārīraka Bhāṣya) Sankara did not allow the *Aham-pratiti* to escape from the scope of his purview. He indicated at once that it was an error but developed its various implications. It looks as though he prepared an inventory of the various instances in which the *aham* manifested itself and classified them into various types, showing clearly the basis for such a classification. We seem to have four types :

I. Putrabhāryādiṣu vikaleṣu sakaleṣu vā ahameva vikalāḥ sakalovā.

II. Aham sthulāḥ aham kṛṣāḥ aham gaurāḥ aham tiṣṭhāmi aham gacchāmi.

III. Aham kāṇaḥ klīvo vadhiro'ndhaḥ.

IV. Aham kāmaya aham saṃkalpayāmi aham saṃśaye, etc.

Although these have been given as distinct types, still their inter-relation should not be ignored as the earlier superimposition proceeds on the basis of the more subsequent. (Cf. Vivaraṇa, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, p. 93.) Thus the first *adhyāsa* is possible only if the following *adhyāsa* are conceded.

I. Putrabhāryādiṣu vikaleṣu sakaleṣu vā ahameva vikalāḥ sakalovā.

The instances cited in the *Pancapādikā* in this context are very instructive. If a neighbour dresses up and adorns a man's child with ornaments, the father feels as though he is

adorned. The neighbour also, on his part, feels that he has honoured the child's father. Again, an adversary who would like to molest a king would perhaps capture a small village in his territory and consider that he has inflicted an irreparable loss on his enemy and the king would also reciprocate this feeling. The process involved in such cases is put by Vācaspati as follows : He first superimposes *deha-tādātmya* (Identity in difference) on *aham*, then the properties of the *deha* viz., ownership of wife and children, even like slenderness or stoutness. (Nirnaya Sagar Ed., p. 44.). Another statement worth noting in this connection is from the Ratnaprabhā : It is not possible to superimpose the *sākalya* or *vaikalya* of a wife or a son in the face of a clear knowledge of the difference between himself and either of them. Further this will drive us to *anyathākhyāti*—an untenable position (Benares Ed., p. 62).

II. Aham sthulaḥ aham kṛṣaḥ aham gauraḥ aham tiṣṭhāmi aham gacchāmi.

The Bhāṣya refers to such instances as cases of the superimposition of the characteristics of the body (*deha-dharmān*). Here we must first admit the super-imposition of the *dharmīn* : dharmyadhyāsaṃ vinā dharmādhyāsaḥ kutastyaḥ ? The use of the word *dharma* alone in the Bhāṣya is justified by Padmapāda as follows : dharmasābdastu manuṣyatvādi dharmasamavāyina evādhyāso na deho'hamiti jñāpayitum (Pañcapādikā, p. 35.)

The Bhāṣyakāra indicates thereby that in these cases we superimpose only the *deha* or body as associated with characteristics like humanity and not the body by itself. Otherwise we would have statements like *deho'ham*, which are not current in experience. (See Vivaraṇa, Viz. Sans. Series, p. 93.)

III. 'Aham kāpah klivo vadhiro'ndhaḥ.

In these instances the attributes of the *indriyas* are superimposed on the *aham*. Here also, as in the previous type, the *dharmyadhyāsa* should be understood to precede the *dharmādhyāsa*. But these two differ from the first type inasmuch as they are cases of *sākṣādadhyāsa* while the first is a case of *praṇālikayādhyāsa*.

The Ratnaprabhā and its commentary Pūrṇānandī are clear on the point : kṛṣatvādīdharmavato dehāderātmani tādātmyena kalpitatvāt taddharmāḥ sākṣādātmanyadhyastāḥ.

IV. Aham kāmāye, aham samkalpayāmi, aham samśaye. Here the *antaḥkarana* is superimposed on the *sākṣin* through *abheda* and thereafter its features are superimposed on the *sākṣin*. (Cf. the Ratnaprabhā). Since the *antaḥkarana* is closer to us than the *indriyas* the *adhyāsa* is through *abheda* or identity and not through *tādātmya* or identity in difference. In the earlier instances there is a possibility of the difference between the *Ātman* and the body or the *indriyas* being perceived. But the difference between the *antaḥkarana* and the *sākṣin* is hard for the majority of the people to perceive. Hence this is described as a case of *abhedena adhyāsa*. The distance between the object superimposed and the *sākṣin* who is the *āśraya* of the superimposition determines the degree of attachment that we have for it, the principle being the longer the distance, the less close the attachment. (Cf. Siddhānta Bindu, Kumbakonam Edition, p. 104.)

The foregoing instances refer to *dharmādhyāsa*. Though the *dharmyadhyāsa* is also present, the more prominent of the two is *dharmādhyāsa*. Although the *dharmādhyāsa*, being the cause, deserves to be treated first, still, as Vacaspati points out, since the *dharmyadhyāsa* by itself is harmless and since the Bhāṣyakāra is here referring to *adhyāsa* as an evil to be got rid of, he must first deal with those cases of it in which

its harmful character is more manifest. (Cf. Bhāmati, Nir. Sag. Edition, p. 44.)

We have till now reviewed cases of *adhyāsa* where the *Ātman* is the *adhiṣṭhāna* or receptacle and *anātman*s are the *āropya*s or the super-imposed. It must not be forgotten that as a result of all these *adhyāsa*s we obtain *vyavahāra* in the form of *pravṛtti* or *nivṛtti*. Everything except *Ātman* is *jāda* and unable to act of its own accord. Unless we admit the presence of a spark of *Ātman*'s sentience the activity arising as a result of these pieces of knowledge is inexplicable. These being *adhyāsa*s, the presence of *Ātman* in them can be only through *adhyāsa*. For, anything that appears as a *viśaya* in *adhyāsa* must be *adhyasta* because we do not countenance the *anyathākhyāti* doctrine. The objection that this would land us in nihilism has no point because there is no *svarūpādhyāsa* for *Ātman* although there is *samsargādhyāsa*. (See Ratna-prabhā and Puṇṇānandī, Ben. Ed., p. 63.)

In the course of this detailed reference to a passage in the Bhāṣya and some of the commentaries thereon we have had access to a few phrases like *pranālikayādhyāsa sūksādhya-yāsa*, *dharmyādhyāsa dharmādhyāsa*, *tādatmyenādhyāsa*, *abhedenādhyāsa*, *svarūpādhyāsa*, *samsrstatvenādhyāsa*, *prarasparādhyāsa*. These phrases serve to point out the differences among the various instances of the *aham-pratīti*. Take any case you like of the *aham-pratīti*, the conclusion irresistibly forced upon you is that it is an error.

Again, in the Bhāṣya under the *Samanvaya-Sūtra* an opponent makes out a plausible case for the *ahampratīti* by urging that the *ahamubhimāna* in the body and other things is only *gauṇa* and not *mithyā*. He would have us believe that we are aware of the difference between the *aham* and the body and that we are identifying the two to serve certain practical ends. But this awareness of difference is a gratui-

tous assumption and conflicts with experience. An identification of two things whose difference is not cognised cannot be anything but an error. (Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya with Ratna-prabhā—Benares Edition, p. 187.) Under no circumstances can the *aham-pratiti* be declared true.

But Sankara would not leave matters at that. He realised that the *aham-pratiti* constitutes the fundamental blunder which is supplanted by the final truth. The *aham-pratiti* being *anubhavasiddha* the piece of knowledge that uproots it must also be couched in the same form. Statements like *aham sthulaḥ* are false in the light of the true conception embodied in the statement *aham brahmāsmi*. Even though the *Aham-graha* is an error it continues till the end. Among the *upāsanas* the *ahamgrahopāsana* occupies a higher place than others because it helps us to realise the non-difference between the *jīva* and the *para*. In all *ahamgrahopāsanas* there is need for a *vyatīhāra* or a reverse process also as we notice in statements like *tvam vā ahamasmi bhagavo devate aham vai tvam asi bhagavo devate*, or, *tadyo'ham so'sau yo'sau so'ham*.

The *aham pratiti* is the first to appear and the last to disappear. Strictly speaking, it is beginningless even like *samsāra* and disappears only in the case of the fortunate few who obtain *ātmakṣātkāra*. As *Padmapāda* says, the *ahamkāra-granthi* or the knot of egotism is the *mūlā-stambha* or the supporting pillar of the dramatic stage of worldly experience or *samsāra*. The cutting asunder of of this knot symbolises final realisation.

Descartes played with the *ahampratiti* like a sentimental lover who, being enamoured of his mistress as soon as he sees her, does all in his power to secure her for himself, but consigns her in the long run to an unmerited contempt. Like a shrewd man of the world, Sankara probed into the

diabolical guiles of the witch *ahampratiti* even at his first meeting and keeping his eyes open to her deceptive character, consigned her into the depths of an unfathomable abyss. He admitted that the *aham-pratiti* is indubitable and serviceable as a fact, but also re-iterated that it was inadmissible as a reality.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS.

(*Psychology Section*).

N. K. SEN, M.A.,

University of Delhi.

Friends and fellow delegates,—I deeply appreciate the kind feelings which prompted the organisers of this session of the Congress to ask me to preside over the Psychological Section. I could not possibly say 'no' to an invitation so friendly in its nature although I wondered why the selection should fall on one who had done practically nothing to deserve such a signal honour. It is true I have the advantage of age and experience, having been a student and teacher, however humble, of Philosophy and Psychology for more than a quarter of a century ; but I can hardly have any pretensions to call myself a philosopher or psychologist. But like a poor man who takes a pride in wealthy relatives I can mention a few friends and pupils who have achieved some distinction in these departments of knowledge and this seems to be my only claim to be among you this morning.

I have no ambition to attempt a learned discourse for you ; but I should like, as a student and teacher, to compare notes with you and discuss with you if I may, a few points which have occurred to me from time to time—our common aims and the difficulties which confront us all. I have, therefore, chosen as my subject "The Teaching of Psychology in Indian Universities". I cannot say I have any ready-made views or conclusions to offer you. What I propose to do is to indicate a few difficulties and to raise some problems which it may be useful for us to consider.

The study of Psychology begins in most Indian Universities at the post-intermediate stage. In some Universities, however, an elementary study of the subject is included in

the curricula prescribed for the Intermediate classes. How many of you, I wonder, have any experience of imparting instruction in Psychology to Intermediate students? Those who have, will realise the difficulty of the task. The average matriculate is very inadequately equipped for the study of such intangible and elusive realities as mind and mental processes. He often shows a most amusing simplicity and crudeness of thought and expression. His knowledge of English is too elementary to enable him to read a text-book or attend a lecture with interest and profit. To add to his difficulties, the text-books prescribed are in most cases unsuitable—meant not for him, but for British or American youths. I remember an amusing incident which occurred in an Intermediate class room several years ago. During the course of a lecture reference was made to the text-book, a primer of Psychology. The author, a distinguished Psychologist, in explaining the nature of "Affection", brought in the principle that "life is a balance of opposing forces". He illustrated thus (I am using his own words): "Think of the living body as a lump of jelly, standing on its base, but not standing very firmly". Nothing could be simpler so far as language was concerned. But the students were perplexed. What was jelly? Few knew it, some had heard of jelly-fish; but that did not serve the purpose. A long discussion followed on the nature and properties of jelly; but the illustration remained more difficult than the principle illustrated: I do not say that the study of the subject at the Intermediate stage has been entirely unprofitable. On the contrary, it is more concrete and human, and I may say, more alive than Aristotelian logic which it has been almost a universal custom with us to teach in the Intermediate classes.

In the B. A. Pass Course, Philosophy is an elective subject which includes Psychology as part of the studies. The position it occupies in the curricula of the Universities is not

commensurate with its importance and the attention it deserves. The teacher is compelled to rush through the work in about 6 to 9 months and does not get a fair chance to evoke a proper interest in the students. Although in most Universities a *syllabus* is prescribed, teaching is usually confined to one or two set text-books. I do not ignore the value of text-books, and I recognise the help they afford to teachers as well as to students. But suitable text-books are not easy to find. The books that are usually used in our Universities are in most cases elementary works by western Psychologists. They are not only foreign in language and expression but usually in atmosphere and setting. The illustrations are unfamiliar, the details are sometimes strange and they speak of a life not quite our own. The student is not infrequently puzzled ; but he resigns himself to the inevitable. He takes the illustrations and the other details for granted and tries to store them in his mind for the ordeal of the examination. There can hardly be any pleasure in a task like this and he is not entirely to blame if he lacks interest in the subject. There is another aspect of the case which is worth considering. Psychology is a comparatively new science, full of youthful life, the exuberance of which is finding expression in multifarious lines of new investigation and an abundance of speculative effort. There are problems and living issues on which anything like unanimity has not yet been possible. It is of vital importance, therefore, that psychological problems should be studied from different points of view, and hasty acceptance of conclusions should be avoided as far as possible. A text-book, however well chosen it may be, cannot, it seems to me, give an adequate representation of all the modern tendencies and movements. I think I can make my point a little clearer by a comparison. A teacher of Physics or Chemistry is not likely to find the problem of text-books so baffling as the teacher of Psychology. Physics and Chemistry

can now be said to have attained a certain degree of finality and exactitude; controversy, if any, is to be found only in the highest realm of their ultimate questions. The ordinary student can be initiated into these Sciences with the help of many alternative text-books which are useful compendiums of accredited knowledge in these spheres. But in Psychology, as in Philosophy, there are very few topics which have passed the stage of controversy, and text-books by eminent psychologists, therefore, are apt to be partisan in spirit and one-sided in point of view.

You are all aware of the rapidity with which even the fundamental conceptions of psychology are changing; the new schools and their characteristic views, the fresh lines of investigation and the different points of view, make it difficult for us to expect any finality in the conclusions. It is unwise, therefore, to depend on any *one* text-book although written by the most eminent psychologist. A student who has been fed entirely on text-books, particularly on a single text-book, is liable to receive wrong impressions, to mistake a suggestion for a conclusion, a possible hypothesis for an established theory. It may be said, however, that the teacher is there to counteract these tendencies, but the importance attached by students, and sometimes by examiners, to text-books makes his work extremely difficult. Even supposing that the teacher is both willing and able to undertake the work of synthesis and to represent psychology as a living and growing science, the time at his disposal and at the disposal of the student is strictly limited. We should not lose sight of the fact that psychology is generally treated as a branch of philosophy and the University curricula seldom give the science its due—an independent place as a separate subject.

What I have said about the B. A. Pass Course applies almost equally to the Honours Course where, as is usually

the case, "Honours" really means a few more additional papers. The position of psychology in post-graduate studies is no more satisfactory where it covers only a small part of the course prescribed in philosophy and the teaching seldom extends beyond the set books.

I must not forget to mention here that the claims of psychology to be treated as a separate subject have been recognised, in recent years, by some of our Universities by providing opportunities and facilities for specialization in this subject in the B. A. Honours and the post-graduate stages. Students in these Universities can now, if they like, take Honours or their M. A. in psychology alone. Provision has also been made in some Universities for the study of experimental psychology. But so far as my experience goes, and my experience is unfortunately limited to North India, these specialised courses in psychology have not been able in most cases to attract the expected number of students. However, a move in the right direction has been made.

I should like to compare notes with you on a point which occurs to me in connection with the numbers of students of philosophy or psychology. I cannot unfortunately separate the two subjects as in most Universities the former includes the latter. Does the subject enjoy the same popularity as it once undoubtedly did? In my own University and in some of the Universities of North India with which I have the privilege of being in touch, there are signs, regrettable as they are, of a waning interest in the subject. History and Economics, particularly the latter, are now attracting an overwhelmingly large number of students and philosophy classes are becoming thinner and thinner every year. I have tried to investigate in my limited sphere this ominous phenomenon. I have made enquiries from students and the answers received have, I must say, puzzled me. Let us consider some of them. One says, "In these hard days of struggle for

existence, speculation is of no avail". Another opines, "The study of the subject is not so profitable as that of Economics, History or the languages. It is of little value so far as a career in life is concerned". These are some of the observations I could elicit from my students. They are vague in the extreme as you will notice, but they are unmistakable indications of a flagging interest in the study of the subject. Interest in and popularity of subjects are to a large extent determined by the standard of examinations and the importance that is attached to them by the authorities responsible for the conduct of competitive examinations for recruitment to the public services. Students of philosophy have had a grievance for a long time in this respect. Philosophy was excluded from the syllabus prescribed for some of these competitive examinations and in others it did not afford the same advantages as subjects like History and Economics. But these grievances have been redressed in some measure, I understand, in recent years. Leaving aside these utilitarian considerations for a moment, we should seriously examine another aspect of the problem which touches us far more deeply than any thing else. Has the educational or cultural value of the subject depreciated among our students? This will raise a very large issue which it may not be possible to discuss here fully; but we cannot ignore it altogether. I have no statistical information bearing on the point; but it may be interesting to watch the increasing or decreasing popularity of the different subjects taught in Universities and to study its causes. For, I believe, such a study is likely to disclose some deep undercurrents of thought and wish in the student's mind which, treated properly, may give us important results. In the meantime we have to take the facts as they are, and examine the situation as we find it. The average student, it is generally admitted, shows a deplorable lack of intelligent interest in his studies. The

examinations loom so large in his mind and he is so distressingly influenced by their exaggerated value that he loses both the joy of learning and the spirit of free enquiry. The evils of the present system of examinations are too well known to need any discussion here. But can we as teachers absolve ourselves from all obligations and responsibilities? Have we succeeded in inspiring them with a love of knowledge and a loyalty to truth? These are questions which will disturb the equanimity of every thoughtful person engaged in teaching. Why is philosophy condemned as a futile speculation? Why is the study of psychology abandoned as unprofitable? I think the reason is not far to seek. These false conceptions owe their origin to some perverse methods of study as well as to ignorance and prejudice. The study of psychology, I regret to say, has been dissociated from life—life as we live it and find it around us. The study of the science so far at least as our students are concerned is confined to books and lectures. They do not often realise that the real object of study is mental life rather than the syllabus or the text-book. It is indeed true that we talk to them of "introspection" and "observation of behaviour" as methods of psychology. I have even seen a class in which the students have, in obedience to the instruction of the teacher, kept quiet for some time with closed eyes and thought that they were introspecting. But they gather from their books and their teachers that introspection is a difficult task and that observation of the behaviour of others is often misleading. Few students have been encouraged to realize that for the data of psychology they have only to look within and around themselves and that this 'looking within and around' will reveal to them in concrete and understandable form what is dealt with perhaps obscurely for them in the books; that in their daily intercourse with their fellowmen they are brought face to face with principles which psychology investigates. It is

ridiculous, I admit, to expect a young student to carry out systematic introspection without previous training; but every intelligent youth can, with a little attention, examine to some extent the contents of his own mind—his thoughts, feelings and desires. If he cannot, what is the value of his psychological studies? Again, can he not understand, for practical purposes, the meaning and significance of the behaviour of the members of his family, his friends and those with whom he comes in daily contact? Had he been unable to do so social intercourse would have been impossible for him. I cannot believe, therefore, that our students are incapable of taking a true psychological interest in life itself. But it is the pursuit of the abstract rather than the concrete and real, devotion to books rather than interest in life, which makes them dull students of psychology. Imagine for a moment a student of astronomy who has never looked at the sky, or a student of Botany who has never been in a garden, and you will see my point. A living and fruitful interest in psychology cannot be expected in one who has never learnt to take an interest in the life and doings of his fellowmen as well as his own experiences. The problems of psychology do not appeal to him as living human problems and no wonder that he finds psychology dry and unprofitable. What is to be done then?—One would ask. The reply is simple. Divert at least a part of the energy and attention at the disposal of the student from books and theories to human life in its common and familiar manifestations. Even while teaching a book the teacher can, if he is so inclined, refer frequently to the ordinary incidents of every-day life in illustrating his principles. He can also present to his students human problems to which they can apply their knowledge of psychology. This can be done, I believe, if the teacher is not obliged to rush through his work so as to cover the prescribed syllabus within the limited time of a few months. It has been said, and I think

with some justification, that a successful professional man, or, for the matter of that, a trader who comes in daily contact with his fellowmen knows more of psychology without studying the science than even an advanced student of psychology who has confined himself to his books. Our student will perhaps say in self-defence that his knowledge is scientific and that the knowledge of the layman is only practical. He may be right to some extent; but in the acquisition of his scientific knowledge he has, by neglecting the study of actual human life, pursued the shadow and sacrificed the substance.

I should not omit to make here a passing reference to the importance of encouraging an intelligent interest in the behaviour of animals. Our students need not travel far to find them and no special arrangements are necessary to watch them. Most text-books give some account of investigations relating to the behaviour of animals. Some of them are so simple that a student of average intellectual equipment can easily verify them. It is lack of interest here as elsewhere which makes his learning a matter of taking things on trust. He is not prepared to observe and think for himself; but is content to cherish his respect for authority—the authority of printed pages. It is really a question of the attitude of the student's mind; and the teacher's hardest task is to change this attitude.

I have tried so far to indicate some of the difficulties we have to face as teachers of psychology. I have also raised one or two problems which it may be worth our while to consider. But problems are sooner raised than solved, and difficulties are not removed by a mere statement of their nature. I will now venture to make a few definite suggestions.

In the first place, it is time that we recognised the claims of psychology to be treated with greater respect than is at

present shown to it. What I mean is that it may be allowed in some cases to break off from Philosophy of which it has long been considered so long a branch. In the B. A. Pass Course, for instance, we should have psychology as a separate and complete subject having the same position as is occupied by any other subject prescribed for the Examination.

This principle of separation may be further extended to Honours and Post-graduate studies by the institution of an Honours School and an M.A Course in psychology in Universities where, at the present moment, no provision exists for these special studies.

Secondly, a general acceptance of this principle will, I expect, emphasise the fact that Psychology is a special Science and needs a special treatment. No argument is necessary to show that a science, if it is to be studied as such requires, proper demonstration and practical work; but this aspect of our psychological studies has been generally neglected so far. Practical classes in Psychology and intensive tutorial work would, I believe, solve some of the difficulties we all experience as teachers. It would also encourage students and teachers alike to explore the possibilities of the application of psychological principles to our civic and industrial life. Take, for instance, the use of psychology in the art of advertisement. A trained psychologist could, you will admit, devise means of attracting public attention and making effective impression. This is only an illustration and by no means exhausts the possibilities.

I will now come to my final point which has been in my mind all the time—the possibility of an Indian School of Psychology. By this I do not mean merely a band or succession of Indian psychologists devoted to some special doctrines, although that, by itself, would be highly desirable. I want Indian psychologists to deal with the Science from the Indian

point of view. The question of the point of view does not arise in sciences like Mathematics, Physics or Chemistry where the interest or the object of study is not human. I do not doubt the fundamental unity of human nature which makes universal conclusions possible in the human sciences. But the human mind is so personal and human nature is so greatly modified by race and environment that it is difficult to expect Universality to the same extent in psychology as in the other sciences. Apart from racial traits and temperamental peculiarities, the psychologist has to take note of those subtle and indefinable, yet very real, tendencies which one vaguely calls 'the mentality of a people'. All these peculiarities constitute a considerable part of what may be called our concrete individuality. If we ignore them, we miss the reality and get instead a body of abstract generalities. The local colour and atmosphere, the actual environment to which the mind reacts are by no means negligible factors. The Indian School of Psychology should take into special consideration Indian conditions and make the study of the actual mental life of the people its special problem. I don't, however, say that the fundamental, and hence the universal, characters and tendencies of the human mind should be excluded from the scope of its enquiry. I want only to emphasise the fact that the universal, however great its value in Logic, is not the real in Psychology. The Indian School will, let us hope, not only create a tradition of independent investigation, but make a distinct contribution to the Science and enrich it by the results of its special study of the variety in the unity of our mental life. We have only received so long from the West, let us now see if we can give something in return.

An approach to Reality.

N. V. Phadke.

Common sense dechotomises reality into physical and psychical. But philosophy cannot rest with dualism. Every type of philosophy tries to explain the world with reference to one principle of explanation.

Three explanations have been offered:

(1) Mind has been regarded as purely material.

(2) Matter has been regarded as mental.

(3) Both mind and matter have been attributed to a *tertium quid* which is neither mind nor matter.

The first two positions are beset with difficulties. The third one is acceptable from all points of view.

Materialism is unable to solve the problem of secondary qualities. And in these days we know too much about matter to be any longer materialists. Present-day criticism of matter endorses the remark which Berkeley already aimed at it—"There can be no use of matter in Natural philosophy".

Panpsychism spiritualises the universe to its tiniest particle. The principle of continuity is adhered to very rigorously. As a matter of fact it was on this principle that Leibnitz and his followers based their theory. But the panpsychist misconstrues the doctrine of continuity. Continuity does not mean absence of real differences. Continuity and emergency of differences—these are the complementary aspects of the same cosmic process.

One great motive of panpsychism is to emancipate soul or self from the bonds that the determinist fastens on it. For soul's freedom the whole universe is conceived as endowed with a psychic and vital spontaneity and necessity is dismissed wholly. But the "laudable desire to save spontaneity and freedom by denying necessity altogether is to fall into the other

extreme of pure chance". Absolutism, is free from, extremism of either kind. According to Idealism, Nature, as a whole is complementary to mind and has no independent existence. So also, mind is, intellectually and ethically, void, if it has no external world to furnish it with materials of knowledge and of duty. Man and the world, are organically related. Absolutist thinkers do not vainly try to establish the spiritual nature of reality by abolishing matter altogether. They treat Nature as a scene or background on which the drama of spirit is to be enacted. The hypothesis of absolutism, is that reality is something different from both mind and matter. A *tertium quid*, a *neutrum* behind both. The nature of the absolute realises itself in the universe.

According to the Idealist, Truth and Absolute are identical. The Absolute is a whole, comprehensive intellectual system.

Thus there can be no other criterion of truth or thought than the coherence of each judgment with the whole. It is the characteristic of thought to always develop towards a higher unity. The dialectic necessity of thought points to the Absolute, for the matter of that to the ultimate cognitive criterion. The greater the unity thought attains, the truer it is. There is nothing like absolute untruth. Error consists in having lesser degree of reality.

{ — The doctrine of coherence that is founded on the conception of absolute is unacceptable. The absolute as all-realised and perfectly coherent in itself is of no use to us. What guarantee is there that such a perfection exists and even if it does how can we know that our thought is or is not coherent with it? This latter fact makes judgment of truth and error impossible. The conception of the block universe is not valid. Reality as we experience it is dynamic. Bergson is a greater seer of reality, than Hegel.

Being unable to ignore the obvious dynamism of reality the Idealist characterises reality as a "self-fulfilling, self-fulfilled organised experience, thus comprehending in one phase both being and becoming. This is contradiction pure and simple. Being and becoming cannot be called equally real. So Vedanta dismisses becoming.

The stumbling block to the Absolutist is the problem of error. The all-embracing Absolute is truth and perfection. How are we then to reconcile error and disharmony with it? Idealists say—all error and disharmony are made good in the Absolute. Error is error because it is looked from an isolated point. To a larger vision all is truth. Error is said to be the part appearing as something whole or as something else. But the fact of appearance is error. And this fact as such cannot be absorbed in the body of the absolute.

Idealism is faced with a dilemma. If Absolute includes error it becomes a congeries of error and has its perfection jeopardised and if it excludes it, its absoluteness is ruined.

Immortality.

B. N. Mazumdar

The belief in immortality is universal in the human race. From the most primitive stage of the development of human reason, man has refused to see in death the end of his existence and activities. But the belief is not generally well-defined, and in the forms in which it appears among uncultured peoples, it is associated with many crude ideas and practices, which reason in its higher stage discards. The primitive idea of the

soul regards it as an 'ethereal image' of the body', which survives bodily death, carrying with it the consciousness and volition of the dead man. The primitive belief in the life after death cannot be regarded as the same as the belief in immortality, for the idea of eternity associated with that of immortality is too abstract to be grasped by the primitive mind. The Old Testament does not give us any clear and definite doctrine of immortality. It was inspired by the idea of one God as the Supreme Reality, and of the possibility of communion with Him. The idea has a remarkable parallel in the religious thought of Greece. The Greek conception of the origin and destiny of the soul passes into the full light of philosophical discussion in Plato's Dialogues. According to Scholastic philosophy, the soul is intrinsically independent of the body although extrinsically dependent, in the sense that it enters into relations with the body and certain of its activities are dependent on the instrumentality of the organism. One of the oldest and most prevalent forms of the belief in immortality and future life is the doctrine of re-incarnation or the transmigration of souls. In the East the doctrine of re-incarnation became the basis of the most elaborate scheme of moral retribution ever offered to the world in the name of religion, and this scheme of moral retribution is called the law of Karma.

The critics point out several defects of this doctrine. First of all it is beyond verification. Then the individual having no memory of the past cannot connect the punishment or reward with the sin or virtue. Karma itself is incapable of effecting release. It is only through knowledge of the absolute that immortality is attained. Immortality thus is not attained by passing through a cycle of existences. Immortality is not endless continuity of existence.

But this last fact is really the distinction of Indian thought. The blessed state of perfect oneness of truth, love

and beauty is, the Indian mind holds, the essential nature of the soul which progressively unveils itself through the course of transmigration till ultimately by spiritual experience it returns to itself. This is the true meaning of immortality.

Value and Personality.

H. M. Bhattacharyya.

The problem of value to-day has acquired such a large dimension that an exhaustive treatment of the subject in all its bearings is impossible within the limits of this paper. We shall therefore limit ourselves to the consideration of the relation between value and personality.

Several questions may be asked regarding the relation between value and personality: (1) Whether value exists only in, for and through personality, either individual or universal; (2) Whether it is over-personal or impersonal and enjoys an absolute existence apart from and independently of valuing persons; (3) Whether personality is itself a value; (4) Whether all values being pragmatic and relative in a sense, the ultimate reality, as a non-personal existence, is independent of value.

Among the idealists who make value and personality to be co-extensive we may mention Green, William Temple and others. According to Green, all values are for, of, or in a person. Values are personal standards and all other so-called values are but relative to persons. Values are thus wholly in a subject and not in objects, and are therefore personal or subjective. If then individual persons can develop values

independently of the objective environment; much more so, can the universal reality realise itself in and through the individual persons. But to make values personal depending entirely upon its self-evolution and completely out of relation with the environment, is to forget the important fact that self or person is not an isolated unit but forms a necessary part of the scheme of the universe.

But do values constitute the quality or the essence of the divine personality in whom the values are said to be conserved? Green however has not given us any definite answer so it.

William Temple, however, suggests that consistently with the theistic view of the universe, the ultimate principle must be personal, a universal will with a purpose, and the direct object of his creative activity is value. But since value must embody itself in men and things the universe has its origin and growth by way of the realisation of the values which are thus *raison d'être* of the world as such. According to him then value is the essence of or co-substantive with the ultimate reality which is personal.

Hoffding and others give a different account of the matter. According to them, values are eternal and they are conserved in a being which is not necessarily a person. Hoffding's famous axiom is that the higher values are eternal realities having nothing to do with the flux of the temporal world and are not affected by the moral progress of the individual or society. This is Platonism. This theory cannot explain the progressive increase of values and changeful religious and moral atmospheres which the development of religious and moral consciousness necessarily implies. But it is just possible to think of the supreme person as realising himself in so many ideals receiving consummation in his being. The divine being can thus be thought as the person whose

personality consists in the continual creation and progressive consummation of the so-called values.

To pass over to realism. Realists also variously interpret the relation. Alexander does not make value to be purely subjective, nor even purely objective; the typical values of truth, goodness and beauty do not wholly belong to the spiritual plane but are partly determined by the objective character of things. Spatio-temporal order is tending towards the evolution of values. Values are the emergents among other emergents evolve as new qualities in the relation of interaction between the objective world and the subjective.

The entire universe is being led into higher and higher levels of existence. The next higher empirical quality is the 'deity'. Deity is a variable quality. Values are but approximate material which helps the growth of deity and god as actual is not the eternal source of values, but values, being emergents like other emergents, form the substratum for the life of god. Thus it is not god who evolves values, rather values evolve god.

Herbert Lloyd Morgan who is also an upholder of emergent evolution like Alexander differs from the latter. He denies that the very constitution of things is rooted in value. The entire process of evolution is guided by spiritual activity which gives value constitution to it.

According to Whitehead the world of experience is the abode of the necessary distinctions and limitations which are expressed in terms of logical, scientific and value relations. The category of value has its application within the system of events resulting from the self-limiting activity of god. God is not concrete but is the ground of all concrete actuality. No reason can be given for the limitation he imposes on himself.

The American neo-realist Perry takes a wholly psychological view. The essence of value according to him consists in the interest of the individual mind. And personality is nothing but the organisation of interests. To extend personality beyond humanity to god is sheer anthropomorphism.

Coming to Indian thought we find that the concept of value occupies an important place. The question of the attainment of value or *niḥśreyāsa* is connected with the question of the ultimate condition of personality. Nyāya and Buddhism conceive Moksha *niḥśreyāsa* as the dissolution of personality. Sāṃkhya believes in the conservation of personality but holds that it is at best divorced from conative and emotive endowment and hence of all value-content.

The Jaina however tackles the value-problem in a more humanistic way. Human personality is made up of values intellectual and emotional. Values apart from individual persons are fictions of our mind. In Hindu Idealistic realism we are familiar with the concept of Purushottama or a supreme personality who is the home of all that is highest and best. In the pure non-dualistic idealism however personality is a lower category. The absolute and ultimate reality is pure existence. It is no person, personality being the result of *upādhi*. Values and valuations refer at best only to the world of our practical estimation, not the ultimate reality which is beyond reason and estimation.

Value involves a reference to a system of specific limitations including the different orders of relations and a limited agent born of the same limitations. But personality cannot be extended to the unlimited reality whose self-limitation the universe is. The ultimate reality is rather to be understood as including individual personalities as its elements. Ultimate reality is non-personal and hence is independent of value.

The Basic Idea of Hindu Philosophy.

J. B. Dave.

Hindu philosophy is evolutionary in character. The Rig Veda starts with pure nature worship, which personifies the phenomena of nature. Then grew the Brahmana texts where importance is given to the minute details of sacrifice and of ceremonial worship. The Upanishads began to discern the underlying unity of the cosmos. The Upanishadic seers approached the problem both from the objective and the subjective point of view. The ultimate reality as viewed from the objective side they called Brahman. Subjectively the ultimate reality discovered is Ātman. The finite is contained in the Infinite and the differences in the phenomenal world are due to illusion. Egoism is at the root of all that is morally bad and the truly moral man subordinates personal to social ends.

The Upanishads are found guilty of making the destruction of individuality the highest goal. But the Upanishads meet the charge. The Upanishads teach not mere extinction but union with and absorption into Brahman. A river does not lose its essence when it is merged in the ocean. It loses its name and form only.

Then through Jainism and Buddhism which subordinated the metaphysical to the ethical end, Hindu philosophy evolved into the theism of the Bhagavad-gita. Here the doctrine of divine incarnation is formulated for human redemption. The Gita brings the lofty and subtle Upanishadic teachings within the reach of all.

On the Possibility of an Imageless Thought.

J. Sen Majumdar.

By imageless thought we mean pure consciousness, which is not the consciousness of anything in particular. It is consciousness in general. Stout maintains that an absolutely imageless thought is possible. Such an imageless thought is different from subconscious mental modification. But it is difficult to see how the imageless thought is different from subconscious mental modification. In this sense only can it exist. An absolutely imageless thought other than the subconscious experience is not possible. In all conscious thinking there are always images or their verbal substitutes.

Madhusudan Saraswati

and

His Contribution to Advaita Thought.

B. N. Kanjilal.

Madhusudan Saraswati is a well-known name in Vedānta philosophy and he has established his claim to recognition by the great learning and subtlety of discourse that he has displayed in his Advaita Siddhi. Unlike Śrī Harsha who in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* is more concerned to refute the objections against Vedantism like a true Vaitaṇḍika, Madhusudan is concerned to show at the same time how the Vedānta position can be established by arguments. Hence,

like Chitsukha, he uses the positive method in his book, although his trenchant criticism of the position of Vyāsāchāryya and the Dvaita position in general proves him to be a dialectician of no mean merit. He attempts to show that the world-appearances are all illusory in character and prove the truth of the Śruti text that plurality does not exist. He does not make any distinction between māyā and avidyā, and comes to the conclusion that the locus of avidyā is *chit* in its omniscient aspect and not the finite ego or its buddhi. He maintains that there is no essential difference among the jīvas which are really so many reflections of a single being who may be called the Super-jīva. This theory is known as the Ekajīvavāda. In establishing this thesis Madhusūdan relies upon Śruti texts in preference to sensuous experiences. His general position regarding the distinction between saguna and nirguṇa Brahma is that they refer to different stages of discipline attained by men. He thinks that both Brahma and māyā must be held responsible for the world appearances. In other respects his position is more or less identical with that of Vedantic writers in general, but in establishing it he displays a wealth of learning and critical ability which is unsurpassed even in Vedānta literature.

Is there an Internal Perception of Sense Organs ?

Dr. Rasvihari Das.

Mr. Stout has expressed the view that we have an internal perception of sense-organs. Against him it is maintained that no such internal perception of sense organs is possible. Let us confine ourselves to the eye. Stout maintains that we can perceive the seeing eye. The essayist appeals to introspection to ascertain the case. He is of opinion that by introspection he does not arrive at anything which can be described as the perception of the seeing eye or of its parts. We have muscular and tactual sensations in the eye-ball and by a long process of reasoning we may come to the conclusion that in such sensations the object perceived is the eye with which we see things. But an internal perception of the seeing eye is impossible. If we are to perceive the seeing eye we must not only perceive the eye but also its seeing. But these are two utterly different things and cannot be made the object of a single perception.

An Empirical Approach to the Problem of Consciousness.

D. N. Sen.

There are ascending grades of evolution. Matter which is at the lowest level is identical with energy. It responds by mass-movement and also inner changes to reach equilibrium.

Then in the evolutionary scheme life emerges. A living object such as a plant has all the reactions of matter but some new forms of response also occur at the level of life. The responses at this level are goal-seeking reactions unenlightened

by consciousness. The peculiar features of vital phenomena cannot be explained by physico-chemical theories of life.

At the highest level of evolution consciousness appears. It is a function of a structure which is not merely psychical but psycho-physical and appears at a critical stage of evolution where mere life is transcended by the evolution of organs fitted to perform higher duties. "Mentoid" or mind-like qualities are present from the beginning. Evolution is continuous throughout and consists in overcoming the resistance incident to structure until consciousness emerges and in its development moulds the material structure to its purposes for a free and never-ending progress. It is not impossible that body-bound consciousness is not the last stage of the evolution of reality and that mystic speculations about a free soul are not altogether wild.



The Emotion of Shame and Blushing

Sambhunath Roy,

Shame is a social phenomenon. It appears when social consciousness becomes developed, but it is by no means absent in children and in lower animals. There are allied phenomena namely coyness, shyness, bashfulness, and modesty. These have been carefully distinguished from shame. It has been pointed out why the emotion of shame is connected with the instinct of concealment.

Very recently J. T. Mac Curdy points out in the *British Journal of psychology*, Oct, 1930, that among savages concealment is necessary for practices that are potentially dangerous in a hostile environment namely eating, sleeping,

sexual intercourse, excretion. Shame develops in connection with the publicity of these practices. This paper contends this theory of Mr. Mac Curdy by pointing out how the emotion of shame arises in children not from the sense of fear in hostile situations but from the inhibition of the instinct of self-display of which children are very fond. A man gets ashamed whenever he feels that he has failed to overcome his weakness in a situation which demands his self assertion. The instinctive seeking of cover or concealment is necessary for the masking of weakness which wounds the man's sense of dignity.

The emotion of shame expresses itself in what is known as blushing, and a posture of inactivity. It is so because impulses to self-assertive activities being inhibited there results for the time being a state of inactivity. We have experimentally studied the changes in blood pressure caused in a subject put to shame, and we have found out that shame causes a fall of blood pressure. This is to be so for the blushing which appears in the face and neck especially means dilation of blood vessels which causes fall of blood pressure. We may assert that for the time being there is inhibition of the vasomotor centre causing a general fall of blood pressure.

Some Notes On Bradley's Absolute.

By

Jyotish Chandra Banerjee,

I. The fundamental ideas like relation, causalities, substance, qualities etc. by which our normal mind tries to comprehend the Reality are all, according to Bradley, riddled with contradictions—and hence cannot be real—they are all Appearances.

II. The Appearances are not non-entities—they are appearances of some Reality—so Reality is not without the Appearances—for the real to be really real, according to Bradley, must “possess everything phenomenal in a harmonious form”—the Absolute is an ‘all—inclusive individual system.’

III. Bradley's system can be compared with some Indian thought—like that of Śaṅkara and Nīlvaṅka.

IV. A defense of Bradley:—Scepticism is no demerit of a rational thinker—Bradley's ‘Degrees of Reality’, can be defended by a more happy expression as Degrees of Unreality.

V. Criticism:—Bradley mistook the Self as identified with its contents.—His fundamental defect lies in conceiving the Absolute as a system—the ultimate Reality cannot be a system:

Bradley's Absolute cannot be non-relational—assimilation of relation is not the denial of relation—any sort of distinction either external or internal is not compatible and consistent with the non-relational character of the Absolute.—Unity in both the finite and the Absolute being of the same type Bradley cannot call the finite as appearances. — How can the ‘Appearances’ exist in the Absolute?—if ‘transmuted’ and ‘transformed’, they are no longer appearances.—Identity is also, strictly speaking, not possible.

VI. Conclusion:—Reality is One without a second—It is the integral Substance—negatively it is neither a system nor a process.

Was There A Unitary Karma Doctrine ?

H. D. Bhattacharyya.

The object of the paper is to show that there never was a unitary karma doctrine and that at least three different strands of thought went to make up what is popularly known as the karma theory. The moralists fought for the autonomy of the karmic law; the theists championed the cause of grace; and popular belief advocated the possibility of vicarious enjoyment of the fruits of moral action. The present position of the doctrine is that all these are believed together without reference to their mutual relevancy. A fourth view regarding the efficacy of material objects has further complicated matters.

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Mr. H. D. Bhattacharyya has been appointed Treasurer of the Congress and placed in charge of the publication of the Proceedings. Mr. S. Suryanarayan Sastri is the Secretary of the Executive Committee and is in charge of the Meeting Section; he will receive all papers for the annual session and all nominations and resolutions to be discussed at the Annual Meeting of the Executive Committee and the Congress.

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